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This thesis is a case study of a policy and technological innovation in the New 
Zealand child protection system. It explores policy proposals associated with the White 
Paper for Vulnerable Children. In particular, it examines plans to create a digital 
information system called the Vulnerable Kids’ Information System. Proposals for this 
new information system included plans to test and trial a ground-breaking predictive 
risk modelling tool based on an algorithm that would generate a risk score for all 
newborn children in New Zealand, a risk score that would be used to target 
interventions to prevent harm before it occurred. Data for this study was obtained from 
interviews with four elite informants who were members of two panels advising 
government on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children (the Frontline Panel & the 
Scientific Panel), and from an analysis of a sample of ten news media reports associated 
with the news media controversy about these developments. Drawing on the 
Foucauldian analytical framework of governmentality, and concepts from actor-network 
theory, the study explores how the policy issue of vulnerable children was 
problematised and how this problematisation was connected to the political rationality 
of social investment. It also traces how policy actors – including ministers, technical 
experts, ethicists, academics and others – used rhetorical interventions to frame the 
issue. In spite of the fact that the study intended to trace the development of the 
Vulnerable Kids’ Information System, in the end it was the rise and eventual demise of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 In October 2012 the New Zealand government released a White Paper for 
Vulnerable Children (New Zealand Government 2012a, 2012b) outlining a programme 
of reforms to improve the child protection system and the outcomes for children and 
young people in New Zealand. The White Paper highlighted a number of concerns with 
child maltreatment rates in Aotearoa New Zealand citing the findings of a 2003 
UNICEF Innocenti report (UNICEF, 2003) where Aotearoa New Zealand was ranked, 
“third worst out of 27 rich nations in terms of child deaths from maltreatment” (New 
Zealand Government, 2012b, p.59). The White Paper also noted that, “Three-quarters of 
the children killed between 2002 and 2008 were under five years old at the time of their 
deaths, and many of them had been abused or neglected for an extended period of time” 
(New Zealand Government, 2012b, p.59). 
 
 The White Paper proposed a series of reforms including the introduction of a Child 
Protect Line (a single point of contact for the public and frontline professionals to notify 
concerns about vulnerable children) and community-based Children’s Teams that would 
offer intensive, child-centred family support to vulnerable children and their families. It 
also proposed two significant technological innovations: the introduction of an 
information-sharing platform where frontline professionals from different agencies 
could record and share concerns about children considered to be vulnerable to 
maltreatment; and the development and trialling of an automated, algorithm-based, 
predictive risk modelling tool designed to assess the risk of child maltreatment based on 
data mined from databases held within the benefit, care and youth justice systems. The 
database became referred to as the Vulnerable Childrens’ Information System or more 
colloquially, as the Vulnerable Kid’s Information System (ViKI) and the risk 
assessment system as the predictive risk modelling (PRM) tool. 
 
 The technical innovations proposed in the White Paper were significant new 
developments in the New Zealand child welfare system and, in relation to the PRM tool, 
“an extensive literature review found that there are no jurisdictions currently making 
use of, or that had made use of, automated predictive risk modelling for this purpose” 
(New Zealand Government, 2012b, p.76). It seemed likely that these proposals, like 
other sociotechnical innovations, would give rise to controversy and debate. 
Government-led policies to create child welfare databases in other jurisdictions have 
proven to be deeply controversial (Featherstone et al., 2012; Keymolen & Broeders, 
2013; White et al., 2010) and several UK database initiatives had been terminated as a 
result (Munro, 2011). The predictive risk modelling tool, in particular, was recognised 
in the White Paper to be associated with a number of professional and ethical issues 
including: possible adverse effects on professional decision-making, the potential 
stigmatisation of parents as ‘potential abusers’ and undertaking risk assessment without 
the prior consent of parents or caregivers. This thesis reports on research exploring the 
development of ViKI and its associated PRM tool, it is a case study in the datafication1 
of child welfare services (Redden et al., 2020). The data collection phase of the study 
began in 2013 shortly after the innovations were announced by the Fifth National 
 
1 According to the Southerton (2020), “Datafication refers to the process by which subjects, objects, and 
practices are transformed into digital data”. 
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Government’s Minister for Social Development Paula Bennett, and it ended some two 
years later when the proposal to run a planned, prospective observational study of the 
PRM tool on all newborn children in New Zealand was closed down by the incoming 





 Sociotechnical innovations such as those proposed in the White Paper for 
Vulnerable Children are often discussed in the context of an overarching scientific and 
instrumental rationality, or a way of reasoning that purports to be objective and value-
free (Feenberg, 2019). And yet, very often, these innovations are value-laden and riven 
with ethical conundrums. They represent the kind of policy and technological 
innovations that would benefit from what Flyvbjerg (2012) has called phronetic social 
science: a practice concerned with deliberation about values and interests, with 
interpreting the direction and desirability of policy and with articulating questions of 
power, or “who gains and who loses” from innovative developments (p. 33). Flyvbjerg 
(2006a) contends that the main contribution social science can make to the 
understanding of innovation is to explore value-rational questions. In keeping with this 
position, the overall purpose of the proposed research project was to explore the 
development of ViKI and the PRM tool as a case study in public policy and 
technological innovation. More specifically, it was designed to answer the following 
value-rational research questions (Flyvbjerg, 2006a): 
 
1. Where are we going with ViKI and the PRM tool?  
2. Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?  
3. Is this development desirable?  
4. What, if anything, should we do about it? 
 
Reflections on the Research Rationale 
 
 Throughout my professional career as a social worker, and later as a social work 
educator, I have had a long-standing interest in the application of technologies to social 
work practice whether in information management systems for client databases or 
approaches to online learning. This interest led me to become involved as an active 
member of the Human Services Information Technology Association (HUSITA) whose 
mission is, “to promote the ethical and effective use of information technology for 
human betterment” (HUSITA, 2020). One of the goals of HUSITA is, “to advance 
inquiry and research into the ethics and effectiveness of human service technology” 
(HUSITA, 2020) and through HUSITA conference presentations and journal 
publications I have committed myself to that goal. 
 
 When the government of Aotearoa New Zealand announced in 2012 its intention to 
establish a Vulnerable Kids’ Information System, one of the components of which was 
to be a predictive risk modelling tool, my interest was piqued. Especially so, since just a 
few years previously, a similar information sharing system proposed by the United 
Kingdom government for child protection services in England proved to be highly 
controversial and was eventually closed down (see the discussion in chapter three). Not 
only that but the New Zealand government’s proposal for a predictive risk modelling 
tool was unprecedented, a world first, harnessing a machine learning algorithm that, it 
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was proposed, could be applied to surveil and score the risk of maltreatment for the 
whole population of newborn children in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
 
 This development offered a unique opportunity to study a policy and technological 
innovation that was likely to be highly controversial, ethically challenging and, from a 
political point of view, uncertain of success. I also had a strong interest in actor-network 
theory (Ballantyne, 2015) and an emerging interest in Michel Foucault’s ideas of 
governmentality as developed by the English governmentality theorists Peter Miller and 
Nikolas Rose (Ballantyne, 2019). These frameworks (discussed in more detail in 
chapter four) provide powerful analytical tools with which to trace government policy 
and technological innovations and both were sensitive to the contingency and 




 Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
 Chapter 2 sets the scene for the case study by exploring aspects of the particular 
social, political and organisational context of the Ministry of Social Development, as 
well as the preoccupations of the Fifth National Government of New Zealand who led 
the development from its inception until its closure. This chapter highlights key 
milestones in the development of ViKI and the PRM tool. 
 
 Chapter 3 presents a review of literature in two parts: the first part explores themes 
from international literature on the use of information technologies in child protection 
practice; the second discusses national and international literature pertaining to the New 
Zealand ViKI and the PRM tool. 
 
 Chapter 4 introduces and explains the analytical frameworks and concepts used to 
discuss the development of the case study. It describes and defines the key ideas 
associated with the Foucauldian governmentality approach and discusses the 
connections between that framework and the actor-network theory of Latour and 
Callon. 
 
 Chapter 5 introduces the methodological approach adopted for the study and 
discusses narrative theory, especially the analysis of enthymemes, to reveal hidden 
assumptions and arguments in the rhetorical statements made by policy actors. 
 
 Chapter 6 reports on findings from interviews with four members of two 
government policy advisory groups on their perceptions of issues associated with the 
ViKI and the PRM tool. 
 
 Chapter 7 presents findings from a narrative analysis of news media articles and 
uses  the identification of enthymemes to uncover and explore rhetoric deployed by key 
policy actors. 
 
 Chapter 8 discusses how the findings from chapter five and six relate to the research 
questions and uses the analytical frameworks discussed in chapter three to analyse the 
policy process and outcomes. 
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 Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with reflections on the ViKI and the PRM tool as a 
case study in the datafication of child welfare services and draws conclusions based on 
the analysis offered in chapter 8. Ethical issues for the future use of algorithms in social 




Chapter 2: The Case Study Context 
 
 This chapter sets the scene for the case study by exploring several key contextual 
factors influencing the trajectory of the ViKI and the PRM tool. The sections that follow 
explore: Aotearoa New Zealand as a settler colonial state; the economic and political 
circumstances surrounding the election of the Fifth National Government of Aotearoa 
New Zealand; the Fifth National Government’s ideological commitment to a social 
investment approach to social welfare; some of the historical reforms and issues 
associated with the Child, Youth and Family Service; the introduction of the Green and 
White papers by Minister Paula Bennett; and the eventual closure of the Ministry of 
Social Development’s plans for a PRM tool by Minister Tolley. 
 
A Settler Colonial State 
 
 Aotearoa New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy 
based on the UK Westminster system (Hayward, 2015a). However, its origins as a 
settler colonial state lie in the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi) in 
1840 between representatives of the British Crown and chieftains from indigenous 
Māori tribes. The Treaty outlines a number of tenets on which the British and Māori 
people agreed a political compact including the principles of 
partnership, participation and protection that underpin the constitutional relationship 
between Government and Māori. Although the Treaty is often referred to as the 
founding document of Aotearoa, New Zealand has an uncodified constitution and the 
Treaty (and the Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975) is only one of a number of documents 
that contribute to its constitutional framework (Hayward, 2015b). As Hayward (2015b) 
puts it, “In formal terms, therefore, the Treaty principles have legal force, but the Treaty 
itself sits outside the law; the Treaty is considered a founding document in New 
Zealand’s constitution by convention” (p. 134). 
 
 Despite the principles established by the Treaty of Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand 
has had a long history of colonial abuses that grew along with the population of colonial 
settlers including the dispossession of indigenous land, the oppression of Māori culture 
and language and ongoing institutional racism (Durie, 1998; Hill, 2016; Walker, 2004). 
The legacy of that colonial past lives on in the widely recognised over-representation of 
Māori in many negative social indicators including poverty, poor health and educational 
outcomes (Hyslop & Keddell, 2018). Māori are grossly over-represented in the prison 
population, the care system and in child protection statistics. Challenges to this colonial 
legacy and long history of institutional racism did not flow from enlightened 
governmental actors, but from the post-war phenomenon that would be described as the 
Māori Rennaissance (Walker, 2004): a process whereby Māori mobilised the Treaty of 
Waitangi and mounted protest movements to revive Māori language and culture, 
challenge land dispossession and make claims for economic reparations for loss of land 
and other colonial injustices through the Treaty of Waitangi tribunal.  
 
 Within the domain of social work there were also challenges to institutional racism, 
especially with regard to child protection practice, culminating in the influential Puao 
Te Ata Tu report (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the 
Department of Social Welfare, 1988) highlighting racism as a key obstacle to the 
advancement of Māori people. This report led to the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act, 1989 (recently amended to the Oranga Tamariki Act, 1989), described by 
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Hyslop and Keddell (2018) as ground-breaking legislation with “a commitment to child 
and family-centred practice in general and particularly for whānau Māori” (p.4). A 
commitment that was, according to Hyslop and Keddell (2018), undermined by “the 
harsh economic climate which accompanied the neoliberal political turn of the 1990s” 
(p. 4). Instead of the transformational approach anticipated by Puao Te Ata Tu, the 
failure to adequately resource child protection services, continuing institutional racism 
and persistent structural inequality meant that over-representation of Māori in child 
protection services has persisted (Hyslop & Keddell, 2018). 
 
The Fifth National Government of New Zealand 
 
 The Fifth National Government of New Zealand was in power throughout the 
timespan of this study. They held office for three parliamentary terms from November 
2008 until their defeat by a Labour-led coalition government in October 2017. The 
National Party has often been described as a conservative or liberal-conservative party 
with core values including “individual freedom, the centrality of property rights and 
private enterprise in the economy, discomfort with social and moral reform, (and) the 
importance of the family as the fundamental social unit” (James, 2015, p. 221). It has 
also been described as essentially pragmatic and “the antithesis of radical change” 
(James, 2015, p. 224). 
 
 The Fifth National Government came to power on the heels of the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 and a subsequent recession, both of which were used to legitimise 
the fiscal policies of the then Minister of Finance, Bill English. English acceded to the 
role with a commitment to tackle New Zealand’s rising national debt and to restrain 
government spending (English, 2009). As stated in his 2009 budget speech, “Ten years 
of economic growth and expansive appetites for debt and Government spending have 
ended. Today we have outlined the challenge to rebalance the economy from debt and 
consumption to investment and exports” (English, 2009). This macro-economic 
background was to have profound consequences for the direction of social welfare in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and, as we will discover in chapter nine, motivated 
governmental interest in the datafication of child welfare services in several countries 
(Jørgensen et al., 2021). 
 
Social Policy as Social Investment 
 
 The Fifth National Government was committed to a vision of a social investment 
approach to social welfare. This vision differed markedly from European approaches to 
social investment (Boston & Gill, 2017) that were founded on assumptions about 
strategic investments in universal provision (Morel et al., 2012). The model espoused 
by National was characterised by a strong preference for selectivism and an emphasis on 
careful, targeted investments now to reduce the future financial liability of the state 
(Baker & Cooper, 2018). The Aotearoa New Zealand social investment approach was 
also enabled by a sophisticated technological capability in the form of the Integrated 
Data Infrastructure: a massive research database holding de-identified, longitudinal 
microdata on the population drawn from a series of linked government databases and 
surveys (Social Investment Agency, 2017). Baker and Cooper (2018) argued that the 
distinctive features of the New Zealand approach to social investment included a focus 
on fiscal outcomes rather than social outcomes and that government was wed to the 
“practices and politics of data driven governance” (p.429). 
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 The Fifth National Government’s approach to social investment was an overarching 
political rationality made possible by the contemporary technological affordances of big 
data, machine learning and predictive risk modelling. These affordances offered 
government an alluring way to implement their vision of highly targeted, future oriented 
interventions. Indeed, the critical link between big data, predictive analytics and the 
social investment approach to policy was described in detail in a paper by the Prime 
Minister’s Chief Science Adviser (Gluckman, 2017). 
 
The Child Youth and Family Service 
 
 For several years before the election of the Fifth National Government, the Child 
Youth and Family Service (CYFS) (a central government child protection agency in 
Aotearoa New Zealand) had been subject to repeated crises in public confidence 
generated by media attention to child homicides, a Ministerial review and a series of 
reforms and restructures (Garlick, 2012). In November 2009, one year after taking 
office, Minister Bennett (the Minister for Social Development responsible for CYFS) 
convened an independent Experts’ Forum on Child Abuse to identify steps to prevent 
child maltreatment. The report of the Experts’ Forum (New Zealand Government, 2009) 
noted the absence of arrangements for interagency information sharing as a barrier to 
effective intervention and went on to recommend that, “Government take the necessary 
steps to allow for data sharing between agencies to happen as a matter of course”. The 
report also noted that all contributors to the forum were “enthusiastic about a system 
whereby each agency could share data to provide a clearer overall picture”, but that, 
“The Forum did not interpret data sharing to require any expenditure on new IT. It is 
possible to share data simply by allowing individuals in different agencies to talk to 
each other” (New Zealand Government, 2009, p. 7). However, as we will discover in 
chapters six, seven and eight; this may not have been the response that the Minister was 
seeking. Two years later, Minister Bennett announced the Green Paper for Vulnerable 
Children (New Zealand Government, 2011b). 
 
The Green Paper and the White Paper for Vulnerable Children 
 
 Like other governments based on the UK Westminster model the New Zealand 
government sometimes makes use of green papers and white papers as part of the 
policy development process (Harris & Wilson, 2017). Green papers are issued by the 
relevant government Ministry in order to consult and invite feedback from the public 
and other stakeholders on broad policy directions. A green paper usually “contains no 
commitment to action, it is more a tool of stimulating discussion, but it is often the first 
step towards changing the law” (Care and Support Reform, 2009). White papers offer 
more detailed policy proposals including proposals for future legislative change. There 
is no statutory requirement that a white or green paper is produced before the 
introduction of a bill, but by doing so a government is often seeking to establish a 
public mandate for a significant change in policy direction, especially when the 
proposed change may be controversial. 
 
Of course, such government papers are not just passive invitations for rational collations 
of different points of view. From a Foucauldian perspective they are considered as 
active interventions in the public sphere aimed at governing populations by framing, 
representing and problematising social problems in particular ways (Bacchi & 
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Go0dwin, 2016; Foucault, 1997; Rose & Miller, 2010); a point discussed in more detail 
in chapter 8. The White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand Government, 
2012a, 2012b) was preceded by a Green Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand 
Government, 2011b). In its 32 pages, the Green Paper included 43 questions inviting 
comment from the public. Stakeholders were invited to comment using several 
communication channels including mail, email and Facebook. Responses were required 
to be submitted by the end of February 2012 (six months after the Green Paper was 
released).  
 
 The Green Paper process also involved the establishment of two advisory panels 
(OECD, 2016): a Scientific Panel (Chaired by Sir Peter Gluckman, the government’s 
Chief Science Advisor and including seven people who were academics and/or 
researchers) and a Frontline Panel (Chaired by Murray Edridge, Chief Executive 
Officer at Barnardos). The roles of the respective panels were described as follows 
(OECD, 2016), “The role of the Scientific Panel was to provide an academic and 
research lens over the document…The Frontline Panel provided advice to the drafters of 
the Green Paper from providers directly working with vulnerable children”. Two 
members from each of these groups agreed to be interviewed for the purposes of this 
study (see chapter five for the rationale and chapter six for the findings). 
 
 The Green Paper generated almost 10,000 responses that were coded and analysed 
and included in a 166-page Complete Summary of Submissions document (New Zealand 
Government (2012c) which was published in August 2012, six months after the 
submission date. The Complete Summary of Submissions document was published 
concurrently with the White Paper for Vulnerable Children and, as stated in Volume 
One of the White Paper, it was considered to be one of the four parts of the White Paper 
which were described as follows (New Zealand Government, 2012a): 
• Volume I contains the Government’s plans for getting better outcomes 
for our most at-risk children.  
• Children’s Action Plan – setting out actions and timeframes.  
• Volume II contains the evidence and the detailed rationale for the plans.  
• Summary of Submissions – covering the nearly 10,000 received on the 
Green Paper for Vulnerable Children. 
 The White Paper included a series of wide-ranging reforms to the child protection 
system including plans for an electronic information-sharing platform (ViKI) and the 
disclosure that the MSD had commissioned a prototype study by academic researchers 
at the University of Auckland to test the viability of a predictive risk modelling tool. 
 
The Evolution and Eventual Closure of the Predictive Risk Modelling Tool 
 
 In spite of the consultative function of the Green Paper, and the 43 questions asked, 
some of which referred to information sharing and monitoring, no direct references 
were made in the Green Paper to ViKI or the PRM tool. Unsurprisingly, when the 
White Paper was published, these innovative technological proposals dominated the 
media debate. The PRM tool, in particular, was considered by some key actors, 
including individuals who had been involved in the 2009 Experts’ Forum on Child 
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Abuse, to have “come out of left field” (see NEWS_05 in chapter seven). And yet, as 
we will discuss in chapter eight, there is evidence that the Ministry of Social 
Development had been working on predictive risk modelling since at least 2010, if not 
before. 
 
 The Fifth National Government’s experiment with the development of PRM for 
child protection had three main phases. The first was known as the prototype study. It 
developed a PRM using a de-identified, retrospective, dataset linking records from two 
administrative databases: the welfare benefits system and the child protection services 
system. This study focused only on children under two years of age whose caretakers 
were in receipt of social welfare benefits (Vaithianathan, 2012; Vaithianathan et al., 
2013). It found that 48% of children predicted by the PRM tool to be in the top decile of 
risk, became substantiated cases in the child protection system by age five. 
 
 A follow-up feasibility study was undertaken in 2013 by researchers internal to the 
Ministry of Social Development to consider the technical feasibility and predictive 
validity of the PRM tool (Ministry of Social Development, 2014a; Wilson et al., 2015). 
This study was also retrospective but included data on all newborn children in New 
Zealand examining outcomes up to age five years. It drew on data from five linked 
administrative databases: the welfare benefits system; the child protection services 
system; birth information from the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages; 
data on sentences held by the Department of Corrections and Ministry of Health data. 
The findings from this study, whilst broadly supportive of the PRM tool, were much 
more cautiously expressed, recognising considerable problems with data linkage and the 
use of system contact as a proxy for abuse occurrence (Ministry of Social Development, 
2014a; Wilson et al., 2015). 
 
 Subsequently, in a third and final phase, the MSD proposed to conduct two parallel 
studies: a prospective, observational study that would calculate a risk score and track 
outcomes for all newborn children in order to further test the accuracy of the PRM; and 
a vignette-based user testing trial to test the influence of PRM data on frontline, social 
work decision-making (Ministry of Social Development, 2014a). The National 
government won a third term of office in September 2014 and Minister Anne Tolley 
was selected to replace Paula Bennett as Minister for Social Development. Within a few 
weeks of taking office Minister Tolley halted the MSD’s plans for the prospective, 
observational study but permitted the vignette-based user testing trial to proceed. No 
public announcement was made about this intervention until July 2015, eight months 
after the decision had been taken and only following renewed media interest in the 
issue. Minister Tolley released an image of an MSD internal document to the press on 
which she had scribbled the notes – in relation to the prospective, observational study – 











Table 1: Timeline of ViKI and PRM events 
Year Event 
2008 November: Election of Fifth National Government. Paula Bennett becomes Minister 
for Social Development. 
2009 November: Expert Panel on Child Abuse meets and reports 
 
2011 July: Green Paper for Vulnerable Children published. Call for public submissions 
begins. 
November: Re-election of Fifth National Government. 
2012 February: Green Paper consultation ends with almost 10,000 responses 
July: White Paper for Vulnerable Children published. Media controversy about PRM 
starts. 
September: Predictive Risk Modelling Prototype One study reports 
2014 May: Research study commences 
June: Key informants interviewed. 
September: Re-election of Fifth National Government. 
October: Anne Tolley takes over as Minister for Social Development and in 
November stops prospective, observational trial of the PRM tool (although no public 
statement is made). 
2015 April: Anne Tolley announces a review of the Child, Youth & Family service 
May: Radio New Zealand broadcast on "MSD urged to adopt predictive tool to 
identify at risk children”. 
June: Radio New Zealand broadcast on “Child abuse or big brother”. 
July: Minister Ann Tolley announces closure of prospective, observational trial of the 





 This chapter sets the scene for the case study research signalling important 
contextual background matters, such as the macro-economic influence of the “great 
recession”, the social investment approach to social policy and the history of crises in 
the child protection system. The following chapter offers additional background by 
reviewing the academic literature on the datafication of child welfare and the 
controversy surrounding predictive risk modelling in child welfare. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
 This chapter presents a review of literature in two parts: the first explores themes 
from the international literature on the use of information systems in child welfare 
services; the second discusses recent national and international literature pertaining to 
ViKI and the PRM tool. 
 
Information Systems in Child Welfare Services 
 
 The use of information systems to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public services has been growing in many jurisdictions worldwide (Henman, 2010; 
Homburg, 2008). Aotearoa New Zealand is no exception to this global shift towards 
technology-mediated forms of government or e-government (Gauld & Goldfinch, 2006; 
Gauld, 2003). The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) – the Ministry responsible 
for the care and protection of vulnerable children and young people at the time of this 
study – has had a commitment to the use of information systems for some time. As 
indicated in a 2013-2016 Statement of Intent (Ministry of Social Development, 2013), 
data sharing and the “Smart use of available intelligence” (p.9) are identified as key 
components of the future strategic direction of the Ministry. Garlick (2012) also 
highlighted the commitment of the MSD to using technology in new ways and noted 
that its Chief Executive, Brendan Boyle, “was previously Chief Executive and Secretary 
for Internal Affairs and the Government Chief Information Officer. As such he was 
responsible for providing the government with strategic advice on information and 
communications technology” (p. 300). 
 
 Even before its merger with the MSD in 2006, the Department of Child Youth and 
Family Services had been an early adopter of computerised systems introducing a client 
information system in 1991 (Cunningham, 1996) and a computerised Risk Estimation 
System in 1996 (Smith, 1998). However, apart from articles offering descriptive 
reviews of system adoption and implementation, and anecdotal accounts of the 
reluctance of social workers to use these systems (Cunningham, 1996; Smith, 1998), a 
literature search identified almost no empirical studies on the development or use of 
child welfare information systems in New Zealand prior to the proposed introduction of 
the PRM tool. One notable exception to this is Stanley's (2005, 2007) work on risk and 
decision-making in the New Zealand child protection system. Stanley’s research 
included an analysis of Child Youth and Family social workers’ views on the use of the 
Risk Estimation System and found that many social workers used the system 
strategically, reporting that they completed the fields to produce a result that would 
support decisions already made. This finding, that users make strategic use of 
information systems in ways unanticipated by system designers, is evident in studies of 
social workers in other jurisdictions including England (Shaw & Clayden, 2009), 
Finland (Saario et al., 2012) and Australia (Gillingham, 2013). 
 
 The world-wide growth of electronic information system use in social work 
organisations has not been without its critics (see Devlieghere et al., 2019; Hall et al., 
2010; Parton, 2009). Devlieghere et al. (2019) connect the rise of technology with 
managerialism and the drive for accountability using systems to monitor and control the 
actions and decisions of social workers. The increasing use of electronic databases by 
governments, and the easy sharing of digital information across agency boundaries, 
have led to growing concerns about human rights, privacy and the electronic 
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surveillance of children and families (Devine, 2017; Garrett, 2004; Penna, 2005; 
Wrennall, 2010). In the UK the use of databases in public services became so extensive 
that some commentators depicted it as evidence for the rise of the database state: a state 
where governments have a growing investment in establishing centralised databases to 
monitor and manage population groups (Anderson et al., 2006, 2009). Anderson et al. 
(2009) argued that the database state fused two different faces of government, the 
compassionate and the coercive: 
One is the public services agenda, which formalises our social compassion. It 
speaks of customers and choice, cares for vulnerable children, provides health 
and education, keeps the streets clean and generally seeks to please. The other is 
the enforcing state, in constant conflict with those who break laws or ignore 
regulations. It seeks to exercise coercive control and speaks of enemies, targets, 
suspects and criminals. (p. 8-9)  
 
‘Every Child Matters’ and the Trio of English Databases 
 
 Prior to the academic and news media controversy triggered by ViKi and the PRM 
tool, the most significant debate about the use of technology in child welfare was 
associated with trio of databases introduced by the UK government as part of their 
Every Child Matters policy. These three databases engendered a sustained controversy 
from the moment they were proposed until their eventual demise. Following the 
publication of their Green Paper Every Child Matters in 2003, and the publication of the 
Children Act 2004, the UK New Labour government launched a programme called 
Every Child Matters: Change for Children. This was a pivotal moment for children’s 
services in England and – foreshadowing the rationale for the subsequent Aotearoa New 
Zealand child protection reforms – signalled an emphasis on child-centred services, a 
need for early intervention in the lives of children and families and a push for 
information-sharing and closer integration between child welfare agencies (Parton, 
2008a). Within this sweeping programme of child welfare reforms, new technologies 
were viewed as key enablers to help identify children in need of early intervention; and 
to support improved communication between child welfare professionals. The Children 
Act 2004 was considered to be a direct response to the inquiry by Lord Laming into the 
death of Victoria Climbie (Laming, 2003) and the failings in professional information-
sharing identified in his report. However, others argued that the policy shift was 
influenced by additional, powerful policy drivers. Hall et al. (2010) identified three 
related influences: the pervasive influence of new public management, a concomitant 
commitment to harnessing technology to modernise public services and a significant 
shift towards a more child-centric social policy (see also Jørgensen, et al., 2021, for a 
recent discussion of the common influence of these factors in child welfare datafication 
in three countries). 
 
 Every Child Matters was a far-reaching programme of reform for child welfare 
services that embedded several government aspirations (Hall et al., 2010; Parton, 2006, 
2008a). Parton (2006) argued that the reforms had a dual agenda: to promote the welfare 
of all children as part of a (European style, universalist) social investment agenda and to 
protect children at risk. The most significant change in this policy from previous 
policies was the emphasis on childhood and the child as a central focus for policy 
concern, both in terms of encouraging child development and protecting children from 
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harm. Historically, child welfare policy has always presented significant dilemmas and 
ambiguities for liberal democracies as they attempt to balance a liberal-democratic 
commitment to the privacy of family life with attempts to govern the family (Parton, 
2008b). Earlier child welfare policy often focused on the family and community as a 
site of intervention and intervened in family life as necessary to support children and 
protect them from harm. Every Child Matters represented a significant shift because, for 
the first time, children themselves – rather than families, parents or communities – 
became the focus of policy concern. Hall et al., (2010) argued that this shift was 
associated with a newly emergent social investment perspective on social policy.  
 
 In the UK, the social investment perspective was associated with the work of the 
sociologist Anthony Giddens: one of the architects of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ 
(Giddens, 1998, 2000). New Labour’s approach to social investment represented a shift 
away from both Keynesian economic interventionism, and the neoliberal marketisation 
of everything. It has been characterised as a move from repair to prepare with social 
welfare viewed not as income security for the present, but as investment for the future 
(Morel el al., 2012). The perspective was linked to what was perceived to be the needs 
of post-industrial society for a skilled, educated, flexible workforce and the education 
and development of children as future citizens (Keddell, 2018). The Every Child 
Matters agenda then was not solely focused on child protection, it was interested in the 
development of all children, and the development of all children was a concern for the 
social investment state. Hall et al. (2010) argued that this new policy development was 
associated with a fundamentally different relationship between the state, the child and 
parents. Drawing on the work of Dencik (1989) they contended that: 
when sociologists of the family have talked about the family’s function in 
society, it has usually been analysed as a two-sided relationship, and children 
were seen as part of the family with parents acting as their spokesperson. 
However, this has gradually been superseded by a new development that he has 
called an ‘eternal triangle’, in which the state on one base has a triangular 
relationship with the parents on another base of the pyramid and children on the 
third, as well as parents and children having their own separate set of 
relationships. (p. 399) 
 In the context of this new policy rationality of child-centred, early interventionism 
electronic information systems offered the promise of a technological solution 
(Morozov, 2014) that might enable child welfare professionals to access information 
about children directly and support the government of families at a distance (Parton, 
2012). This new emphasis on a direct relationship between children and the state – 
unmediated through parents – was reflected in the design of the information systems 
associated with the Every Child Matters agenda. 
 
 The Every Child Matters programme was underpinned by the introduction of three 
different databases intended to enable early intervention and inter-professional 
information sharing (Dowty, 2008). The databases were known as ContactPoint, the 
electronic Common Assessment Framework and the Integrated Children’s System.  The 
characteristics of the databases changed over time in response to implementation trials 
and critical reviews, but in their latter form they can be described as follows. 
 
• ContactPoint was a national database or index of all children in England 
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designed to hold basic contact information about children and their parents 
and the details of all practitioners from any public agency involved with the 
child. The system included a facility to flag any ‘causes for concern’ about a 
child’s wellbeing or development. 
 
• eCAF was an electronic version of an earlier paper-based Common 
Assessment Framework (CAF). The CAF was “…a standardised approach to 
conducting an assessment of a child’s additional needs and deciding how 
those needs should be met” (CWDC, 2007 p. 6). It was assumed that its use 
would facilitate the development of a “common language” amongst child 
welfare professionals (Hall et al., 2010, p. 400). 
 
• The Integrated Children’s System (ICS) was a social services only database 
consisting of a series of forms for maintaining records on a social worker’s 
work with a child and their family. The ICS was intended to provide a 
“method of practice and a business process which aims to support 
practitioners and managers in undertaking the key tasks of assessment 
planning, intervention and review” (DCSF, 2008, p.1). 
 
 The Every Child Matters policy and its implementation provoked wide and intense 
controversy within Parliament, the House of Lords, the academic literature, professional 
organisations, civil rights organisations, service user advocacy organisations and the 
news media. The critique of ContactPoint was vigorous from its inception. Critics 
argued it was a disproportionate intrusion into the civil liberties and human rights of 
families and children, that it potentially undermined the confidential nature of the 
relationship between families and child welfare workers, that it involved significant 
costs for unproven benefits, that data security (and therefore the safety of children) 
could not be guaranteed, that the open-ended nature of a professional ‘cause for 
concern’ would lead to net-widening, and that increasing access to information about 
the involvement of specialist services might result in the stigmatisation of children and 
families within universal services (Garrett, 2005; Hudson, 2005; Munro & Parton, 2007; 
Munro, 2004; Penna, 2005). 
 
 Perhaps because they were focused on children deemed to be at risk rather than 
universally applied to all children, debates about the CAF and the ICS were less public 
in nature. They were, however, no less vociferous. Findings from evaluations of the 
CAF revealed that its prescribed structure fragmented the narrative of the assessment 
process, that its focus on needs rather than concerns distorted the assessment process 
and led to difficulties in interpretation, and that – far from leading to a common 
language – CAF users tended to complete the form strategically (replicating Stanley’s 
(2005) findings) to achieve ends influenced by their own professional interests and 
values (Peckover et al., 2009; Pithouse et al., 2009; White et al., 2009). Evaluations of 
the ICS uncovered similar concerns about the disruption of the assessment narrative. In 
addition, there was widespread concern amongst social workers about the complexity of 
the electronic form, the inordinate amount of time taken to complete it, its impact on the 
time available for direct practice with children and families2, the fragmented and 
repetitive nature of the forms and its inflexible approach to the management of 
 
2 Social workers reported spending between 60% and 80% of their available time at their desk 
inputting data (White et al., 2010) 
 15 
workflow (Bell et al., 2007; Broadhurst et al., 2010; Peckover et al., 2009; White et al., 
2010). There were also broader policy concerns that the Every Child Matters agenda 
was part of a wider “political project of citizen surveillance” (Penna, 2005); and the 
emergence in England of a new “preventive surveillance state” (Parton, 2008a) altering 
fundamentally the relationship between children, families and the state. Whatever the 
intentions of politicians and policy makers, their ambitious plans for all three of the 
information systems associated with the Every Child Matters policy was abruptly 
halted. The UK government set up a Social Work Taskforce in 2009 to consider a 
number of matters, including growing disquiet with the ICS. The Task Force 
recommended a fundamental review of the design of the ICS.  
  
 In 2010 the incoming UK Coalition Government decommissioned ContactPoint and 
set up an independent review of the child protection system in England led by Professor 
Eileen Munro. The final report of the Munro Review argued that the English child 
protection system had become “a defensive system that puts so much emphasis on 
procedures and recording that insufficient attention is given to developing and 
supporting the expertise to work effectively with children, young people and families” 
(Munro, 2011, p.6). The report considered that centralised prescriptions for the design 
and use of information technology were deeply implicated in the failings of the child 
protection system and the review called for the removal of “constraints to local 
innovation and professional judgment that are created by prescribing or endorsing 
particular approaches, for example, nationally designed assessment forms, national 
performance indicators associated with assessment, or nationally prescribed approaches 
to IT systems” (Munro, 2011, p. 10). So complete was the reversal in the fortunes of 
these information systems that one academic paper compared the story of the ICS to a 
Greek tragedy in a paper titled, “When policy o’erleaps itself: The ‘tragic tale’ of the 
Integrated Children’s System” (White et al., 2010). 
 
ViKI and the PRM tool 
 
 It was shortly after the UK decommissioned its child welfare databases, that the 
Fifth National Government’s White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand 
Government, 2012a, 2012b) proposed to introduce ViKI and the PRM tool for reasons 
that were very similar to the rationale for New Labour’s Every Child Matters 
programme: promoting a child-centred focus, early intervention and interprofessional 
information sharing. What was new in the proposals of the Fifth National Government 
was the proposed use of predictive analytics to identify children at risk, though this too 
was an example of technological solutionism (Mozorov, 2014). The authors of the 
White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand Government, 2012a, 2012b) were 
aware of the closure of the UK databases. They referred directly to the discontinuation 
of ContactPoint but argued that: 
This reflected, in part, concerns about the security of the database and questions 
about the reliability of data entered (not always ‘factual’, and open to multiple 
interpretations and misinterpretations). The system also placed significant 
resource demands on frontline professionals, in both accessing and entering 
data, and practitioners complained of spending too much time inputting data that 
was perceived to be of little help in protecting children. (New Zealand 
Government, 2012b, p. 74) 
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 This account of ContactPoint highlighted technical problems that could conceivably 
be put right with a different implementation strategy. However, it seriously underplayed 
the political hue and cry generated by ContactPoint in the UK, and failed to represent 
the professional, ethical and human rights arguments posited against the system. The 
White Paper went on to recommend the establishment of an information-sharing 
platform (ViKI) but one that differed from the UK platform in the following respects: 
only children who reach a certain threshold of risk would be included (either because 
they were known to child protection services or identified by the PRM tool); there 
would be a single centralized system rather than a series of linked local databases 
(although the PRM tool would use data on linked administrative databases to produce 
the risk score); privacy would be protected by strict controls around security and access; 
a “common lexicon” (p. 79) would be agreed to support interprofessional 
communication (echoing the failed intentions of the eCAF); and children would be able 
to access their data and have a degree of control over who sees it.   
 
 Unlike the information sharing system, the predictive risk modelling tool was a 
world first and the White Paper recognised that “there are no jurisdictions making use 
of, automated predictive risk modelling for this purpose” (New Zealand Government, 
2012b, p.76). Notwithstanding that it was hailed as an innovative breakthrough in 
preventive child protection practice (Panattoni et al., 2011), the team developing the 
PRM prototype acknowledged the ethical issues associated with it: including the 
undisclosed risk assessment of families by accessing data held on them in a range of 
public sector administrative databases (Panattoni et al., 2011; Vaithianathan, 2012). The 
risk of net-widening, labelling and stigmatisation flowing from the high proportion of 
false positives generated by the PRM tool was also recognised. The PRM prototype 
development team recommended “a full ethical evaluation” (Vaithianathan, 2012, p. 35) 
prior to its implementation and this was commissioned by the MSD from an ethicist 
who was part of the PRM prototype development team (Dare, 2013).  
 
 Predictive risk modelling is a statistical method of identifying characteristics that 
risk-stratify individuals in a population based on the likelihood they will experience a 
specific outcome or event. The result is a risk score. Consistent with the New Zealand 
version of the social investment approach, the idea was that families with high-risk 
scores could be targeted for evidence-based, in-home visiting interventions – like the 
US Nurse-Family partnership programme (Olds et al., 1997) – that would provide 
families with support and might reduce the likelihood of maltreatment 
occurring (Vaithianathan, 2012; Vaithianathan et al. 2013; Wilson et al. 2015). It is 
important to note that, in this case, the risk score was intended to be an adjunct to 
professional judgement (even though the authors highlighted that its accuracy was 
greater than professional judgement or the use of existing actuarial risk assessment 
tools). Also, there were no plans to compel families to participate in interventions, 
although they would be offered a service whether they were currently in contact with 
social services or not. The Aotearoa New Zealand government’s experiment with the 
development of PRM for child protection had three main phases (described in chapter 
two): the prototype study undertaken by a University of Auckland team of researchers 
(Vaithianathan, 2012; Vaithianathan et al., 2013); a follow-up feasibility study 
undertaken by Ministry of Social Development staff (Ministry of Social Development, 
2014a; Wilson et al., 2015); and a proposed prospective, observational study that was 
closed down by the incoming Minister for Social Development in 2014.  
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 The analysis of interviews with advisory group experts who were close to the policy 
process (presented in chapter six) and investigation of the news media articles 
associated with the PRM tool (presented in chapter seven) will inform a fuller 
discussion of the controversy surrounding the PRM tool in chapter eight. The remainder 
of this chapter offers a summary of the issues from the PRM ethical review (Dare, 2013, 
2015) and issues emerging in the academic literature commenting on the Aotearoa New 
Zealand governments trialling of the PRM. 
 
The Ethical Review: An Exercise in Consequentialism 
 
As noted above, prior to the PRM project being shut down, an ethicist, who was a 
member of the project team, conducted a detailed ethical review of its proposed 
operation (Dare, 2013). The review adopted a consequentialist approach to ethical 
analysis identifying both the costs and benefits associated with the PRM tool. The 
following ethical issues associated with the introduction of the PRM tool were amongst 
those identified by Dare (2013): stigmatization, universalism versus selectivism, over 
and under-identification, and privacy and confidentiality. Stigmatization refers to the 
burdens associated with being identified as an at-risk individual or group since the act 
of labelling a family may increase the risk of an adverse outcome occurring. It might 
also increase pressure on families who are already struggling to cope, exacerbate 
existing structural inequalities and reduce the willingness of families to engage with 
service providers (Dare, 2013, 2015; Keddell, 2014a). 
 
Universalism versus selectivism refers to different approaches to social policy, 
distinguishing between universal approaches that make human services available to 
whole populations irrespective of need, and selective approaches that use criteria (such 
as risk scores) to rationalise service provision. The ethical issue here is that approaches 
that target individuals or families are considered by many commentators to be a more 
stigmatising ways of accessing services than universal, or open-ended services targeted 
on deprived neighbourhoods (Danson et al., 2012). 
 
 The issue of over-and-under identification refers to the fact that all PRMs make 
some errors at any threshold for referral. That is, they generate both false positives 
(identifying families at high-risk who do not go on to have child maltreatment 
substantiated) and false negatives (where families who were not given a high-risk score 
do go on to have child maltreatment substantiated). For example, in the prototype study 
described by Vaithianathan (2012) approximately 48% of children identified as being in 
the highest risk decile went on to have a substantiated maltreatment finding by age five. 
However, 52% of children in this decile were false positives. The model demonstrates 
that it is possible, with varying degrees of accuracy, to predict the likelihood of 
substantiated maltreatment, but the issue here is whether the rate of false positives is 
acceptable. There is simply no clear way of deciding an acceptable false positive rate 
objectively and, as has been argued by Narayanan (2018), child protection decision-
makers are likely to have a very different view of an acceptable false positive rate than 
the families impacted by a referral based on an algorithmic assessment of risk. 
 
 Finally, although the prototype and feasibility study used de-identified data, any live 
version of the PRM tool would be mining administrative records from the whole 
population in real time, accessing data for which no informed consent had been given, 
 18 
raising serious concerns about privacy and confidentiality. In spite of identifying all of 
the issues above, and others, Dare (2013) concluded that: 
The application of predictive risk modelling to child maltreatment does raise 
significant ethical concerns. Many of these concerns can be significantly 
mitigated or ameliorated. Remaining concerns may plausibly be regarded as 
outweighed by the very considerable potential benefits of the Vulnerable 
Children PRM. (p. 1). 
 Arguably, these conclusions flow from the explicitly consequentialist approach to 
ethics adopted by Dare (2013). Consequentialist approaches to ethics tend to foreground 
the overall societal benefits of a technological innovation with less attention paid to the 
adverse impacts on relatively powerless groups (Moore, 1999). In an unequal society, 
the burden of false positive identification, with subsequent labelling and stigmatisation, 
would fall most heavily on marginalised communities, especially whānau Māori 
(Keddell, 2014a; Keddell 2019; Stanley & de Froideville, 2020). Consequentialist 
approaches also tend to assume that powerful state actors and decision-makers who 
would wield this technology have necessarily benevolent intentions, and that any 
problems or issues can be mitigated by simple technical or administrative adjustments. 
However, as Moore (1999) has argued – in a paper titled Just consequentialism and 
computing – there are significant tensions between consequentialist ethical theories that 
focus on the societal benefits of actions, and deontological theories that stress individual 
rights and duties. Moore (1999) contends that “consequentialism seems to be insensitive 
to issues of justice” (p. 66) and warns against the danger of the good driving out the 
just, “It may be tempting in some situations to focus on the strikingly good 
consequences of a policy while ignoring injustice. The potential good in (sic) given 




 As the use of computer algorithms has proliferated across a number of domains, in 
both private and public sectors, there has been a parallel growth in critical 
commentaries on issues of algorithmic injustice. Commentators have argued that certain 
uses of algorithms can increase inequality, threaten privacy and even undermine 
democracy (Eubanks 2018a, O’Neil, 2017; Pasquale, 2016; Morozov, 2014). One of the 
promises of algorithmic applications is that they are considered to replace flawed, 
subjective human judgements with dispassionate, objective assessments of people and 
situations. Yet the assumed objectivity of algorithms has been identified as a significant 
part of the problem with their use (Eubanks 2018a, 2018b; O’Neil, 2017; Redden, 
2018). In a comprehensive review of algorithmic injustice in child protection, Keddell 
(2019) highlighted two related sets of issues: those associated with the notion of 
statistical fairness; and those with broader social justice and human rights concerns. 
Both sets of issues flow from the ways in which the administrative datasets in child 
protection are created and the variability, bias and errors they inevitably include 
(Eubanks, 2018a; Keddell, 2019). In strict data science terms, any attempt to use 
machine learning to create a computer algorithm to predict a future event should be 
based on data about the whole population of concern; or a large, randomly selected 
subsample of that population. However, as both Keddell (2019) and Gillingham (2019) 
have argued, child protection datasets do not represent the total population of maltreated 
children, only cases where child abuse has been reported and social workers have made 
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a decision to substantiate it, yet, “Much child abuse and neglect are never reported, and 
many families that are reported may be subject to both surveillance and personal biases” 
(Keddell, 2019, p.6). The issue of surveillance bias refers to the evidence that people in 
poverty are more closely surveilled by authorities and therefore may be more likely to 
be captured in administrative datasets (Keddell, 2019; Bradt et al., 2015). If this is true, 
then this bias, and many other sources of bias (Keddell, 2019), are embedded in the 
historical data on which the algorithm is based. Boyd et al., (2014) argued that, 
“Racism, sexism and other forms of bigotry and prejudice are still pervasive in 
contemporary society, but new technologies have a tendency to obscure the ways in 
which societal biases are baked into algorithmic decision making” (p. 56). 
 
 There is also a problem with the nature of the data included in child protection 
datasets. Data scientists recommend that, when attempting to develop a predictive risk 
model, that the outcome variable – the variable that the model is attempting to predict – 
is valid, reliable and objective. The idea being that the computer algorithm can search 
databases to detect other variables – the predictor variables – most likely to be 
associated with the outcome variable and then use this data to predict the risk that the 
outcome variable will occur in future cases. In a health context both the outcome 
variable (for example cardiac arrest or stroke) and the predictor variables (for example 
age, weight, history of smoking, family history, blood pressure and laboratory results of 
blood tests) tend to be based on objective, observable and measurable factors. However, 
in the context of child maltreatment the outcome variables can be far more subjective 
and the predictor variables less about the characteristics of individuals and more about 
their membership of certain population groups. For example, in the New Zealand 
prototype study, the outcome variable was child maltreatment which the researchers 
defined as “a substantiated finding of emotional, physical or sexual abuse or neglect by 
age 5” (Vaithainathan, 2012, p.3). In other words, the outcome variable was a human 
decision that one of four different categories of maltreatment had occurred. Keddell 
(2019) discussed the evidence from many sources that decision-making in the child 
protection field (including decisions to refer, decisions to substantiate maltreatment or 
decisions to remove children) are profoundly influenced by factors other than the 
objective facts of the case or identifiable characteristics of the families involved. These 
other factors include the location of the site office, the values and beliefs of the social 
worker, the social worker’s level of experience, subjective perceptions of risk, available 
resources and office cultures (Bywaters et al., 2018; Davidson-Arad & Benbenishty, 
2016; Fluke et al., 2016, Keddell, 2014b). Keddell (2019) concluded that: 
statistical prediction tools that use decision points from the child protection 
system as the outcome the tool is trained on will reflect, and lend reification to, 
the many elements that contribute to system contact that have little to do with 
child abuse, and more to do with inequalities, individual practitioner values, 
location, decision making variability and service supply and demand factors. (p. 
281) 
 In addition, the predictor variables derived from child protection databases tend to 
be based on family members being part of population groups – for example, people in 
receipt of welfare benefits, or having a caregiver with a care history (Wilson et al., 
2015) – rather than on their own individual characteristics or merits.  The use of group-
linked data to produce generalisations and profiles about the future behaviour of 
individuals, such as the probability that they will maltreat their child, is ethically 
problematic (Vedder, 1999). This practice conflates group risk with personal risk and, 
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“challenges the right to non-discrimination for individuals, as they are judged based 
essentially on their statistical similarities to others” (Keddell, 2019, p. 15). Put simply, 
allocating risk scores on the basis of membership of certain population groups is closely 
linked to “stereotyping and wrongful discrimination on the basis of stereotypes” 




 The literature review in this chapter situates this study in the context of prior work 
on child welfare datafication. It makes particular note of the controversy surrounding 
the trio of databases associated with the UK government’s Every Child Matters 
initiative, databases that were closed down just prior to the proposals for electronic 
information-sharing and predictive risk modelling included in the White Paper for 
Vulnerable Children (New Zealand Government, 2012a; 2012b). It also reviews more 
recent literature exploring the Aotearoa New Zealand government’s proposals, for a 
population-wide, predictive risk modelling tool to risk score families for the risk of 
maltreatment, a literature that highlights the assumed benefits, the technical problems 
and the ethical risks of the tool. Next, before moving to an account of the methodology 
and finding of this study, the following chapter describes the analytical frameworks 








 This chapter describes two related analytical frameworks that inform and underlie 
this study. The frameworks are, firstly, the governmentality thesis introduced by Michel 
Foucault (1997) and further developed by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (Miller & 
Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 2010), and secondly, actor-network theory as developed by 
Bruno Latour (1987), Michel Callon (1986) and colleagues. Governmentality is the 
primary analytical framework informing the study but some complementary concepts 
from actor-network theory, with its emphasis on sociotechnical innovation, will also be 
applied. The governmentality approach is based on Foucault’s genealogical analysis of 
the complex nature of political power and governmental attempts to manage populations 
in advanced industrial societies (Foucault, 1997). It highlights the ways in which 
political rationalities connect with technologies of government, forms of knowledge and 
expertise to enact governmental policies and programmes. It therefore has an excellent 
fit with a case study of a public policy innovation aimed at harnessing the potential of 
new technologies and data science to reduce child maltreatment. Actor-network theory 
is an approach to the analysis of sociotechnical systems that grew out of the sociology 
of science and technology (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). It is an approach designed to 
study technological innovation and emphasises the ways in which human and 
nonhuman actors are enrolled in complex, heterogenous, sociotechnical networks (Law, 
2009). Although they have differences in emphasis, both governmentality and actor-
network theory share common views on the complex, networked nature of power 
(Matthewman, 2014) and on the uncertainty of success of attempts by actors to 




 The concept of governmentality, first articulated by Foucault (1997), was developed 
to explain how modern liberal democratic governments attempt to intervene in 
populations to achieve their desired goals. Importantly, governmentality was considered 
to be the way political liberalism attempted to resolve a central paradox of the liberal 
democratic state: how to govern the population without resorting to excessive state 
intervention. 
Foucault suggests that liberalism is not so much a substantive doctrine of how to 
govern. Rather, it is an art of governing that arises as a critique of excessive 
government—a search for a technology of government that can address the 
recurrent complaint that authorities are governing too much. (Rose et al., p. 84) 
 At the heart of the concept of governmentality is an attempt to explicate how the 
modern state governed populations less directly, governing at a distance, by harnessing 
combinations of knowledge, power and technology. Population, as an object of 
governance, could be rendered knowable and governable by the application of 
techniques. Governmentality, as Foucault described it, was to be “understood in the 
broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human behavior. Government of 
children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of a state, 
or of oneself” (Foucault 1997, p. 82). Central to governmentality, and historically new 
forms of political power in liberal democracies (Rose & Miller, 2010), was the 
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deployment of knowledge and expertise (including, in the context of this study, the 
claims to expertise of a diverse range of authorities such as paediatricians, social 
workers, health economists, data scientists and ethicists). As stated by Rose, in an 
interview with McKinlay (2017), “states could govern only on the basis of the 
emergence of those authorities who base their claim to manage individual and collective 
lives on forms of expertise grounded in knowledge” (p. 211). In so far as the concern of 
these governmental and non-governmental authorities was to “conduct the conduct of 
others” (McKinlay, 2017, p. 212), and to the extent that they became imbricated with 
the state apparatus – had powers formalised in legislation and embedded in 
administrative structures and processes – then they were implicated in governing 
populations.  
 
 For Rose and Miller (2010) governmentality was fundamentally about two 
interconnected categories: political rationalities or ways of thinking about the objects of 
governance; and technologies of governance designed to give effect to political 
rationalities. Political rationalities “are characterised by three core features: they are 
moral in the sense that they are normative, they are epistemological in the sense that 
they articulate and construct certain objects of government, and they are linguistic in the 
sense that they mobilise the apparatus of language to render reality thinkable” 
(Cornellison, 2018, p 129). 
 
 In the context of this study, and as indicated in chapter two, the Fifth National 
Government of Aotearoa New Zealand had adopted a social investment approach to 
policy as an explicit political rationality with a particular style of thinking about the 
objects of governance characterised by a strong preference for selectivism and an 
emphasis on careful, targeted investments now to reduce the future financial liability of 
the state (Baker & Cooper, 2018). Technologies of governance give effect to political 
rationalities and can range from established, mundane and simple techniques such as 
interviews, case records, examinations, and manuals; to newer, emerging technologies 
of the digital age, including the use of big data and machine learning algorithms. 
Political rationalities and technologies of governance combine in the form of 
programmes of government, or structured attempts to intervene in the social body in 
order to tackle recalcitrant social problems or issues, such as offending behaviour or 
child maltreatment. Programmes of government “do not only express wishes and 
intentions, but define an implicit knowledge” (Lemke, 1997, cited by Cornellison, 2018, 
p. 130) and are therefore linked to expertise: 
The programmatic is the realm of designs put forward by philosophers, political 
economists, physiocrats and philanthropists, government reports, committees of 
inquiry, White Papers, proposals and counterproposals by organizations of 
business, labour, finance, charities and professionals, that seek to configure 
specific locales and relations in ways thought desirable. (Rose & Miller, 2010, 
p.278) 
 So, from a governmentality perspective, the New Zealand government’s White 
Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand Government, 2012a, 2012b) proposed a 
new programme of government, “to address the factors that place children at risk of 
becoming vulnerable, as well as the factors that protect children from vulnerability” 
(p.2) and set out, “major changes to the way in which children at risk of, or 
experiencing, maltreatment are identified and have their needs responded to” (p. 2). In 
particular, and of concern to this thesis, this new programme of government was 
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enabled by proposals for new technologies of governance in the form of ViKi and the 
PRM tool. 
 
 In governmentality studies close attention is paid to the way in which language is 
deployed to constitute the objects of politics, in this sense language can be considered as 
an intellectual technology: 
rendering aspects of existence thinkable and calculable, and amenable to 
deliberated and planful initiatives: a complex intellectual labour involving not 
only the invention of new forms of thought, but also the invention of novel 
procedures of documentation, computation and evaluation. (Miller & Rose 1990, 
p. 3) 
 The use of language as an intellectual technology provides a way in which forms of 
knowledge and expertise become bound up into programmes of government: 
articulating the scope of a programme, representing problems in particular ways and 
proposing solutions. As we will discover in chapters six, seven, and eight, the language 
used to describe a programme of government can become one of the sites of struggle 
and controversy as different policy actors propose or resist key ideas and alternative 
ways of framing social issues in terms of, for example, child vulnerability or structural 
inequality. However, governmentality theorists do not consider that reality can be 
reduced to discourse alone, language is only one element amongst other social and 
material resources deployed to assemble the programme. Borrowing from actor-network 
theory, intellectual technology is an important resource “in the process of forming 
networks through persuasion, rhetoric, and intrigue” (Rose et al., 2006, p. 89). The 
development of networks of allies is considered to be one of the main ways by which 





 This section highlights several concepts from actor-network theory that complement 
the analytical tools provided by Foucault’s idea of governmentality. As noted above 
Miller and Rose (1990) make several references to concepts from actor-network theory 
adapted to their version of governmentality. This section explores the relevance of two 
actor-network concepts that complement the governmentality framework applied in this 
study: the concepts are actor-networks and translation. Actor-network theory is an 
analytical framework developed in the sociological sub-field of science and technology 
studies during the 1980s (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law et al., 1986) 
where it was used for the exploration of scientific and sociotechnical systems. It is also 
a social theory of the relationship between society, science and technology 
(Matthewman, 2011) with a particular focus on how the diverse elements of 
sociotechnical systems are brought into alignment and held in place or fall apart. It is a 
relational and process-based social theory, and shares many of the assumptions of 
Foucault’s post-structural perspective with regard to the role of technology in society 
and the way in which power flows through networks (Matthewman, 2014). Putting a 
policy and technological innovation – like ViKI and the PRM tool – into place requires 
a diverse range of factors and actors to be brought into alignment. In order to succeed 
those who would advance an innovation must negotiate a wide terrain of political, 
technical, legal, ethical, social, bureaucratic and professional obstacles. Since this 
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process involves bringing many diverse elements and interests into alignment – policies, 
people, organisations, databases, protocols, finance, hardware, knowledge, legislation 
and so on – actor-network theorists have described the process as heterogeneous 
engineering or heterogeneous construction (Sismondo, 2010).  Sismondo (2010) 
suggests we may also think of it as co-construction since both material and social 
worlds – the affordances provided by new technologies and the capabilities of people – 
interact with and shape one another. 
 
 There are three fundamental assumptions underpinning ANT that inform the 
analytical stance of this study. Firstly, the assumption that all entities – whether social, 
natural or technological – are relational in character and derive their nature from these 
relations. Secondly, that relationships between entities can be described using the 
metaphor of the actor-network, or heterogeneous networks composed of human and 
nonhuman actors working in association with each other. Thirdly, that heterogeneous 
actor-networks are brought together, assembled over time and made durable (or not) 
through a process that can be described by the ANT concept of translation, a process 
that describes the work necessary to bring the actors in a network into alignment. So, 
ANT offers an analytical orientation that construes the objects of this study – the ViKI 
and PRM tool – as relational in nature, as embedded in networks of human and 
nonhuman entities, and as assembled and made durable through a process of translation. 
The following sections explore the implications of each of these three assumptions for 
the orientation of the study. 
 
 Actor-network theory thrives on the study of innovation, especially controversial 
technical or scientific innovation. It is during the process of assembling a new actor-
network – when the innovation is being debated, negotiated and contested – that ANT 
studies have most to offer (Venturini, 2009; 2010). Like the governmentality thesis, 
actor-network theory assumes that the assembly and stabilisation of an actor-network is 
a process that is uncertain of success, likely to encounter resistance, and requires actors 
to be persuaded, cajoled or compelled to join the network. This is a process referred to 
as translation: 
By translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of 
persuasion and violence thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be 
conferred upon itself, authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or 
force. (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 279) 
 From an empirical and analytical point of view ANT researchers are interested in 
how networks are assembled and maintained in place. In how autonomous actors are 
enrolled in new programmes of activity and prevented from following their own 
designs. Translation then is about making connections, aligning interests and enrolling 
actors in new programmes of action (Callon et al., 1986). Within the governmentality 
perspective problematisation is the central activity of government. According to Rose 
and Miller (2010), “Government is a problematizing activity…The ideals of 
government are intrinsically linked to the problems around which it circulates, the 
failings it seeks to rectify, the ills it seeks to cure” (p. 279). For actor-network theory, 
problematisation is the first step taken in the production of a scientific or technological 
innovation, “that posits an equivalence between two problems that requires those who 
wish to solve one to accept a proposed solution for another” (Law et al., 1986, p xvii).  
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 Since translation involves an innovation that proposes a new way of tackling an 
existing problem, it always, if it is to be put into effect, involves taking a detour from 
business as usual. And, since translation usually involves construing an old problem in 
a new way – using an algorithm to predict child maltreatment and target interventions, 
for example – there is always an ambiguity: a promise and a risk associated with the 
proposed detour. In addition, there are often different interests at play: for example, the 
interests of the designers and advocates of the PRM tool; the interests of politicians and 
policy makers; the interests of those directly affected by the innovation and the wider 
public. A technology like the PRM tool will only be adopted by policy makers and 
politicians to reach their policy goals to the extent that the detour from business as usual 
is found to be acceptable and necessary. As we will discover, the promise of the PRM 
tool to identify families at risk of child maltreatment required government to agree to 
the surveillance of the whole population of families with newborn children and to 
accept a high rate of false positive identifications of risk. This was a detour that was to 
prove acceptable to some political actors, but not to others (see chapter eight and nine) 
 
 It is important to note that both the governmentality perspective and actor-network 
theory, highlight the contingent and inventive nature of actor-networks. There is nothing 
inevitable or certain about the assembly of new actor-networks or the unfolding of 
programmes of government. Both process and outcomes depend on relationships within 
a heterogenous network of actors who could, at any moment, head off in different 
directions. Both the resistance of humans and the unanticipated effects of technological 
systems can influence outcomes. In the words of Miller and Rose (1990), 





 This chapter has argued that the governmentality thesis, and some key ideas from 
actor-network theory, have a good fit with the purposes of a study focused on analysing 
a government led child welfare information system as a policy and technological 
innovation. Governmentality captures well the way in which an overarching political 
rationality – like social investment – can be made possible by the emergence of new 
technologies of governance, like big data and predictive risk modelling; and how new 
forms of knowledge –such as data science – can be harnessed to programmes of 
government. Concepts from the ANT tradition – such as actor-networks and translation 
– also help to highlight key aspects of the policy process: how issues are problematised, 
how actors are enrolled and how the implementation of a policy is likely to include 
negotiations, trade-offs, and political bargaining. Importantly, for the present study, 
both governmentality and ANT perspectives highlight the uncertainty of success of any 
programme of government. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
 This chapter discusses the methodology for this study and begins by offering a 
rationale for the use of case study as an overarching design frame. This is followed by a 
reiteration of the research purpose and research questions and the data collection 
methods selected (including the approach to data sampling and data analysis). The 
chapter continues with a discussion of my response to questions raised by the Massey 
University Human Ethics Committee (MUHEC) and concludes with a recognition of 
the limitations of the research methodology. 
 
The Case Study Design Frame 
 
 For researchers interested in analysing public policy processes, a central 
methodological concern relates to the nature of the object of study: a relatively 
complex, unique and unpredictable sequence of events (Fenwick & Edwards, 2011; 
Hill, 2013). For this reason, studies of policy processes are often case studies using 
qualitative methods to gain insight into the perceptions of key actors and analyse the 
rhetoric deployed in political debates and policy documents (Hill, 2013; Miller, 2012). 
Thomas (2011a) notes that case study is not a methodology or method, but “a design 
frame that may incorporate a number of methods” (p. 512). The definition of case study 
offered by Simons (2009) has a strong resonance with the purpose of this study, “an in-
depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a 
particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a ‘real life’ context” (p. 21). 
 
 Thomas (2011a) developed a classificatory framework or typology to articulate 
different kinds of case study. The framework synthesises and integrates a number of 
different case study definitions allowing Thomas (2011a) to clarify key differences 
between case study types according to their subject (the case study itself), object (what 
the study is a case of), purpose, approach and process. Applying the typology to this 
case study helps to clarify that whilst the case study subject is the ViKi and the PRM 
tool, the object (or what the case study is a case of) is an instance of a public sector 
project concerned with the datafication of child welfare services (Church & Fairchild, 
2017; Jørgensen et al., 2021; Redden et al., 2020). Identifying the object of the case 
study is important because it helps to place the case study in context, or as Thomas 
(2011a) puts it, “The object constitutes…the analytical frame within which the case is 
viewed and which the case exemplifies” (p. 515) (see chapter nine for a discussion of 
this case as an example of child welfare datafication). Thomas' (2011a) framework also 
helps characterise this case study as a key case study with intrinsic and exploratory 
purposes, an illustrative/descriptive approach and a diachronic (unfolding over time) 
process. 
 
Research Purpose and Questions 
 
 In chapter one the purpose of the study was identified as tracing the development of 
the ViKi and the PRM tool as a case study in the datafication of child welfare services. 
Chapter one also highlighted the value of a phronetic approach to researching policy 
and technological innovations: a practice concerned with deliberation over values and 
interests, with interpreting the direction and desirability of policy and with articulating 
questions of power, or “who gains and who loses” (p. 33). As indicated in chapter one, 
this study was framed with Flyvbjerg’s (2006a) four value-rational questions in mind: 
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1. Where are we going with the Vulnerable Kids’ Information System?  
2. Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?  
3. Is this development desirable?  




 Public policy making is not usually based on observable decisions, made by a 
particular set of actors, acting together at specific point in time. It is, as Hill, (2013) 
contends, better thought of as a “web of decisions, taking place over a long period of 
time” (p. 16). Secondly, public policy making is a political process involving power 
exercised by key political actors sometimes making, or influencing, policy decisions 
from behind closed doors (Flyvbjerg, 1998). As it transpired many of the decision in 
relation to ViKI and the PRM tool were very opaque (see chapter eight), as similar 
developments have proven to be in other jurisdictions (Jørgensen et al., 2021; Redden et 
al., 2020; van Zoonen, 2020). 
 
 So, how do we trace the development of policy and technological innovations like 
ViKI and the PRM tool? How do we follow the actors when they may be operating 
behind closed doors? Ricci (2010) stated that, regarding socio-technical controversies, 
“During a controversy every actor constantly leaves some traces…made up by the 
interview transcriptions, official reports, statistical data, operating and normative 
procedures, and industry analyses and media news”. Molloy (2010) argued that key 
informant interviews are perhaps one of the most valuable sources of data within policy 
case study research since – depending on whether they are policy makers, policy 
advisers or policy managers – these stakeholders can offer insights, from their 
perspective, on the evolution of the policy process. Interviewing key informants, then, is 
one of the methods selected for this study. Secondly, when public policies are 
controversial, as is often the case when they involve the introduction of new 
technologies, then mapping the nature of the controversy and the issues associated with 
any public debate, can be a useful source of data (Venturini, 2009, 2010). For this 
reason, the study includes an analysis of news media articles on the proposed 
introduction of ViKI and the PRM. The two sections that follow will discuss the two 
data-collection methods selected – key informant interviews and news media analysis – 
in more detail. 
 
Key Informant Interviews 
 
 The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews are recognised as an appropriate 
method for gaining insight from key informants who have played a significant role in a 
process such as a policy development (Bryman, 2012; Molloy, 2010). Using a flexible 
interview guide (see Appendix 1) can help give the interviewer (and the interviewee) a 
sense of purpose and direction, whilst, at the same time, allowing the interviewer to be 
responsive to emerging or unanticipated issues. The interview guide for this study used 
the four value-rational questions as their starting point but was also influenced by prior 
findings from the literature on the datafication of child welfare services (see chapter 
three). Initial draft questions were finalised following consultation with my research 
supervisors. The interview guide was divided into four sections that explored: 
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1. The informant’s involvement in the policy process, 
2. Perceptions of the key influences shaping the development of ViKI, 
3. Perceptions of the design of the system, 
4. Future challenges and issues arising from system implementation including 
unintended consequences and ethical issues. 
 
 Although, the qualitative interview is a remarkably common method of data 
collection in social science research, it is not without pitfalls and requires a careful 
consideration of underpinning theoretical assumptions. Silverman (2011) has described 
three broad perspectives on the research interview: positivist, emotionalist and 
constructionist.  These three perspectives differ in terms of how they conceptualise the 
relationship between interviewer and interviewee, and the type of knowledge they 
assume can be obtained from the interview. The positivist interviewer tends to view the 
interviewee as a repository of “facts, reflections, opinions, and other traces of 
experiences” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2011, p. 152), and the interview process (usually in 
the form of structured interview schedules) aims to obtain data about valid and reliable 
social facts. An emotionalist interviewer, on the other hand, seeks direct access to the 
authentic human subject using more open-ended interview techniques to tap into the 
subjective, lived experience of the interviewee. Finally, a constructionist interviewer 
considers the interview to be a practical accomplishment: an account co-produced by 
the interviewer and interviewee that can be considered as a topic for study, rather than 
as resource or window on reality. From this perspective, as Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007, p. 107) put it, “Accounts are not simply representations of the world; they are 
part of the world they describe”. The analytical assumption underpinning this study 
follows the constructionist perspective and assumes that informants offer partial but 
important insights into the key actors and influences on the policy processes associated 
with ViKI and the PRM tool. These narratives are not considered to be windows on 
reality, but to represent a view from the particular standpoint of the interviewee 
(Haraway, 1988). 
 
Sampling Key Informants. 
 
 Purposive sampling is the process of selecting informants and other data in a 
planned and strategic way to ensure their relevance to the research questions under 
consideration (Bryman, 2012). There are different types of purposive sampling but the 
type most suited to the design of this study is what Bryman (2012) describes as fixed, 
and a priori generic purposive sampling: clear criteria for the selection of informants 
were established at the outset of the study and remained the same throughout. 
 
 The original intention of this study was to get as close to key policy actors, internal 
to the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), as possible. Once my research proposal 
had been approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee (MUHEC) a 
research access application was submitted to the Ministry of Social Development’s 
Research Access Committee (RAC), who act as the formal organisational gatekeepers 
of the MSD (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). It was intended that, if access was 
agreed, the researcher would consult with the National Children's Director of the 
Children's Action Plan Directorate (the most senior MSD manager in charge of the 
development), or another senior manager identified by the MSD. The purpose of this 
consultation was to identify six to nine individuals who met the criterion of being: 
someone who has played a significant role in the development and design of the 
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Vulnerable Kids’ Information System. In January 2014 the Research Access Committee 
Coordinator responded to my research access application by stating that the committee 
had reviewed the application and declined access for the following reason: 
The main reason for this decision was that most policy work in this area is still 
in the thinking and talking stage rather than the written stage. Current thinking 
won’t necessarily reflect final policy.  So although you might be able to 
interview some policy analyst on their current thinking and show how this is 
similar or different to that reflected in the green paper.  This will have no future 
relevance to the final policies. (C. Smits, personal communication, January 29, 
2014) 
 Given that the rationale for this research was to study policy process in the making, 
rather than its conclusions (and described as such in the RAC application) this was a 
disappointing response. The MSD decision to decline access meant that the research 
could not now include policy insiders as informants. Following further consultations 
with my research supervisors, an amendment was submitted to the Massey University 
Human Ethics Committee, which led to a reformulated research design. This new 
design retained the data collection methods of semi-structured interviews, but the key 
informants would have to be at one remove from the MSD. To identify key informants 
who could still offer an informed perspective on ViKI and the PRM tool I decided to 
move the focus upstream. At the stage before the White Paper the development of the 
Green Paper was supported by two advisory panels: the Scientific Panel (a reference 
group of independent academic experts and researchers) and the Frontline Panel (a 
reference group of senior managers and executives from child welfare agencies). 
Membership of these groups was in the public domain and a list is included in OECD 
(2016). There were seven members of the Scientific Panel and ten members of the 
Frontline Panel (excluding the Chairpersons). All seventeen members of both groups 
were invited to participate in the research. Five responded, one declined, and four 
agreed to be interviewed. Two informants who agreed to be interviewed were members 
of the Scientific Panel, and two were members of the Frontline Panel. Although the 
sample size is small this is considered acceptable in a qualitative study of a relatively 
elite group who could offer exceptional insights into aspects of the policy process that 
would otherwise be hidden from view (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).  
 
Analysing Key Informant Interviews. 
 
 Once transcripts of the interviews have been made the interview research data will 
be in textual format and can be checked by participants before being analysed as 
different kinds of text. There are many different approaches to the analysis of textual 
data (Gibson & Brown, 2009) but this study adopted a narrative approach. Narrative 
analyses include a range of approaches that share a storied form (Riessman, 2004). 
There are many different definitions of narrative, but Riessman’s (2008) is often cited: 
in everyday oral storytelling, a speaker connects events into a sequence that is 
consequential for later action and for the meanings that the speaker wants 
listeners to take away from the story. Events perceived by the speaker as 
important are selected, organized, connected and evaluated as meaningful for a 
particular audience. (p.3) 
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 The interviews with the four informants were analysed using a narrative, thematic 
approach. Thematic narrative analysis is similar to grounded theory but with, according 
to Riessman (2008), three important differences. Firstly, whilst grounded theory 
eschews the use of prior theory, thematic narrative analysis does not and, as noted 
above, the review of literature (in chapter three) shaped the formation of the interview 
schedule. Secondly, thematic narrative analysts “strive to preserve sequence and the 
wealth of detail contained in long sequences” (Riessman, 2008, p. 74) rather than 
fragmenting the data into codified segments. Finally, although overlapping themes 
between interviews can be identified, thematic narrative analysis adopts a holistic stance 
to interview data retaining the coherence of each account as a case and identifying the 
themes within them. This approach provides a strong sense of the particular standpoint 
of each actor and the plurality of perspectives on government policy development, as 
well as the commonalities between accounts.  
 
National News Media Reports 
 
 When policy actors engage in media discussion of new policy initiatives, they often 
deploy narrative structures to persuade and reassure the public that the policy makes 
sense, that it is the best possible course of action and that it resolves some pressing 
public concern or issue (Czarniawska, 2004, Feldman & Almquist, 2015). Narrative 
arguments expressed in the public domain, “follow logic and a structure that makes 
rational sense to people…and they offer methods to communicate the values of a public 
project and a framework through which these values can be enacted” (Feldman & 
Almquist, 2015, p. 2). Indeed, narratives are a powerful means by which to influence 
public opinion and generate public support for a policy stance (Callahan, Dubnick & 
Olshfski, 2006). At the same time, they also reveal something about the political, 
ideological and ethical stance of the narrator. Exploring the purpose of rhetorical 
analysis, Feldman et al., (2004) have stated, “People tell stories in order to convince, 
and our concern is with the understandings that they are trying to convey through their 
stories” (p. 152). 
 
 Feldman and Almquist (2015) have argued that while explicit narratives can be 
usefully studied, so to can implicit narrative structures: narratives where some of the 
key components of the argument remain unstated but obvious to the listener or reader. 
Explicit arguments often take the form of the classical three-part syllogism: a form of 
logical reasoning that connects two premises (a major and a minor premise) to deduce a 
conclusion. For example: 
 
1) Major premise: All men are mortal.  
2) Minor premise: Socrates is a man.  
3) Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
 
 However, there are very some good reasons why a narrator may not want to make 
explicit all of the premises of an argument: 
First, from the perspective of persuasion, engaging the listener in completing the 
argument makes the argument more compelling…. If the listener supplies one of 
the premises, then presumably she or he is more likely to believe it. This may be 
particularly important in cases where the premise is controversial or 
questionable. (Feldman & Almquist, 2015, p. 210) 
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 Arguments where one of the premises or the conclusion is implicit, and where the 
relationship between the premises is not based on logical deduction, but may be more 
probabilistic or controversial, are called enthymemes. The analysis of these 
enthymemes, deployed in the rhetoric of policy actors, is central to the analysis of the 
news media reports sampled in this study. 
 
Sampling News Media Reports. 
 
 National news media reports on the ViKI and the PRM tool were identified by 
conducting key word searches of the database Newztext3 using different combinations of 
the terms “database” “child*” “abuse*” and “predict*”.  The search was constrained by 
limiting it to the two largest circulation newspapers in Aotearoa New Zealand (the New 
Zealand Herald and the Dominion Post) and searching for articles appearing during a 
three-year timescale from the publication of the White Paper in October 2012 until 
December 2015, shortly after the closure of the proposed, prospective observational 
study of the PRM was announced. The search identified 85 articles that were reviewed 
for relevance with 75 being excluded and the remaining ten forming the sample.  
 
 
Analysing New Media Reports. 
 
 The rhetorical approach to narrative analysis has been described in detail (Feldman 
et al., 2004; Feldman & Almquist, 2015; Knight & Sweeney, 2007) and includes the 
following steps: a) identify the stories; b) describe the story lines; c) identify the 
oppositions; d) construct syllogisms and identify which syllogisms have implicit 
statements (the enthymemes). From the data to be analysed – in this study, news media 
reports – the analyst should first identify the stories. Feldman et al., (2004) distinguish 
the overall encompassing narrative from individual sub-sets within the narrative they 
refer to as stories. The encompassing narrative is “the grand conception that entertains 
several themes over a period of time” (Feldman et al., 2004, p. 149). Stories, on the 
other hand, “are instantiations, particular exemplars of the grand conception. They 
respond to the questions of ‘And then what happened?’ or ‘What do you mean.’” 
(Feldman et al., 2004, p. 149). According to Feldman et al., (2004), “Stories provide 
rich data that express movement, interpret ideas, and describe from the storyteller’s 
perspective how things used to be and how they are, as well as how they should be” (p. 
150). In this study the encompassing narrative is the news media report (with its theme 
identified by the title) from beginning to end, and within each news report individual 
stories were identified. The purpose of the rhetorical analysis of these stories is to 
surface their underlying logic and the narrator’s implicit assumptions. 
 
 In identifying stories within the news media, it is important to distinguish the stories 
from mere descriptions, which Feldman et al., (2004) have defined as “a list without a 
plot”. Once the stories are identified analysis can proceed in three steps. Firstly, 
identifying the storyline, the basic point (or points) that the story is being used to make. 
Secondly, identification of the main oppositions (implicit or explicit) within the story: 
arguments often contrast two differing perspectives and identifying these oppositions 




2015). Thirdly, the arguments being made within the story are represented as a 
syllogism or enthymeme. In the case of an enthymeme – a syllogism where there is a 
missing part or where a part is probabilistic rather than logically binding – the analyst 
infers the missing part and includes it in a complete enthymeme using a notation to 
distinguish the implicit parts (in the case of this study the implicit statements are 
identified using capital case). This rhetorical approach to narrative analysis is an 
interpretive one, involving the analyst in making choices “to include some things and 
exclude others and to view the world in a particular way when other visions are 
possible” (Stone, 1988, p. 306). Although, the implicit parts are inferred, giving readers 
access to the original content, along with the analyst’s interpretation, makes the 
interpretive process more transparent and allows readers to decide whether the 
inferences made are reasonable or not. The news media findings in chapter seven 
include web links to the full news media articles. 
 
One final consideration with regard to a rhetorical approach to narrative analysis has 
been highlighted by Gottweis (2006, 2007) who draws attention to fact that, whilst 
many commentators consider argumentation to be principally a matter of rationality, 
classical Aristotelian rhetorical analysis recognises three modes of argumentation: these 
are logos, ethos and pathos. According to Gottweis (2006), “In the Aristotelian 
tradition, logos instructs and applies reason, ethos refers to the ‘morality’ of the speaker, 
and pathos has the function to move and refers to the passions” (p. 476). As we will 
discover, all three argumentative strategies were evident in debates about ViKI and the 
PRM tool. It is important to note that the point in making this distinction is not to 
privilege logos, or the rational, over other modes of argumentation, but to recognise 





 In accordance with the Massey University’s Code of Ethical Conduct for research 
involving human participants (Massey University, 2014) a human research ethics 
application for this study was submitted to the Massey University Human Ethics 
Committee (MUHEC) and approved in August 2013 (HEC: Southern B Application 
13/61). Following, notification from MSD Research Access Committee that access 
was declined an amended ethics application was submitted to MUHEC. The main 
amendment was the change in the target group of interview informants from MSD 
insiders to members of the two advisory panels to the Green Paper: the Scientific 
Panel and the Frontline Panel.  
 
 In response to this amended application the MUHEC had three main questions: 
firstly, what was the method by which the researcher would gain access to the names 
and contact details of the member of the two advisory panels; secondly, was it necessary 
to seek permission from the employing organisations of potential informants; and 
thirdly, was there potential for the researcher to end up with privileged knowledge from 
the interviews that may be of professional or commercial benefit in the future. In 
response to the concerns raised I clarified that the full names and contact details of 
all members of the two advisory panels was a matter of public record and available 
on the open internet (OECD, 2016). Secondly, that permission would not need to 
be sought from employers since the informants were being recruited as individuals 
with expertise who had served on a government advisory committee, not because 
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of their current role in a particular organisation. Finally, in relation to the issue of 
any professional or commercial benefit the researcher might gain from the study, I 
responded that the answers to the questions posed during the interviews were intended 
to illuminate policy processes associated with the development of the technological 
developments recommended in the White Paper. However, although there may be 
professional and public interest in this data, there was no conceivable way in which the 
findings could be turned to the commercial advantage of the researcher. Since it was the 
intention of the researcher to publish the findings and disseminate them widely, any 
benefits that might be derived from the data and their analysis would be shared with the 
wider academic and professional community. This amended application was 
approved by MUHEC in April 2014 (appendix two).   
 
Limitations of the Research 
 
The limitations inherent in this study flow mainly from the use of case study as a 
research design choice and from the potential for bias in a generic purposive approach 
to sampling (Bryman, 2012). 
 
Limitations of Case Study Design 
 
The use of case study as a research design frame, the data collection methods of in-
depth interviews and news media reports, and a narrative approach to analysis all share 
commonly recognised limitations with regard to qualitative research with an 
interpretivist orientation. Case study designs are considered to have limitations on the 
generalisability of findings, especially in the context of a qualitative, single case study 
design. However, as both Thomas (2010) and Flyvbjerg (2006a) contend, these assumed 
limitations are often overstated. Thomas (2010) argues that a more limited everyday 
generalisation or abduction from case study findings is still possible; and Flyvbjerg 
(2006a) asserts that case studies have the capacity to produce practical, contextual 
knowledge – or phronesis – from the case narrative. Interpretivist research seeks to, 
“grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman, 2012, p.30) and this research 
design is an interpretivist one involving the analyst in making choices, “to include some 
things and exclude others and to view the world in a particular way when other visions 
are possible” (Stone, 1988, p. 306). This is inescapable in the political domain, 
however, by laying bear the underlying logic and implicit assumptions of political 
argument, the method of narrative analysis enables the reader to reflect upon and 
consider alternative points of view. As Feldman et al., (2004) argue, “our analysis is 
based in the presumption that we live in a social world characterized by multiple 
interpretations and that as people tell stories these numerous interpretations are manifest 
in multiple and sometimes conflicting logics” (p. 151). 
  
Limitations of Generic Purposive Sampling. 
 
 Generic purposive sampling had a good fit with the design of this study, 
however, as others have noted (Duke, 2002; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) there 
are often difficulties accessing relatively elite policy actors. The sample of four 
advisory group members is a small proportion of the total of seventeen Green 
Paper advisory panel members overall. Also, since this was a self-selected sample 
there is a possibility of bias in their motivation to be interviewed: it is possible, for 
example, that the four advisory panel members agreed to be interviewed because 
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they shared strongly negative or strongly positive views on the advisory panel 
process. However, this study was not concerned to achieve a representative sample 
of advisory panel members, but simply to elicit information about the policy 
process. Although there were only four informants, they each had privileged access 
to a significant part of the policy process and had been considered by government 
actors to possess relevant expertise. As MSD outsiders, with some distance from 
government accountabilities, they were also likely to be able to be more candid 
than insider informants.  
 
 The ten news reports were selected using a clear set of criteria and limiting the 
sample to the two largest circulation news outlets. However, there may have been 
significant issues pertinent to the case debated in other newspaper outlets and in 
other news media, both radio and television. In fact, that proved to be the case in 
this study and the discussion in chapter eight makes reference to a government 
video (New Zealand Government, 2011a) and to two Radio New Zealand 
programmes (Cowie, 2015; Ryan, 2015), but these sources are not included in the 




 This chapter has outlined the rationale for adopting a case study design to this 
study and justified the two methods of data collection of in-depth, semi structured 
interviews and the analysis of news media reports. Two different forms of narrative 
analysis – thematic narrative analysis and rhetorical narrative analysis – are explained 
and justified. Responses to issues raised by the MUHEC were elaborated and the 
limitations of the study discussed. The next two chapters will discuss findings from the 





Chapter 6: Findings - Expert Panel Interviews 
 
 This is the first of two chapters presenting the findings of the study. This chapter 
presents findings from interviews with four expert advisors: two from each of the two 
government advisory panels convened to advise on the Green Paper: the Scientific 
Panel (a reference group of independent academic and research experts) and the 
Frontline Panel (a reference group of senior managers and executives form child 
welfare practice agencies). Chapter seven will present findings from an analysis of news 
media reports where key stakeholders make public statements on the ViKI and the PRM 
tool. As indicated in chapter five the interviews with the four advisors were analysed 
using a thematic narrative approach (Riessman, 2008). This approach does not attempt 
to code themes across interviews but adopts a holistic stance retaining the coherence of 
each account and identifying the themes within them from the standpoint of the 
interviewee (Haraway, 1988). By doing so we are able to get a strong sense of the 
plurality of perspectives on government policy development as well as the 
commonalities between accounts. Findings from each of the four interviews, with a 
brief commentary summarising interview themes, are presented below. The interview 
findings will contribute, along with the news media report findings presented in chapter 
seven, to the final discussion and analysis offered in chapter eight. 
 
 The first two accounts, Simon’s story and Christine’s story, are based on individual 
interviews with two members of the Frontline Panel. The second two accounts, Roger’s 
story and Eleanor’s story, are from individual interviews with two members of the 
Scientific Panel. The names of the interviewees have been altered to protect their 
identity and maintain confidentiality. It is important to note that use of the word 
narrative in the interview section headers, is not intended to suggest that the interviews 
are works of invention, but to foreground the fact that they are narrative accounts and 
are treated as such in the analysis. During the interviews the four advisors were asked 
not only to reflect on past events, but also to offer views on the motivations of policy 
actors and to speculate about the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed 
technological developments. They were all perfectly capable of doing so, but 
understandably, when talking about the likely outcomes of a technological innovation 
that was still in development, their responses were sometimes uncertain and ambivalent. 
Since all four interviewees were being asked to reflect on their contribution to 
government advisory groups (two as senior managers and two as academic researchers) 
it is not surprising that they had some critical reflections to make about the nature of 
that process and the impact of their contribution. 
 
Simon’s Narrative: “This was the Minister’s Legacy Piece”. 
  
 Simon was a member of the Frontline Panel and a senior manager in a large non-
governmental organisation. He set the context for his interview by stating that his 
organisation considered itself to have a policy and advocacy role, “to be able to 
represent points of view and advocate for change for vulnerable people”. As we will 
see, that policy level standpoint permeated Simon’s story. 
 
 Simon stated that the primary purpose of the Green Paper was, of course, to consult 
the public but added that it was, more specifically, to seek a public mandate for Minister 
Bennett’s concern to respond to the historical issue of child protection failures, 
especially with regard to abused babies and child homicide. From Simon’s point of 
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view, Minister Bennett was the key policy actor driving the reforms and he considered 
that her motivation to improve policy was deeply held. He speculated that she may have 
had an aspiration to make improved child protection policy her political legacy, “Yeah, 
I mean I think when the White Paper was launched, I think I made a comment to the 
effect that this was the Minister’s legacy piece”. 
 
 Whilst Simon’s view was that the Minister was highly motivated to reform child 
protection, he also believed that, from the outset, the government’s child protection 
reforms were deliberately framed to focus on the problem of vulnerable children, and 
that this framing was powerfully influenced by a wider governmental, political 
perspective in the form of the National government’s commitment to the social 
investment approach. Revealing his ambivalence towards this way of framing the policy 
issue, Simon stated that he had “a great deal of difficulty” with it: 
And the vulnerable children focus was very much it, and while, at a personal 
level, I have a great deal of difficulty about the tight focusing of vulnerability, 
and perhaps a lack of understanding of drivers of vulnerability, that was key to 
the push really.  
 This idea of framing the issue in relation to vulnerable children was reiterated 
throughout the interview with Simon. He related the focus on vulnerable children to the 
motivation of Minister Bennett to prevent serious harm to children and child homicide: 
I mean the Minister feels, I think, a personal affront whenever a baby dies on her 
watch and good on her for feeling that way, yeah. So, she has a real concern 
about babies dying, children being abused and injured, neglected, seriously 
neglected, and so that was one of the lenses.  
 Simon suggested that a particular lens – a way of framing or problematising the 
issue – was at work not only in how the Green Paper was drafted, but also in how 
submissions in response to the Green Paper4 (New Zealand Government, 2012c) were 
interpreted: 
And, of course, when you get tens of thousands of responses, the analysis of 
those responses is totally dependent on the lens. And so, the lens that was taken 
to the analysis of the responses to the Green Paper was one that fitted the 
particular perspectives of the government of the day. 
 One “lens” was the Minister’s personal concern about vulnerable children and 
“babies dying”, but there were, according to Simon, broader political considerations at 
work. He referred to the concepts of market segmentation and targeting as key political 
emphases and connected those concepts with the National Government’s broader 
ideological positioning. Simon described the government’s rationale for market 
segmentation and targeting in terms of economic considerations in the wake of the 
“post-global financial crisis” and “tight focusing on expenditure, so we’re looking for 
value for money, we’re looking for more for less”. He also introduced the idea that the 
National government had a pragmatic approach to policy making and one that focused 
on managing symptoms: 
 
4 There were almost 10,000 submissions received in response to the Green Paper (New Zealand 
Government, 2012c) 
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And within the resource constraints the government believes that it exists under 
in this field, then the pragmatic response is to say, “How do we ameliorate the 
symptoms in the most effective way?” They also have a strong belief in that 
kind of segmentation of market and delivering a product to a segment of the 
market which, the whole construct of targeting and closely targeting. 
 Simon considered that the main purpose of the Green Paper was to achieve a public 
mandate to prioritise a focus on vulnerable children, so that this mandate would 
subsequently give legitimacy to the policy recommendations of the White Paper, 
“Well, the central thesis of the Green Paper that then was translated into the White 
Paper is, ‘Do you believe we should prioritise the needs of vulnerable children over 
other segments of society?’”. 
  
 Simon also stated that alternative frames of reference – such as the consideration of 
“structural issues” – were subtly excluded from the agenda:  
But actually, the question, that kind of using, prioritising our resources to 
address that societal problem wasn’t the question or the answer being sought. 
The answer being sought was, how do we sort out these families that abuse 
children?  
 When the interview turned to Simon’s views on the ViKI, Simon stated that one of 
the “key findings” in inquiries into the death of children concerned the lack of 
information sharing between professionals involved: 
So, one of the threads then through that is that when the inquiries into children’s 
deaths that have occurred over that period. I mean one of the key things, one of 
the key findings consistently was everybody had a little bit of the information, 
and if somebody had put it all together then the vulnerability of this child would 
be obvious.  
 For the most part Simon’s account was broadly descriptive of his understanding of 
government policy and its drivers, although he indicated his personal ambivalence 
towards the focus on vulnerable children, and it is reasonable to infer reservations about 
the exclusion of structural issues and poverty from the agenda. However, in the passage 
below, Simon’s makes a subtle shift in register towards a more critical stance, telling 
the interviewer that “the real concern” of government was with “bad people” who have 
access to children and who need to be sorted out: 
So, if you looked at the Green Paper and the White Paper, the real concern was 
that there are bad people out there who have access to children, who do things to 
those children that result in that serious harm, or death. So, we need to sort out 
the bad people and make sure that they don’t have access.  
 In the context of his broader account, it is clear that the implication was not that 
these “bad people” were random strangers, but the parents and caregivers of children. 
The purpose of the information system then, was to identify vulnerable children, by 
identifying parents and caregivers who might put them at risk.  
 
 Moving to the methods which might make this purpose achievable, Simon connects 
this goal to the broader agenda on the use of government data for social good. He uses 
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the linguistic device of heteroglossia5 “quoting” the Minister of Finance in the 
following passage, to explain the government’s stance on the use of data, and 
highlighting the moral imperative to do so: 
Most recently I’ve heard our Minister of Finance say, “If we hold the 
information that allows us to segment our society, then, and to be able to 
identify those groups that most need support and would be most responsive to 
support and get the best outcome from that, it would be irresponsible of us not to 
do so. And that now we have that much data being held, and we have the 
capacity to do this, then surely we must.” 
 Having offered a coherent outline of the government’s rationale for its policy stance, 
Simon returned to his earlier statement about the absence of a focus on poverty. At this 
point his narrative shifted into the role he described himself as having when the 
interview opened, to, “represent points of view and advocate for change for vulnerable 
people”: 
I mean it’s interesting, so vulnerable children live in a vacuum. So, the fact that 
we live in a low wage, low benefit society, and that children who are from 
families with low incomes, or from whichever source, are vulnerable and more 
at risk than other children, is not mentioned (laughter)…But that’s not one of the 
questions that the government wants to consider, so they’re saying, “Well what 
are the other things we can do to ameliorate the chances of these children being 
harmed, being injured?”. 
 When discussing the proposed information sharing system, and, in particular, the 
PRM tool Simon, once again, revealed his ambivalence towards this new technology 
describing himself as wearing two “hats”: 
I mean I’d say, I’m concerned at one level, it feels quite Orwellian, particularly 
when you throw predictive risk modelling into it. And so, I’m quite concerned, I 
guess my civil society kind of approach, my civil liberty approach is kind of 
going, “Gee, as a young parent I might have raised a few flags, and our kids 
turned out okay.” So, is this a good thing? But then my other hat goes, “We have 
thirteen children a year die because we didn’t know the stuff that we need to 
know, even though the information was there if someone would just look for it”. 
So, what’s the balance in that, what’s the balance in that? And we’re in this new 
society, we are in a new society where the, our lives are lived online, it’s there.  
 Exploring his ambivalence further, Simon said he was somewhat reassured when, in 
policy discussions, it was stated that the predictive risk score would not be used without 
the oversight of a professional. However, immediately following this remark, he 
indicated some uncertainty about this assurance. To illustrate this point he drew on an 
example of the reforms proposed by the government’s Welfare Working Group (2011)6: 
 
5 Heteroglossia is a term theorised by Michael Bhaktin referring to instances when “The speaker as 
author incorporates the words and voices of others, but the utterance becomes the speaker's own when it 
is populated with his or her own intentions and accent and is appropriated for the speaker's own purpose.” 
(Given, 2008) 
6 Minister Bennett was also the minister responsible for the Welfare Working Group (2011) that 
recommended sanctions on beneficiaries for failing to comply with certain requirements: such as having 
their children immunised or ensuring they attend early childhood education. 
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The thing that really concerns me is that the government said, “We’re going to 
incentivize people to engage in this investment process.” And what they actually 
meant is, “We’re going to punish people if they don’t.” So, what I would be 
concerned about is if this process moved from one of saying, “We’re going to 
actively engage with people in a positive way, to help them overcome the 
difficulties that might lead to their children being vulnerable through some really 
proactive, but positive work.” To one of, “We will sanction people if they don’t 
engage in this stuff”. 
 When the interview moved on to the subject of issues and obstacles to the 
implementation of ViKI and the PRM tool, Simon was concerned not only about the 
impact on the right to privacy of families, but also about the possible unintended 
consequences of increased technological surveillance that might lead some parents and 
caregivers to take steps to avoid coming to the attention of the authorities and to “fly 
under the radar” thus putting some children at greater risk: 
It actually could end up meaning that if you’re a sole parent, you’re less likely to 
become part of a permanent blended family in the longer term. Because every 
time you have an unrelated person moving in with you, somebody from a nice 
social service agency comes around to see if everything’s alright. And you kind 
of go, “I’m not interested in that.” So, there’s a bunch of stuff that could emerge 
from it. 
 Turning again to his advocacy stance, Simon highlighted the issue of stigma, 
labelling and the othering of the poor as “bad parents”:  
The other one is that it’ll still be set up as an “us and them”. Us good parents 
don’t have anything to worry about, but those bad parents do, and those bad 
parents are already the other, because generally they’re on benefits and parents 
of poor children. 
 Simon ended his account by talking about alternative ways in which the predictive 
risk modelling tool could be used, for example by using the data in an aggregate way to 
take into account contextual and community issues, rather than focusing on problem 
individuals and families. Once again, he indicates uncertainty about the technological 
innovation recognising that it might be a “good thing” if used in the “right way”, a way 
that offers, “the kind of hand-up that people need” rather than, “…a punitive or 




 Simon offered a detailed policy level account describing the motivation of policy 
actors, the framing of policy issues and the connection between policy proposals and the 
National government’s broader political and ideological stance: their political rationality 
of social investment. He made explicit reference to the political framing or 
problematisation of the issue as one of child vulnerability with a concomitant focus on 
early intervention, the identification of vulnerable children and the targeting of “bad 
parents” who might harm them. He also recognised the active exclusion of alternative 
ways of framing these policy issues in terms of structural issues or poverty. 
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 Minister Paula Bennett was clearly identified as the central policy actor with a 
passionate commitment to tackle child protection and a key concern to tackle child 
homicide. For Simon, this was evident from the Green Paper which he considered was 
used as a policy device to obtain a public mandate for a selective focus on the most 
vulnerable, as a way to enrol the public in the programme, before the nature of the 
programme was made explicit. Simon argued that ViKI and the PRM tool were 
intimately connected to the National government’s broader policy agenda and in 
keeping with their wider welfare reforms. He considered that the key characteristics of 
this approach, the social investment approach, were seeking value for money; a 
pragmatic approach to tackling symptoms; a commitment to market segmentation and 
targeting; and the use of government data for social good. 
 
 While Simon recognised potential value in the use of ViKI and the PRM tool he 
also expressed ambivalence. He was concerned about balancing the loss of privacy for 
service users against the potential benefits of preventing child maltreatment. He was 
concerned about whether the main outcome of the technological innovations would be 
positive, proactive support for poor families; or surveillance and sanctions on a 
population group who are already disadvantaged. Finally, Simon was concerned that 
technological surveillance could have unintended consequences including: the labelling 
and stigmatisation of families, families choosing to avoid contact with the child welfare 
system thus putting some children at greater risk, and perhaps having a negative impact 
on family relationship choices. 
 
Christine’s Narrative: “Joining up the Dots…That was the Dream”. 
 
 Like Simon, Christine was also a member of the Frontline Forum convened by the 
Ministry of Social Development. Christine was a senior manager in child health services 
and, perhaps for that reason, her account had a strong emphasis on the theme of 
improving interprofessional collaboration for child protection. Throughout the interview 
Christine highlighted the value of collaboration or “joining up the dots” between 
agencies as an important policy goal, linked to the idea of professionals sharing what 
they know about children: 
How we’re joining up the dots within the sector and to me that was, for me the 
vision behind it is that how, as a country, can we work better together rather than 
working in our own separate ways…to ensure that children are not being siloed 
in one area, and somebody knows something here and somebody knows 
something there and never the twain shall meet. So, it was to me… that was the 
dream. 
 Whereas Simon spent considerable time offering an overview of government policy 
direction and its connection with other macro-level issues, Christine moved directly to 
the issue of information sharing and information sharing systems: 
I don’t think a particular system was talked about until the White Paper was 
actually presented. I think for me sharing of information has to be high on the 
agenda if you are looking out for the best outcomes for children...but we must 
have good process around that and good structure around that and involve 
whoever the caregiver is of those children if need be, so they are aware of how 
these things are happening. 
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 The imperative of having safeguards around information sharing was a recurrent 
theme in Christine’s account as was the active involvement of caregivers in the 
information sharing process. The idea of having an electronic system to facilitate 
information sharing made sense to Christine: 
I think that that’s logical, I think most of us, if you’re going to try and join the 
dots you’ve got to find a way of doing it, doing it on hard paper is not 
satisfactory, doing it via communication between two individuals doesn’t always 
work.  
 Christine was very positive about the prospect of electronic information sharing. 
However, she was also aware of possible pitfalls. This was evident in another recurrent 
theme in Christine’s account, the issue of different professional paradigms, philosophies 
and language that might impact on how information was shared: 
I mean this has all been driven through the Ministry of Social Development. But 
I come out of a health environment which do have some different drivers and 
that is evident in a lot of the development that’s going on now. It’s a bit like the 
social work paradigm and the nurse paradigm are quite different (laughter). 
 If finding ways to share information across professional boundaries was a key issue 
for Christine, she signalled a different perspective on the PRM tool, revealing, like 
Simon, an attitude of deep ambivalence: 
Sharing of information had to be there. We have to do it in a coordinated way 
and let’s find a way in which parameters can be put around that sharing of 
information. With the predictive modelling, I’m not so convinced about that 
personally. 
 Returning to the theme of different professional groups with different professional 
languages and philosophies, Christine explored the issue of working relationships 
between nurses and social workers linking this to what she perceived to be different 
views on who was the client in a family situation, and different perspectives even when 
working within a common assessment framework: 
When we came to work out how our staff are going to work together, we had a 
lot of work to do with our staff because they’re different philosophical bases. 
And as social workers they work with the adult as the client, we work with the 
child as the client, and that straightaway changes the way in which you do your 
assessment.  
 Although Christine was positive about the idea of electronic information-sharing she 
was also clear that information sharing could not be an end in itself, put simply, it was 
important to be clear about how to move from information to action: 
It’s all very well having all the information sitting there in a system but so, so 
what? What are you going to do with it? How are you going to make it work? 
How…who’s going to be managing and assessing, and where is the lead in 
looking after that child? 
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 When the interview returned to her views on the predictive risk modelling tool, 
Christine explained why she thought the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) might 
have thought this was a good idea: 
they thought within MSD they could see when people hit different departments 
and they could look at amalgamating all of their systems and see, okay where 
are the common threads coming through and is there an indication here that 
you’re a solo mother, or you’re on a benefit, or you’re getting housing, whatever 
it is that you’re collecting information on. Putting that all together and seeing, is 
there something there that indicates there’s something with this child, or this 
family, they do it from a family perspective probably.  
 Christine highlighted the limitations on using administrative data to assess risk, she 
referred to findings from the Growing Up in New Zealand7 longitudinal study on 
children, “Because some of the indicators that are shown antenatally, they looked at 
those vulnerability points antenatally and by nine months some of those had gone and 
others had come in.” In other words, according to Christine, the administrative data held 
by MSD would not be able to take account of these dynamic shifts in real life risk 
factors which would impact on the accuracy of the administrative databases used by the 
predictive risk modelling tool. If predictive risk modelling has a role, Christine did not 
think it could be a dominant one, “I think it’s a tool to have back, way back but not as 
the forefront, in my view. I think ethically we’ve got to be really careful using that.” 
 
 Returning to the theme of information sharing, Christine restated her view that she 
thought “the biggest obstacle would be are we assessing in the same way? So therefore, 
sharing and understanding what we’re sharing, because we all come from quite different 
philosophical bases.” In spite of this reservation, she went on to offer an example of 
how electronic information sharing might work in practice:  
So, if my child, or if a child goes into the emergency department at hospital and 
they, all they see is a child in front of them, they may see a child that’s got a 
bruise on its arm, or it’s fallen over and it’s very explainable, not a problem, 
everything seems fine. If they could access notes that perhaps the GP has, that 
perhaps the Plunket nurse has taken and in there there’s some concern, or there’s 
been some discussion about domestic violence, there’s been some discussion 
about alcohol and drugs as part of that assessment. That might then ensure that 
the assessment done when they reach that point is a bit more thorough. 
 However, revealing her sensitivity to the risks around electronic information 
sharing, Christine reiterated the need for tight parameters to govern data security, and 
adherence to the information privacy principles of the Privacy Act (1993):8 
But we’ve got to make sure we’ve got the right parameters around that, that we 
are looking after client information in a safe, secure way. We’re only sharing it 
 
7 Growing Up in New Zealand: http://www.growingup.co.nz/ 
8 Christine did not refer to the Privacy Act (1993) directly, but it seems safe to assume she was referring 
to information privacy principle ten that, “agencies must use personal information for the same purpose 
for which they collected that information”. However, in this context, it is important to note that principle 
ten also states that, “Other uses are occasionally permitted (for example because this is necessary to 
enforce the law, or the use is directly related to the purpose for which the agency got the information)”. 
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for the purposes for which it was intended for the best outcomes for that child. 
Let’s get some really good parameters around that. 
 Christine constantly referred to the delicate balancing act required for effective, 
interprofessional electronic information sharing. She valued the “immediacy” of an 
electronic record, but highlighted the need for knowledge and skill, insisting that 
professionals have, “got to know how to access it, you’ve got to have the right security 
to be able to do all of those things.” When asked to reflect on possible unintended 
consequences of the electronic information system Christine immediately identified the 
possibility of the false positive identification of risk, “Oh that it picks up children that 
shouldn’t be picked up, absolutely.” The key to avoiding that outcome, Christine 
emphasized, was having highly skilled staff to interpret the information, “…so it comes 
back to education and training of staff in behind that so that they’re understanding what 
it is that they are seeing and then being able to assess that correctly.” 
 
 Christine associated the risk of false positives, and the subsequent labelling of 
families, with the use of the predictive risk modelling tool. She framed this concern in a 
way that highlighted the potential harm this might cause to the working relationship 
between professionals and the families with whom they were working: 
On information and then the feeling of those families, well what is the feeling of 
those families? They’ve been labelled straightaway and I think that’s something 
we’ve got to get out of our system is that labelling of families. Because families 
in high need communities know pretty early on that they’re being targeted or 
labelled in some way. So, we’ve got to be careful that we don’t do that and then 
that in itself can create a risk for that family.  
 Asked to expand on what the risk of labelling might entail, like Simon, Christine 
identified the risk that the families might deliberately evade contact with the system and 
go “underground”, putting some children at greater risk: 
Mmm…and then they’ll go underground, and something happens further down 
the track and I don’t know, you’ve just got to be aware of the labelling and often 
as soon as there is any sort of insinuation then people think, “Well there was 
something in there and I’m always looking, I’m always looking, is there 
something there or not?” 
 From an ethical perspective, informed consent was one of the most important issues 
for Christine, “So, I’m a great believer in just being really transparent about every 
interaction that happens. What you’re doing with that information? Why are you doing 
it? Where are you going with it?” 
 
 Anticipating the possible public controversy around the introduction of the 
information system, Christine argued for the value of transparency not only in relation 
to families known to the system but also with the wider public: 
I think the best is to be really up front with the public straight off that there is a 
database, for want of a better word that’s what it is, that will collect information 
on children that may, through no fault of their own, or maybe their family at that 
point in time, because of their own resilience factors need extra support and 
help. 
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 Overall, although highly sceptical of the value of the PRM tool, Christine was 
positive about the potential for electronic information sharing and its role in early 
intervention. However, she also highlighted a degree of uncertainty over 
implementation by adding that this was possible, only “if we can get it right”: 
And it’s making sure that we’re all on the same page around how we’re sharing 
that information, and I think that that’s the challenge with this but if we can get 
it right, it would only support parents in their parenting role with children, 
because to me I see them getting in supports earlier. Getting in extra support 
when it is identified. 
Summary 
 
 Christine’s account was very focused on the practicalities of interprofessional 
collaboration and the potential value of the electronic information sharing system. She 
was, however, much more guarded about the value of the PRM tool. For Christine 
electronic information sharing has the potential to provide access to “immediate” 
information that unlocks interprofessional collaboration and enhances outcomes for 
children. She was however conscious that effective electronic information sharing needs 
good processes and protocols to keep data secure and ensure that users adhere to 
information privacy principles. She considered that effective information sharing might 
be impeded by the different professional paradigms, philosophies and language of 
different professional groups. She recognised that this can impact on shared assessment 
processes even when an agreed, common assessment framework has been established. 
Christine also recognised that while information sharing was necessary it was not 
sufficient. There was also a need for clarity about the pathway from information to 
action including a shared understanding of who is responsible for taking what action.  
 
With regard to the predictive risk modelling tool, Christine was concerned it may not be 
able to deliver the promise the MSD considered that it would. If used at all, Christine 
thought, it ought to be kept in the background and not be allowed to drive professional 
decision-making. Christine’s main concerns with the predictive risk modelling tool 
were: that it can’t take account of dynamic changes in family risk and resilience; it can 
lead to false positives and the labelling of families; that the latter might drive some 
families to avoid contact with the system putting some children at risk; and that the 
labelling of families may have a negative impact on working relationship between 
professionals and families. In general, she was of the view that ensuring the best use of 
any information systems required staff who were well educated and trained; and that 
there is a need for fairness and transparency to ensure the informed consent of families 
and the support of the public. 
 
Roger’s Narrative: “Now This is Where You Have the Paradigm Clash”. 
 
 Roger is a senior academic researcher and was a member of the Scientific Panel 
established to offer advice on the shaping of the Green Paper. Roger set the scene for 
his interview by making clear his stance on policy making and his role in advice giving 
to government. There was, he said, a correct way to generate knowledge on which to 
base policy, which was to follow a structured scientific process moving from systematic 
reviews of evidence, to pilot studies, to randomised control trials. However, he argued, 
the New Zealand government do not generate knowledge in this way. He described a 
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“paradigm clash” between his own “modern prevention science” stance, and the 
position adopted by government and other stakeholders in the policy making process: 
Now that’s just a basic, modern prevention science process to developing policy, 
which everybody ought to know and ought to be able to do at least to some 
extent. Now this is where you have the paradigm clash. The government, the 
staff in government agencies do not do this model. This is not the way they 
generate knowledge. They generate knowledge the way in which it was done in 
the White Paper and thence the Green Paper.  
 Roger contrasted the “modern prevention science process” with his experience of 
the government’s “consultancy process” approach where, as he described, a policy 
analyst generates knowledge by consulting stakeholders in meetings, “People write up 
various things on the whiteboard, and then the analyst, the policy analyst writes up a 
report giving her, in this case it is her, impressions of what is said and what needs to be 
done.” In that context, Roger argued, “research knowledge is just simply treated as one 
part of a discourse, which can be modified enough and changed by other parts of the 
discourse”. As a result, in his view, “what went into the White and Green Papers, had 
very little resemblance to what you would advocate to prevent child abuse, neglect, and 
all the other issues of vulnerability”. 
 
 Roger elaborated his narrative about the “paradigm clash” by using a practical 
illustration. He used an example of his involvement in researching a form of home 
visiting as an intervention to tackle child maltreatment and described the government 
response to his study, “We did a pilot study and then we did a randomised trial and so 
forth. And I thought that would impress everybody. It doesn’t, it’s just seen as a sort of 
embarrassment.” Using heteroglossia he described how government policy advisors 
rejected this evidence-based approach, “And they said, ‘Oh no, we know better ways of 
evaluating this than randomised trials, everybody knows that’s out of date.’” Returning 
to what he perceived to be the government’s preferred modus operandi he offered the 
following detailed description: 
The rules of the game are fairly clear. There are people who you call 
stakeholders, right. And you invite them to Wellington for a day, and they sit 
down, and they have a talk. Then they get put into groups and then they make 
various recommendations about the questions. Like one of the questions would 
be, “What are the best methods for preventing child abuse?” And then the 
groups all come back and said, “Well our group took this from a Māori 
perspective, and we thought that…” “And our group…” All of this is written up 
on the board, indiscriminately. The policy analyst then writes a report that can, 
that weaves the threads together into a coherent whole. The fact of the matter 
however, is that that model is never tested against the reality of the evidence, 
ever.  
 Given Roger’s strongly critical view of what he argues to be the government’s 
preferred policy making process, it is not surprising that, when asked about the 
influence of his contribution to the final Green Paper and White Paper, he stated that it: 
Was relatively small. I was very disappointed. I mean I had expected to see 
something about…do something a lot more with Family Start and evaluate it. I 
expected them to set up some pilot study ideas and evaluate them, which they 
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didn’t do.  
 Turning to the idea of the children’s information system, Roger was clear that, in the 
Scientific Panel, “it wasn’t discussed really at all. The information system, as far as I 
can recall, was written as an addendum to the conceptual ideas of the Green Paper and 
the White Paper”. At this point, as a possible explanation for the emergence of the 
information system as a policy option, Roger offered an aside on the theme of the 
politics of the policy making process: 
Now what’s not clear in any of this to me ever, is the extent to which the shape 
of these policies is dictated by the policy maker’s awareness of what the 
Minister wants. Now, I’m not saying that the Minister tells them to do it, it’s a 
much more subtle model than that. It’s a model in which they’re aware that this 
is what the Minister would like, and they focus on the bits that the Minister 
would like and she’s put in her speech, rather than an evidence-based thing.  
 Returning to the theme of the information system Roger highlighted the interest of 
the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in making use of the data in its 
administrative systems and referred to the study of predictive risk modelling using 
administrative data by Vaithianathan (2012). Roger speculated that the MSD wanted to 
use this data as an “alternative to research” but highlighted the problem of using data 
based on administrative decisions that might include systematic biases, including bias 
that might have led to the overrepresentation of Māori in the systems: 
So, I think they saw the development of these databases as providing an 
alternative to research and a way of evaluating things. As I keep on pointing out 
to them, that while the, her analysis was good, the data quality was probably 
quite poor. 
 Roger was of the view that using administrative data for programme evaluation 
purposes without doing validation studies was possible but problematic. However, when 
asked directly about the use of this data to predict future child maltreatment in particular 
families he reacted strongly saying, “Be careful, be careful. I had this out with an MSD 
official who came and told me all of this.” Roger went on to highlight the likelihood of 
universal screening being likely to lead to significant numbers of false positives and the 
risk of labelling children and families: 
And so, anyway, this MSD official, who shall remain nameless, told me very 
proudly, “Oh yes,” he said, “we can get 50% prediction of repeat abuse and 
that’s better than mammography.” I said, listen, in mammography you are 
treating a patient and giving her advice about a therapeutic intervention to help 
her. If you are going to walk up to a family and say, “You’re a lot of child 
abusers and we’re going to fix you up,” that’s totally different. 
 Roger considered that using the tool for the purposes of triage, to assess risk and 
gauge the level of intervention and support required in families who were already 
known to social workers, could be helpful, but differentiated using the tool in this way 
from prediction, “That’s not predicting that they’re going to do it, it’s reacting to their 
level of risk.” 
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 Turning to the information sharing aspect of the system Roger was very sceptical of 
the idea that better electronic information sharing could prevent child homicide: 
That’s a silly argument. The argument that they had information that they 
weren’t sharing, because if you actually look at the families who kill their kids, 
the Kahuis and everything, there’s probably at any one time in this country 
about five to six thousand of them that bad. Only ten will kill their kids. Now 
which ten, no one ever knows.  
 Returning to discuss the problems and issues with the design of the information 
system, Roger identified several, all of which were associated with the PRM tool. 
Firstly, there was the risk of labelling that derives from false positives; secondly, the 
errors and biases inherent in the administrative databases; thirdly, being clear about the 
kinds of services or responses to make depending on the level of risk identified. Roger 
was also concerned to point out the opportunity cost of investing in expensive 
information systems: 
There’s only so much cash to go round. Now do you develop a flash data 
system, or do you say, “Look, we really don’t need a flash data system, what we 
need is good policy and we should be invested in developing good policy, and 
the data system can wait.” 
 Roger returned to the issue of distinguishing the identification of risk from the 
ability to predict future harm: 
Well I think the first, the most risky, one is the false belief that we can predict 
child abuse. Saying that someone’s got a 50% chance of abusing their child, 
isn’t predicting child abuse. It’s describing risk.  
 Roger discussed the problems inherent in staff who were not trained to understand 
statistical analyses using the outputs of this analysis to decide on interventions. His 
account made it clear that he perceived a strong risk of risk scores being interpreted in a 
discriminatory manner:  
The big ethical issue is if someone who doesn’t understand the difference 
between risk and certainty, starts to treat people and families in a discriminatory 
way that implied that they are abusers, villains, undesirables. The aim of the 
system should be to say these are the families that need help, not the families 
that need watching. And that’s the risk. Unless you train your staff to say, “No, 
this doesn’t mean they need watching, they need help”. 
 Finally, Roger was not convinced that the PRM tool could or should be used by 
practitioners to inform interventions with families, though he could see other uses: 
You’ve got a population of people using this system for whom at-risk statistics, 
numbers, are not their natural vocabulary. And they are being asked to use that 
in complex ways to handle the lives of people who are a very difficult 
population. I’m not sure that it’s very suitable for practitioner use. I can say yes 
for analyst use and for making decisions, and perhaps also for when there are 
groups of people brought together with an analyst to say, “Here’s what the 
data…” But just chucking all this complex data to people who are not 
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statisticians and not numerically minded to interpret, it has a high risk, I think.  
Summary 
 
 The recurring theme of Roger’s narrative focused on what he referred to as a 
“paradigm clash” between what he termed a “modern prevention science process” (a 
rational, positivist, evidence-based approach to knowledge generation and policy 
making) and what he presented as the New Zealand government’s commitment to a 
“consultancy process”. He characterised the latter as a process whereby a government 
policy analyst generated knowledge by meeting with key stakeholders and writing a 
report based on that meeting or series of meetings. In that context, research evidence 
was given no particular weight, but considered as “one part of a discourse”.  
 
 Roger also considered that, in terms of policy making, there were subtle political 
influences on the policy-making process whereby the recommendations of policy 
analysts are influenced by “what the Minister wants”, leading to a lack of independence, 
the system running on its own knowledge and alternative sources of evidence being 
ignored or excluded. 
 
 When asked about ViKI and the PRM tool, Roger focused on the latter. He was of 
the view that the quality of data contained in government administrative databases is 
likely to be quite poor, and to include errors and biases inherent in the administrative 
decision-making processes. Because of poor data quality and systematic bias, he 
believed that risk assessments based on that data should be used with care. Roger 
considered that the PRM tool might be of value to assess the level of risk in families 
known to social workers and to gauge the best level of intervention required. However, 
he was careful to point out that assessing risk is not the same as predicting harm and it 
is dangerous to consider that it is. Roger also highlighted that the idea that electronic 
information sharing could lead to a reduction in child homicides was fundamentally 
flawed. It is, he considered, impossible to predict which of the number of high-risk 
families might go on to seriously harm a child.  
 
 In addition, he identified several problem and issues associated with the predictive 
risk modelling tool including the risk of inappropriate labelling; the likelihood of errors 
and biases inherent in administrative database; a lack of clarity about the connection 
between the level of risk identified and the kinds of services and responses required; the 
opportunity cost of investment in expensive databases systems. Roger thought the PRM 
tool may have value if used by skilled analysts to inform decision making about 
population groups but giving the data to practitioners to work with individuals and 
families was, in Roger’s view, very risky and may lead to discriminatory practices. 
 
Eleanor’s Narrative: “For me it’s about joining up the Information with the 
Intervention”. 
 
 Along with Roger, Eleanor was involved in the Scientific Panel established by 
government to offer advice on the shaping of the Green Paper. Eleanor was also a senior 
academic researcher and began her account by referring back to the earlier 2009 
Experts’ Forum on Child Abuse in which she was involved. She stated that the 2009 
meeting was a “precursor to being involved in anything with the Green Paper” and that 
it was, “a really useful meeting...But what was really good about that and I think was 
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really useful, was it was multidisciplinary, and we had people from Starship9 and, you 
know, paediatricians”.  
 
 At no point did Eleanor make an explicit statement that the later Scientific Panel 
was less helpful, but its membership consisted of researchers and academic staff and 
included no paediatricians (although a consultant paediatrician was included in the 
Frontline Panel). Eleanor elaborated on the value of a multidisciplinary group of 
advisors and explained what she felt to be the particular value of  “…hearing from the 
paediatricians around what actually happens at the coalface” and the insights they could 
bring: 
what do you do to actually galvanise the systems, bring the systems together to 
work with this family? And I think they gave some really good clues on how 
you could then work with vulnerable children, like through a system approach 
and a multidisciplinary team. And I felt that was really useful… 
 Eleanor went on to give an example from her experience of practical ways in which 
interactions between practitioners and families might be improved to empower families 
and to protect children. The example she offered was of the introduction of a protocol: 
 
to have a way of asking families when they come in for other medical reasons, 
what’s happening for their child and what’s happening for them, in terms of 
violence against partners, and to actually ensure that all workers knew how to 
ask those questions and in a good way. 
 
 This protocol was in use in Starship and at the 2009 meeting, “it got down to the 
real nuts and bolts of how you do this in an empowering way.” Having offered this 
practical “nuts and bolts” example, Eleanor continued by juxtaposing this approach with 
what Minister Bennett wanted: 
The other thing that came out of that meeting was Paula Bennett came and, I 
think it was a two-day meeting, and we had to report to her, and she was really 
convinced that what we needed was an information system that could find 
vulnerable children. Like she just, that was what she wanted. She wanted to be 
able to locate these people…This was the end of 2009. So, she was really clear 
that that’s what she wanted. She wanted to be able to identify who was 
vulnerable.  
 Eleanor went on to explain the difference between the “nuts and bolts” intervention-
oriented approach of the paediatricians at Starship and Minister Bennett’s determination 
to develop systems that could do risk assessments and identify families and children at 
risk: 
But she said, “We need to have risk systems that do risk assessments and 
management of that, and we need to find these people.” And what we were 
trying to say to her, “But that’s only finding them, and actually getting data, but 
how are you actually going to then intervene?” And that’s why I was giving the 
 
9 Starship Hospital is a national centre of excellence in paediatric health care in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
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example of Starship, because as soon as they identified, they had a whole 
process that could come in behind because they had services and supports, and 
we tried to explain that to her.  
 
 Eleanor’s reflection on the 2009 group draws into opposition the idea of using 
systems to identify vulnerable children and more practice-oriented processes that offer a 
clear pathway from contact with service providers to forms of intervention. Having set 
up this background, and this opposition, she moved on to discuss her involvement in the 
Scientific Panel and here her account established another opposition, this time between 
the promotion of wellbeing and child surveillance: 
They were interested about thriving and how can you create wellbeing, but they 
hadn’t joined up those big picture ideas with actually how you do the 
interventions. So, actually I just think it’s, you have all these ideas but it’s trying 
to get… ‘cause I think there’s a lot of surveillance, so that’s one driver, and then 
there’s the we want children to thrive within their families and whānau, and we 
want to achieve wellbeing. But I think actually those ideals are quite 
contradictory at times, because it takes a lot of resource to do the wellbeing 
piece. 
 Eleanor described the debate on these issues inside the Scientific Panel and referred 
to contributions from people who were involved with the Whānau Ora initiative. She 
contrasted the surveillance and risk perspective associated with the information system, 
with a more, “developmental perspective, which is about thriving and wellbeing and 
achieving their aspirational goals, and every child in the whānau needs to be looked 
after”.  This latter perspective, Eleanor argued, would be a more universalist approach: 
but if you take a stance which is around surveillance, you won’t get families 
engaging and whānau engaging…So it’s like the debates were really there 
around the table. Do you have a risk system which is just identifying who’s at 
risk? Or do you have a universal system which says every child should have 
access to supports? And I don’t think they’ve worked that out. 
 Asked to explore the tensions for government between a universalist approach and 
more targeted interventions on high-risk families, Eleanor argued that the key problem 
for government was funding the universal option. In a related point, she also 
highlighted, as did Simon in the Frontline Panel, the way in which poverty and 
inequality were subtly erased from the agenda of the group: 
Eleanor: But we weren’t allowed to use, the word poverty was reframed. Words 
like inequality were reframed…called ‘lacking material resources’ or something.  
 Interviewer: How did that happen?  
Eleanor: I think it was just, you could tell. You could tell that when you said 
poverty, words changed in the document, nothing much was, but you could… 
 Interviewer: Subtle? 
 Eleanor: Yeah, it was very subtle.  
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 When the interview moved on to discuss the information system itself Eleanor 
introduced another opposition, this time between the idea of electronic information 
sharing and genuine interprofessional communication and planning, or, “professionals 
around the table talking to each other about intervention”:  
So, they might have, they have ways of joining up, sorting out the information 
system so professionals are joined up, share information. I still don’t think 
they’ve got professionals around the table talking to each other about 
intervention. I think that’s where it falls down.  
 Eleanor returned to her earlier theme about the distinction between identification 
and intervention, this time connecting identification to assessment and arguing that 
some of her own research had shown evidence of “over-assessment, and over-collection 
of information” to the detriment of actually intervening to effect positive change. For 
Eleanor, gathering information for its own sake was futile: 
So, I think the danger is, is that you have an information system at the core. It 
satisfies our need to know that professionals are sharing information, that they 
can assess, that they can assess risk, that they can measure risk, and we can tick 
it off and say, “We know how to find those people”…But what is the 
intervention?  
 Referring to findings from her own research on information systems, and echoing 
the comments by Christine, Eleanor went on to highlight problems created when 
different professionals use a shared information system without sharing a common 
lexicon, “unless you have people putting in the same information, using the same 
concepts and the same terms, it’s useless.”  
 
 Moving on to discuss the PRM tool Eleanor expressed several reservations about its 
predictive ability and referred to the risk number produced by the model, “But you can’t 
guarantee that “cause you give someone a number that they will have the same outcome 
as the person sitting next to them”. She elaborated on the problem with the 
individualised risk focus of the predictive risk modelling tool, contrasting this with 
contextual factors (such as poverty) that the tool could not pick up: 
What we’re finding in our study is that contextual risk is not measured and is not 
taken into account by services. So, the fact that people live in impoverished 
environments, don’t have good access to support networks, because everyone in 
their support networks is poor or living with violence or whatever, doesn’t take 
into account cultural identity, whether those networks are there. So, it’s a very 
narrow measure. 
 She also highlighted, as did Christine, the problem with dynamic changes occurring 
over time: 
So, that’s the concern about a predictive model. And you can’t get a predictive 
model, because you can’t, like you can’t, you can measure somebody right now, 
but you can’t control their inputs over time. And you can’t control what those 
inputs are going to create in terms of outputs. You just can’t.  
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 To make the most of an information system, she argued, professionals need to 
engage with each other and to realise that the families captured in the data are complex, 
dynamic and subject to change. She considered that there is a danger that an emphasis 
on information system technology will detract from the human element and undermine 
the intentions of the system designers: 
So, if information sharing is just a technical system where you input data, and 
then in your office you get on the computer and you pull out that data, it’s not 
going to work, because what we’re dealing, we’re not dealing with inanimate 
objects….We’re dealing with human beings, we’re dealing with rapid change in 
these families, we’re dealing with transient families, we’re dealing with complex 
communities. So there has to be a big human element.  
 From an ethical point of view, Eleanor was very concerned about informed consent 
to information and the right of people to access the information that is held on them: 
I think the ethical issues are around how those, do those people understand what 
that information is used for? What information is collected, the purpose of it, can 
they change their information? Can they get their file, can they see their file, can 
they see what’s been recorded about them, what words are being used? Is it a 
strength assessment or is it risk? All of those things are huge ethical issues. 
 Eleanor concluded be emphasising, once again, the problem of recording 
information without leading to effective interventions: 
For me it’s about joining up the information with the intervention. That’s what I 
want to see evidence of. I want to see that if information’s being collected on 
people, I want to see some real substantive change to their outcomes. I want to 
see them getting better services. I mean one of the things we’re seeing in our 
study is that volume of services, engagement with professionals makes no 
difference to outcomes, which is very scary.  
Summary 
 
 Throughout Eleanor’s account her preoccupation, and the main theme to which she 
constantly returned, was the distinction – or narrative opposition – between information 
collection for its own sake and effective intervention planning. As she indicated this 
position flowed from her own research findings into information systems that identified 
an over-emphasis on information collection and assessment at the expense of 
intervention planning. Eleanor contrasted her involvement with the earlier 2009 
Experts’ Forum on Child Abuse, with the Scientific Panel for the Green Paper, arguing 
that the former was useful because it was multidisciplinary and included paediatricians 
who offered insights into, “what actually happens at the coalface”. Eleanor identified an 
opposition between the views of the 2009 Experts’ Forum on Child Abuse which had an 
emphasis on practical intervention planning, and the views of Minister Paula Bennett 
who, as early as 2009, was convinced that what was needed was an information system 
that could identify vulnerable children. 
 
 This opposition was mirrored by another within the thinking of the Scientific Panel: 
the opposition between a universalist, developmental perspective on child wellbeing, 
and a more selective, targeted focus on establishing systems for risk assessment and 
 53 
child surveillance. Eleanor argued that government policy makers de-emphasised 
universal child wellbeing solutions (perhaps because they were more expensive) and 
reframed any mention of structural issues such as poverty and inequality. 
 
 Eleanor considered that it was possible to connect child welfare professionals using 
an electronic information system but did not believe this would necessarily lead to 
effective interprofessional communication or intervention planning. In that sense, she 
believed, the information system might provide false reassurance. Like Christine, she 
was also of the view that electronic interprofessional information sharing is problematic 
because different professions do not share a common lexicon and may use the same 
terms and concepts in different ways, leading to differences in interpretation. 
 
 Eleanor was deeply sceptical about the role of the PRM tool because of its focus on 
individual risk factors rather than taking account of contextual risks such as poverty, 
environmental disadvantage, family violence and poor social networks. She also 
concurred with Christine that the predictive risk modelling tool cannot account for 
dynamic changes in risk and resilience factors over time. For Eleanor, the PRM tool 
carried the risk that a focus on information systems and risk assessment would detract 
from the human, relationship focused, complex and dynamic nature of professional 
work with families. Finally, her main ethical concern lay in the surveillance of 
population groups without consent and the extent to which this technical development 




 Although the number of informants in this study is small, their closeness to the 
policy process and their role as elite expert advisors to government makes their insights 
into an otherwise opaque process very illuminating. Their relative independence from 
government also makes it possible for them to adopt a more critical perspective than a 
civil servant might have been able to adopt. Whilst each informant had a unique 
standpoint on the policy process there were several cross-cutting themes including: the 
key role and influence of Minister Bennett, an awareness of the ways in which the 
policy discourse was actively steered by governmental actors, and a deep ambivalence 
about the ethics of the proposed technologies, especially the PRM tool. The next chapter 
explores many of the same issues but in the context of the public, news media 
controversy about ViKI and the PRM tool. 
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Chapter 7: Findings: News Media Articles 
 
 This chapter presents findings from a sample of news media articles that discuss 
ViKI and/or the predictive risk modelling tool. As described in chapter five, the analysis 
takes a narrative methodological approach, used, in this instance, to analyse stories told 
and arguments made about a technological and policy innovation in the child protection 
field. Because of the rhetorical nature of public media accounts – stories told by policy 
actors who seek to influence and persuade public opinion – a rhetorical narrative 
analysis technique was applied to identify both the explicit and implicit premises of the 
narrator’s arguments.   
 
 The application of this technique to news media reports results in the identification 
of stories, storylines, narrative oppositions, syllogisms and enthymemes to tease out the 
implicit inferences in public rhetoric (see chapter five for a discussion of the method). 
Table 2 lists the ten news media articles sampled using the sampling approach described 
in chapter five. Links to the complete online articles are provided for reference in the 
table below.  A brief description of each article is included in Appendix 3. Inclusion of 
the links to the complete article is to help the reader assess the validity of the analyst’s 
interpretation of the implicit premises in the enthymemes (expressed in capital letters). 
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 The first six news articles were published between October 11th and October 25th 
2012, and the last four between May 21st and August 3rd 2015. The articles varied in 
length from 332 to 2,493 words and the complete dataset included 9,480 words. The 
dataset included only those articles from the two largest circulation news media: the 
New Zealand Herald (n=8 articles) and the Dominion Post (n=2 articles). 
 
 The findings below are arranged into two parts. The first relates to those articles 
published in October 2012 that respond to the government’s announcement about the 
White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand Government, 2012a, 2012b), 
principally featuring arguments made by Minister Paula Bennett, and the response of a 
range of different experts and policy actors. The second part discusses four articles 
published between May and August 2015 that delineate issues with the PRM tool and 
the closure of the planned, prospective observational study by the incoming Minister 
Anne Tolley.  
 
The 2012 News Media Articles 
 
NEWS_01 Trevett, C. (2012, Oct 11). Govt Database to Track 30,000 At-Risk Kids. 
 
 Most of this article presents the views of Minister Bennett and, following analysis of 
the data, three significant stories were identified:  
• Story 1.1: Poverty is not an excuse 
• Story 1.2: The database is critical and being intrusive is justified 
• Story 1.3: Children will not be stigmatized. 
 
Story 1.1: Poverty is not an Excuse. 
 
 Storyline. This is a story about Minister Paula Bennett rejecting claims by 
spokespeople from two opposition parties who stated that poverty is the most significant 




• poverty associated with child abuse/poverty not associated with child abuse 
• finding excuses for child abuse/holding people responsible for child abuse. 
 
Enthymeme 1.1.1. Poverty is the most significant factor in child abuse. The 
government’s White Paper does not address child poverty. THEREFORE, THE 
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GOVERNMENT’S WHITE PAPER WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PREVENT CHILD 
ABUSE. 
 
Enthymeme 1.1.2. It is morally wrong to use poverty as an excuse for child abuse. 
LABOUR AND THE GREENS USE POVERTY AS AN EXCUSE FOR CHILD 
ABUSE. THEREFORE, LABOUR AND THE GREENS ARE MORALLY WRONG. 
 
Commentary on Story 1.1. Enthymeme 1.1.1 above represents the arguments of the 
two opposition spokespeople as presented by the journalist. Although the concluding 
premise is implicit the argument is clear that since the government’s White Paper “does 
not address child poverty” and “poverty was the most significant factor in child abuse” 
then the White Paper will be ineffective.  
 
 Minster Bennett’s riposte, represented in Enthymeme 1.1.2, only makes the major 
premise explicit, but is a clear attempt to rebut the political critique of the opposition 
parties by shifting the argument from an empirical claim  that poverty is a significant 
factor in child abuse – a relatively uncontroversial claim supported by several empirical 
studies (for example Berger & Waldfogel, 2011; Bywaters, Brady, Sparks, & Bos, 2014; 
Cancian, Shook Slack & Yang, 2013; Fein & Lee, 2003; Shook & Testa, 1997) – to a 
moral claim.  
 
 In doing so, from a narrative perspective, Minister Bennett makes a rhetorical shift 
from logos to ethos10, de-emphasising the logical and empirical claim being made by 
the opposition MPs, and foregrounding a moral and ethical argument about using 
poverty as an excuse for child maltreatment. There is here also an appeal to emotion, or 
the use of pathos, calling on readers to reject arguments that might place children in 
harms way. As Gottweis (2006) puts it, “Emotions belong to the repertoire of rhetoric, 
and emotional display and the language of passion may very well coexist with 
argumentative and ethical discourse.” (p. 474) 
 
Story 1.2: The Database is Critical and Being Intrusive is Justified. 
 
Storyline. The database will allow child-care professionals to share information that 
will prevent child harm and child homicide. We need to re-balance concerns about 
privacy with the need to protect children from harm. 
 
Oppositions. 
• sharing information/ failing to share information 
• preventing child harm and homicide/failing to prevent child harm and homicide;  
• being intrusive/protecting the right to privacy 
• putting the pieces together/not putting the pieces together 
 
Enthymeme 1.2.1. In cases like Nia Glassie’s different agencies held a little piece of 
information but did not share it. If agencies shared information it could have helped 
prevent the death of Nia Glassie. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S PLANS FOR 




10 See the discussion of the three modes of argumentation – logos, ethos and pathos – in chapter five. 
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Enthymeme 1.2.2. Some people consider the database to be intrusive into the 
privacy of families. However, by enabling better information sharing, the database 
might help to prevent child homicides. THEREFORE, THE ENDS JUSTIFIES THE 
MEANS, BEING INTRUSIVE IS JUSTIFIED. 
 
Commentary on Story 1.2. There are two different arguments embedded in this 
story represented in enthymemes 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 both of which have implicit 
conclusions. Combined, the two arguments are essentially justifications for the 
information sharing database and for the predictive risk modelling tool. Justification for 
information sharing is linked to the case of Nia Glassie where it is argued, that her death 
might have been prevented had professionals shared information, therefore an electronic 
information system could prevent child homicides. Secondly, enthymeme 1.2.2 
effectively heads off any arguments about breaches of privacy, by entailing that the 
benefit of preventing of child homicide outweighs the burden of the loss of privacy. 
This last comment about sacrificing privacy echoes the Minister’s comments in the 
video associated with the Green Paper. In that video she asked viewers directly, “…what 
you would give up so that vulnerable children come first. Are you willing for all 
children to be tracked at birth for example?” (New Zealand Government, July 2011a). 
 
 The case of “our lovely Nia Glassie” is explicitly referred to in the news media 
article and the article includes an image of her. From a narrative point of view the case 
of Nia Glassie is used as an exemplar (Feldman & Skolberg, 2002) to represent all 
children who are maltreated. Once again, the Minister’s rhetoric uses pathos (Gottweis, 
2007) to mobilise public concern. Indeed, in this argument Minister Bennett moves 
clearly from logos to pathos as the foundation of her argument, appealing to the 
emotional sensibilities of the media reading public and pushing aside doubts they might 
have about the new technology. The Minister’s rhetorical choices resonate with the 
point made by Gottweis that, “as uncertainty becomes more pronounced in many policy 
fields, it might be useful to reconsider pathos and emotion not as a ‘force’ on its own, as 
a ‘fact’ of political life’, but as being intrinsically linked to the everyday practice of 
policy making, as a rhetorical device that takes considerable impact in many policy 
areas and is a key element of policy argumentation”. (Gottweis, 2006, p. 475) 
 
Story 1.3: Children Will not be Stigmatized. 
 
Storyline. This is a story explaining that, although some children who end up in the 




• stigmatision / non-stigmatisation 
• automatic responses / professional discretion 
 
Syllogism 1.3.1. The automatic predictive risk modelling tool may identify some 
children as being at risk who turn out not to be at risk. However, no response will be 
activated unless a professional decides to do so. Therefore, children will not be 
stigmatised or worked with unnecessarily. 
 
Commentary on Story 1.3. Although it is not explicit in the extract above, or in the 
article, this argument is clearly a reference to the predictive risk modelling tool and 
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arguments that, because it generates a significant number of false positives, it may lead 
to the labelling and stigmatisation of families.  Minister Bennett’s argument is expressed 
as a syllogism, rather than an enthymeme, because each of the premises is explicit. The 
issue here is firstly, that the Minister refers to the stigmatisation of children rather than 
the stigmatisation of parents or caregivers, and the argument seems to be that because 
there is a human interpreting the findings before action is taken then no stigmatisation 
will result. And yet the point being made by other policy actors who are concerned with 
the predictive risk modelling tool, is that it is the knowledge that human actors have of 
the risk score that may lead to the labelling and stigmatization of parents and carers. 
Policy makers may assume that keeping a human in the decision-making loop will avert 
poor outcomes by allowing human judgement to override an inaccurate risk prediction, 
yet relatively little is known about how machine learning algorithms affect human 
decision making, and some studies suggest, “that people struggle to interpret machine 
learning models and to incorporate algorithmic predictions into their decisions, often 
leading machine learning systems to generate unexpected and unfair outcomes”. (Green 
& Chen, 2019, p. 3). 
 
NEWS_02 Collins, S. (2012, October 13). Economists Maths Aim to Forecast Which 
Children Will be Abused 
 
Analysis identified two main stories in this article: 
• Story 2.1: The predictive strength of mammograms and 
• Story 2.2: Rushing into using the method without careful testing. 
 
Story 2.1: The Predictive Strength of Mammograms. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about the predictive risk modelling tool designed to predict 
the likelihood of child maltreatment. It tells us that, even although the predictions made 




• being on benefits/not being on benefits 
• substantiated maltreatment/ no substantiated maltreatment 
• false positives/false negatives 
 
Enthymeme 2.1.1. The predictions based on the predictive risk modelling tool are 
not certain but are similar to the predictive strength of mammograms. 
MAMMOGRAMS ARE AN ACCEPTED TECHNOLOGY USED TO PREVENT 
SERIOUS RISK OF HARM. THEREFORE, THE PREDICTIVE RISK MODELLING 
TOOL SHOULD BE INTRODUCED TO PREVENT SERIOUS RISK OF HARM. 
 
Commentary on Story 2.1. This story presents the views of Associate Professor 
Rhema Vaithianathan, one of the original architects of the PRM. The persuasive strength 
of the enthymeme deployed in her argument lies in keeping the minor premise and the 
conclusion implicit and using an analogy designed to compare the usefulness of a 
familiar technology with this new technology. The story relies on the readers familiarity 
with mammography as a well-established and accepted technology. The use of an 
analogy with medical technology may also provide the PRM tool with a reassuring 
scientific gloss. What the argument does not highlight is the continuing debate about the 
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harms and benefits of mammography in the medical world (Løberg, et al., 2015), or the 
difference between a medical imaging technology that tries to capture evidence of a 
currently exiting physical condition and one that attempts to risk score a possible future 
event based on administrative data that is open to a significant degree of interpretation. 
 
Story 2.2: Rushing into Using the Method Without Careful Testing. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about a child development expert – Professor David 
Fergusson – who warns against introducing the predictive risk modelling tool without 
careful testing.  
 
Oppositions. 
• risking labelling and stigma/avoiding labelling and stigma 
• careful testing/mass roll out without careful testing 
 
Enthymeme 2.2.1. BEING WRONGLY IDENTIFIED AS A POTENTIAL CHILD 
ABUSER LABELS AND STIGMATISES PEOPLE. THE PREDICTIVE RISK 
MODELLING TOOL INCLUDES A HIGH RATE OF FALSE POSITIVES. Therefore, 
the predictive risk modelling tool will label and stigmatise a lot of people. 
 
Enthymeme 2.2.2. THE CORRECT WAY TO IMPLEMENT NEW 
INTERVENTIONS THAT HAVE RISKS IS TO CONDUCT PILOT STUDIES AND 
RANDOMISED CONTROL TRIALS. The predictive risk modelling tool is a new 
intervention that is associated with significant risks. Therefore, the method should be 
carefully tested with pilot studies and randomized control trials before being widely 
implemented. 
 
Commentary on Story 2.2. This story presents the views of Professor David 
Fergusson as a counterpoint to those of Associate Professor Rhema Vaithianathan. 
Fergusson’s arguments are presented to highlight the risks of social workers labelling 
and stigmatizing carers as “child abusers”. The argument is not that this will be 
inevitable, or will outweigh any benefits, but that caution should be exercised in the use 
of unproven technologies such as the predictive risk modelling tool and that a more 
rigorous, evidence-based approach – using randomised control trials – should be 
adopted. 
 
NEWS_03: APNZ (2012, October 14). NZ Has 'Underlying Current of Violence 
Towards Children': Paula Bennett 
 
Analysis identified one main story in this article: 
• Story 3.1: It is “too simplistic” to blame poverty for New Zealand’s child 
abuse rates. 
 
Story 3.1: It Is “Too Simplistic” to Blame Poverty for New Zealand’s 
Child Abuse Rates. 
 
 Storyline. This is a story where Minister Bennett explains that reducing 




• simple explanations of child maltreatment/complex explanations of child 
maltreatment 
• poverty as one factor/ over 100 different factors. 
 
 Enthymeme 3.1.1. Child maltreatment is a complex problem involving over 100 
different factors, one of which may be poverty. Jacinda Ardern (Labour) and Metiria 
Turei (Green Party) argue that poverty is the most significant factor in child 
maltreatment. THEREFORE, THE ARGUMENTS PROPOSED BY JACINDA 
ARDERN AND METIRIA TUREI ARE TOO SIMPLISTIC. 
 
 Commentary on Story 3.1. This story appears to be another intervention to 
tackle the criticism from opposition parties. This time the argument accepts that poverty 
may be a factor in child abuse but argues that child maltreatment is multifactorial. It is 
not clear what the, “…list of a hundred different factors” consists of, but this may be a 
reference to the 132 factors used by the predictive risk modelling tool (Vaithianathan, 
Maloney, Putnam-Hornstein & Jiang, 2013). The purpose of the story is to counter the 
critique from the political opposition and support the position that focusing on poverty 
is not a solution to child maltreatment. 
 
NEWS_04: Misa, T. (2012, October 15). Tapu Misa: Child Abuse Plan Shows a Lack 
of Vision.  
 
Two significant stories were identified during analysis: 
• Story 4.1: Downplaying the role of poverty and 
• Story 4.2: Targeting misses the mark. 
 
Story 4.1: Downplaying the Role of Poverty. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about how the government’s White Paper downplays a 
well-established association between poverty, inequality and child maltreatment. 
 
Oppositions. 
• acknowledging the association between poverty and child maltreatment/ 
downplaying the association between poverty and inequality. 
 
Enthymeme 4.1.1. It is not possible to tackle child maltreatment effectively without 
acknowledging its strong association with poverty and inequality. The government’s 
White Paper downplays the association between poverty and inequality. THEREFORE, 
THE GOVERNMENTS WHITE PAPER CANNOT EFFECTIVELY TACKLE CHILD 
MALTREATMENT. 
 
Commentary on Story 4.1. As enthymeme 4.1.1 illustrates, the main argument in 
this story effectively reiterates, with more detailed evidence, the argument in 
enthymeme 1.1.1 that child maltreatment cannot be tackled without tackling poverty 






Story 4.2: Targeting Misses the Mark. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about how targeting services on particular population 
groups can have unintended side-effects: making the services stigmatised, negatively 
impacting uptake and demeaning service users. 
Oppositions. 
• universal services/targeted services 
• social cohesion/social stigma 
• inclusion/humiliation. 
 
Enthymeme 4.2.1. Targeting services on vulnerable people can have unintended 
consequences such as creating a ‘poverty trap’, stigmatising services and humiliating 
service users. The government’s plans for children’s services propose targeting services 
on vulnerable children. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS RISK 
CREATING A ‘POVERTY TRAP’, STIGMATISING SERVICES AND 
HUMILIATING SERVICE USERS. 
 
Enthymeme 4.2.2. Providing universal services is more effective because they avoid 
the unintended effects of targeting and have the additional benefits of building 
community and promoting social cohesion. THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS DO 
NOT PROVIDE UNIVERSAL SERVICES. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S 
PROPOSALS MISS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD COMMUNITY AND 
PROMOTE SOCIAL COHESION. 
 
Commentary on Story 4.2. The two enthymemes in this story both contain implicit 
conclusions that offer strong criticism of the government’s plans to target services on 
the most vulnerable. The first argues that targeting services on population groups can 
have unintended consequences associated with stigmatisation. The second enthymeme 
addresses the opportunity cost of not offering universal services that have additional 
benefits of building community and promoting social cohesion. This story therefore 
highlights the underlying problems with a political rationality based on selectivist social 
investment, contrasting it with an alternative political rationality founded on 
universalism and wellbeing. 
 
NEWS_05: New Zealand Herald (2012, October 20). Predicting Trouble: Child 
Abuse Database Raises Eyebrows  
 
Analysis identified five distinct stories in this article: 
• Story 5.1: Raising alarm in surprising quarters 
• Story 5.2: The danger of a revolution 
• Story 5.3: A new database may not even be necessary 
• Story 5.4: Enormous amounts of stress 
• Story 5.5: Doing more harm than good. 
 
Story 5.1: Raising Alarm in Surprising Quarters. 
 
Storyline. Dr. Patrick Kelly (head of New Zealand’s main child abuse unit and 
member of a 2009 Experts’ Forum on Child Abuse), is surprised and alarmed at the 





• sceptical experts/convinced experts 
 
Enthymeme 5.1.1. WHEN PEOPLE REGARDED AS EXPERTS IN THEIR FIELD 
ARE SURPRISED OR ALARMED AT PROPOSED GOVERNMENT POLICY 
CHANGES IT INDICATES THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG. Dr Patrick Kelly (an 
acknowledged child protection expert) is surprised and alarmed at government’s plans 
for a revolutionary new "predictive risk model". THEREFORE, SOMETHING IS 
WRONG WITH THE PROPOSED GOVERNMENT POLICY. 
 
Commentary on Story 5.1. This first story in the article sets the scene and grabs the 
reader’s attention by establishing that a child protection expert, working at a widely 
recognised and respected centre for expertise in child protection, who contributed to a 
government advisory group on child protection, is “alarmed” about a proposed 
government policy to introduce an “untried” technology. The story also implies that 
people with expertise in child protection have not been consulted or involved in 
decision making about an important policy issue. 
 
 
Story 5.2: The Danger of a Revolution. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about how revolutionary changes can carry risks and 
disrupt existing practices. 
 
Oppositions. 
• evolutionary change/revolutionary change 
 
Enthymeme 5.2.1. Introducing untested revolutionary change is uncertain of success 
and can disrupt existing practices. The government’s proposed new "predictive risk 
model" is an untested and revolutionary change. THEREFORE, THE PREDICTIVE 
RISK MODEL IS UNCERTAIN OF SUCCESS AND MAY DISRUPT EXISTING 
PRACTICES. 
 
Commentary on Story 5.2. Having established the credentials of the source in the 
earlier part of the article the journalist uses quotations from Kelly to highlight the 
riskiness and uncertainty of the proposed policy and technological change. This 
argument also implies its opposite, that slower, more evolutionary change might be less 
risky and disruptive. 
 
Story 5.3: A New Database May Not Even Be Necessary. 
 




• talking to each other/ sharing information on a database 




Enthymeme 5.3.1. It is possible to encourage interprofessional information sharing 
without investing public funds in expensive information technology. THE 
GOVERNMENT PLANS TO INVEST IN AN EXPENSIVE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO 
WASTE PUBLIC FUNDS. 
 
Commentary on Story 5.3. The conclusion, implied in this story, is that, since the 
same outcomes can be achieved using simpler less technological approaches to 
information sharing, the government is wasting public funds. 
 
Story 5.4: Enormous Amounts of Stress. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about how relying on a computer model undermines 




• supporting professional judgement/undermining professional judgement. 
• inducing stress in families/ not inducing stress in families 
• creating risks for children/ not creating risks for children 
 
Enthymeme 5.4.1. Relying on a computer model can creates lots of false negatives 
and false positives. The uncertainty created by false positives and false negatives can 
undermine professional judgement and create unnecessary stress that leads to risk for 
children. THEREFORE, THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PREDICTIVE RISK 
MODELLING TOOL WILL UNDERMINE PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT AND 
CREATE STRESS ON FAMILIES THAT LEADS TO RISKS FOR CHILDREN. 
 
Commentary on Story 5.4. Citing the CEO of the professional association of social 
workers, this story highlights the PRM tool and the issue of false positives and 
negatives with two main points included in the conclusion: that the PRM will 
undermine the professional judgement of social workers and, since many predicted 
high-risk families will be false positives, interventions may induce unnecessary stress 
by labelling and stigmatising families leading to increased risks for children. 
 
Story 5.5: Doing More Harm Than Good. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about the harm that might be caused to the high proportion 
of families who will be identified as high risk by the predictive risk modelling tool but 
would not go on to harm their children. 
 
 Oppositions. 
• doing harm/doing good 
• knowing that an intervention will work/not knowing that an intervention will 
work. 
 
Enthymeme 5.5.1. Intervening with families who have been falsely identified as 
being likely to maltreat their children can only be justified if no harm will result from 
the intervention. The government does not know whether harm will result from these 
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interventions. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS TO INTERVENE 
IS NOT JUSTIFIED. 
 
Commentary on Story 5.5. This story reinforces the previous story 5.2 in 
highlighting the riskiness and “experimental” nature of the PRM. 
 
NEWS_06: Dare, T. (2012, October 25). Abuse Prediction Tool Too Vital To Ignore. 
New Zealand Herald. 
 
There are a number of points made in the article but all of these points form the basis 
for a single story best described using the title of the article. 
 
Story 6.1: Abuse Prediction Tool too Vital to Ignore. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about how the concerns that critics have of the 
implementation of the PRM tool should be set aside. 
 
 Oppositions. 
• accepting the criticisms of the PRM / rejecting the criticisms of the PRM 
• implementing the PRM/ not implementing the PRM 
 
 Enthymeme 6.1.1. A number of people have been critical of the government’s plans 
to introduce a predictive risk modelling tool for child maltreatment. These objections 
are either ill-founded or describe issues that are possible to manage. THEREFORE, 
THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE THE PRM TOOL SHOULD 
NOT BE REJECTED 
 
Commentary on Story 6.1. As an opinion editorial by one of the Auckland 
University team who developed the PRM tool this article represents a significant 
intervention in the public debate about the PRM. The author identifies several 
objections to the tool – that social workers already use risk assessment tools, that the 
PRM will lead social workers to rely more on computers than their own judgement, that 
the tool is linked to efficiency savings and will lead to lower spending on child 
maltreatment, that social workers can share information without the need for a database 
and that being identified as an at-risk family might increase stress and the risk of abuse. 
These objections are dismissed as either ill-founded or manageable and the implied 
assumption is that the government should not be persuaded from its plans to implement 
the PRM. Many of the argument made here are repeated in detail in the full ethical 
review of the PRM tool written by Dare (2013). 
 
The 2015 News Media Articles: Responses to News of Testing the Predictive Risk 
Modelling Tool 
 
 The flurry of articles in the news media during 2012, in response to the publication 
of the White Paper (New Zealand Government, 2012a, 2012b), focused mostly on ViKI 
and, in particular, on the PRM tool. However, between 2012 and 2015 the media debate 
fell silent only to be reopened by a news article on a proposed trial of the PRM tool by 
the Ministry of Social Development using historical case studies. As discussed in 
chapter two, there had been a change of Minister in October 2014 and the new Minister, 
Anne Tolley, called a halt to the plans of MSD officials to conduct a population wide, 
 65 
prospective, observational study of the PRM on all newborn children. However, the 
Minister did give approval for a more limited trial of the PRMs influence on social 
workers decision making using historical cases. This intervention did not become public 
knowledge until eight months after the decision was made in the form of a press release 
reported by the media in July 2015 (see NEWS_8). So, the news media article 
NEWS_07 was an intervention by the MSD describing their intention to conduct what 
was officially referred to as the vignette-based, user testing trial but without making 
any mention of the fact that the Minister had cancelled a population wide prospective, 
observational trial (see chapter two for the sequence of events). 
 
NEWS_07: Collins, S. (2015, May 21). CYF In Child Abuse Predictor Trials  
 
Analysis identified two main stories: 
• Story 7.1: Evaluating the PRM’s use as a screening tool on professional 
decision-making 
• Story 7.2: Proactive use of the PRM. 
 
Story 7.1: Evaluating the PRM tool’s use to Support Professional Decision-
Making on Cases Notified to CYF. 
 
 Storyline. This is a story that describes how the MSD plan to evaluate the PRM by 
comparing how two groups of social workers make decisions about historical cases: 
both groups will make decisions about historical cases but only one will have access to 
PRM data and have been trained in its use. 
 
 Oppositions. 
• making decisions with training and access to PRM data/ making decisions with 
no training or access how to PRM data 
• better decision-making/worse decision-making. 
 
Enthymeme 7.1.1. TRAINING SOCIAL WORKERS IN HOW TO USE THE PRM 
MAY LEAD TO BETTER DECISION-MAKING AND AVOID UNINTENDED 
OUTCOMES. MSD and CYF plan to evaluate the effect of training social workers in 
how to use the PRM to screen notifies cases. THEREFORE, MSD AND CYF WILL BE 
ABLE TO DISCOVER IF THEY CAN PREVENT UNINTENDED OUTCOMES. 
 
Commentary on Story 7.1. This story highlights a cautious and considered approach 
to testing the PRM tool, and its effects on the decision making of social workers, using 
historical cases. The story also signals that what is being sought is ministerial approval 
to use the tool to support decision making on “…’live’ calls to the centre”, in other 
words, where cases have been notified to the CYF call centre using PRM to triage 
notification rather than to surveil the population. As we will discover, Anne Tolley, the 
new Minister for Social Development, had intervened to halt a proposed population 
wide, prospective, observational study of the PRM tool eight months before this article 
was published, but this is not yet public knowledge. 
 




Storyline. The expert who developed the predictive risk modelling tool hopes it will 
be used to proactively identify at-risk children in the population at large. 
 
Opposites. 
• Proactive use of PRM on the total population/reactive use of PRM with children 
reported to CYF  
• reactive use of the PRM in New Zealand/proactive use of the PRM in the USA. 
 
Enthymeme 7.2.1. Proactive use of the predictive risk modelling tool, developed in 
New Zealand, can help to identify at-risk children in the population before they have 
been abused. Unlike Pittsburgh in the USA, the New Zealand government are not 
trialling proactive use of the PRM. THEREFORE, THE NEW ZEALAND 
GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ACHIEVE THE REAL BENEFITS OF A 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED BY NEW ZEALAND EXPERTS. 
 
Commentary on Story 7.2. In this story, Rhema Vaithianathan, one of the chief 
architects of the tool and a spokesperson for the PRM, appears to be reacting to a 
change in direction for the PRM from a tool that would risk assess all newborn children, 
to one that would only be used on children who had been notified to CYF. She is 
advocating strongly for the population wide use of the tool and comparing the position 
of the New Zealand government unfavourably to the state of Pittsburgh in the USA 
where her ideas about proactive use of the PRM are being trialled11. 
 
NEWS_08: Jones, N. (2015, July 30). Anne Tolley Scraps 'Lab Rat' Study On 
Children. 
 
Analysis identified four main stories in this article: 
Story 8.1: Not on my watch, children are not lab rats. 
Story 8.2: Testing the predictive modelling tool with historical data 
Story 8.3: Population wide use of the PRM will never fly 
Story 8.4: Minister Bennett was unaware of the proposal 
 
Story 8.1: Not on My Watch, Children Are Not Lab Rats. 
 
Storyline. This is a story about how the incoming Minister for Social Development 
stopped a planned observational study to test the predictive risk modelling tool that 
would have seen the model applied to predict the risk of maltreatment of all newborn 
children in New Zealand and then monitor whether or not those predicted to be at high 
risk went on to be abused. 
 
Oppositions. 
• Treating children as children/treating children as ‘lab rats’ 
• observing harm occur and doing nothing/intervening to protect children from 
harm 
 
11 In fact, Allegheny County, in the state of Pittsburgh, was using a version of the PRM tool to assist the 
decision-making of child protection call screeners. However, this implementation was also proving to be 
highly controversial as one report, in a normally tech friendly news outlet, highlighted that, “Human 
choices, biases, and discretion are built into the system in several ways.” (Eubanks, 2018a). 
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• being a responsible minister/ not being a responsible minister. 
 
Enthymeme 8.1.1. A RESPONSIBLE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ENSURES THAT THEIR OFFICIALS DON’T TAKE ACTIONS THAT ARE 
UNETHICAL AND NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Minister Tolley acted to 
prevent an unethical proposal by MSD officials. THEREFORE, MINISTER TOLLEY 
IS A RESPONSIBLE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 Commentary on Story 8.1. Just two months after Dorothy Adams announced an 
MSD trial using historical case studies Minister Tolley makes a dramatic announcement 
that she intervened to stop a proposed observational study on all New Zealand 
newborns. The rhetoric deployed here is all about ethos, demonstrating the ethical 
character of the new Minister who intervened to halt a potentially unethical action by 
her Ministry officials. What is most curious about this dramatic public announcement is 
that it refers to a decision made some eight months previously, at which point, no 
announcement was made. 
 
Story 8.2: Testing the Predictive Risk Modelling Tool with Historical 
Data. 
 




• Testing with historical data/ testing with live data. 
 
Enthymeme 8.2.1. TESTING THE PREDICTIVE RISK MODELLING TOOL 
WITH HISTORICAL DATA IS MORE ETHICAL AND SAFER THAN TESTING IT 
WITH LIVE DATA. The MSD are testing the predictive risk modelling tool with 
historical data. THEREFORE, THE MSD IS MORE ETHICAL AND SAFE. 
 
Commentary on Story 8.2. This second story ties back into the stories of the 
previous article where the trial on how the PRM influences professional decision-
making using historical data was announced. However, it remains unclear why no 
reference was made to the closure of the population wide, prospective, observational 
study either at the time the decision was made, or when MSD made the announcement 
about the study with historical cases in May (see News_07 above). 
 
Story 8.3: Population Wide Use of the PRM Will Never Fly. 
 
Storyline. Using the predictive risk modelling tool to assess the risk of individual 
families who are not already known to Child, Youth and Family is not feasible and will 
not be implemented 
 
Oppositions. 
• Using the PRM to assess risk in the whole population /Using the PRM to assess 
risk in children notified to CYF. 
• Social workers approaching families not known to CYF / social workers 
focussing on work with families known to CYF 
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Enthymeme 8.3.1. POLICIES THAT LEAD TO UNNECESSARY STATE 
INTERVENTION IN PRIVATE FAMILY LIFE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED. Using 
the PRM to screen the whole population of newborn children will lead to unnecessary 
state intervention in private family life. THEREFORE, THE PRM SHOULD NOT BE 
USED TO SCREEN THE WHOLE POPULATION OF NEWBORN CHILDREN. 
 
Commentary on Story 8.3. Although Minister Tolley has argued that the main 
reason for the closure of the proposed observational study was based on the ethics of the 
proposal, in this story she reveals another reason: a discomfort with social workers, as 
agents of the state, “out in the community with clipboards knocking on people's doors 
[based on predicted risk]”. This seems like a stance that is closer to the National party’s 
traditional support of the family as the fundamental family unit (see chapter two) and 
dislike of state intervention in family life and may indicate a significant shift from 
former Minister Bennett’s commitment to the use of the PRM to target vulnerable 
children as part of the wider data-driven commitment to selective social investment. 
This story also suggests a possible new role for the PRM as a tool to assist decision-
making at the point of notification. 
 
Story 8.4 Minister Bennett Was Unaware of the Proposal 
 
Storyline. Minister Bennett, the former Minister for Social Development, was not 
aware of the proposed observational trial, so she cannot be held responsible for it. 
 
Oppositions. 
• Being aware of an unethical proposal/not being aware of an unethical 
proposal 
 
Enthymeme 8.4.1. IF MINISTER BENNET WAS AWARE OF THIS PROPOSAL 
SHE MUST HAVE SUPPORTED IT. Minister Bennett was not aware of this proposal. 
THEREFORE, WE CANNOT ASSUME THAT SHE SUPPORTED IT. 
 
Commentary on Story 8.4. This story suggests that the journalist is aware that there 
has been a shift in policy direction and has attempted to check whether the former 
Minister for Social Development was aware, and therefore responsible for, the proposed 
observational trial, a claim that is denied by a government spokesperson. 
 
NEWS_09: Dominion Post (2015, July 30). Editorial: Children Not To Be 'Lab Rats' 
In Fight Against Abuse  
 
Analysis identified two stories in this article: 
• 9.1 No sane politician could have done otherwise 
• 9.2 Sensible reforms 
 
Story 9.1: No Sane Politician Could Have Done Otherwise 
 
Storyline. MSD officials appear to have proposed a study that would identify 





• identifying children at high risk of harm and doing nothing/intervening to 
protect children from harm  
 
Enthymeme 9.1.1. Conducting an observational study that would not intervene if 
children were identified as being at high risk of abuse is unethical. MSD officials 
proposed such a study. THEREFORE, MSD OFFICIALS ARE UNETHICAL. 
 
Commentary on Story 9.1. This story makes a strong case that the actions proposed 
by MSD officials were irresponsible and that the intervention by Minister Tolley helped 
to avert the irresponsible decision making of her officials. Yet the story also makes it 
clear that the proposal was submitted to the Minster for approval prior to ethical 
clearance, that is its content would still have been subject to ethical review. The editorial 
makes no mention of the delay in revealing this news. 
 
Story 9.2 Sensible Reforms 
 
Storyline. Intervening to prevent child maltreatment is difficult and requires a 
careful balancing act, Minister Tolley’s proposed legislative reforms are sensible, but 
the MSDs proposed use of the PRM tool is not.  
 
Oppositions. 
• Achieving the correct balance between intervening to protect children and 
breaching people’s rights/ Not achieving the correct balance between intervening 
to protect children and breaching people’s rights. 
• Sensible reforms/ irresponsible reforms. 
 
Enthymeme 9.2.1. Tackling child abuse and neglect is a difficult domain and 
sensible reforms require a careful balancing act between the rights of parents and 
children. MINISTER TOLLEY’S PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS ACHIEVE 
THIS BALANCE. THEREFORE, MINISTER TOLLEY IS A SENSIBLE MINISTER. 
 
Enthymeme 9.2.2. Tackling child abuse and neglect is a difficult domain and 
sensible reforms require a careful balancing act between the rights of parents and 
children. THE MSD OFFICAL’S PROPOSED OBSERVATIONAL STUDY DOES 
NOT ACHIEVE THIS BALANCE. THEREFORE, THE MSD OFFICAL’S ARE NOT 
SENSIBLE. 
 
Commentary on Story 9.2. In this story the editorial makes a direct contrast 
between legislative reforms proposed by Minister Tolley that are difficult but, according 
to the author, necessary and acceptable12; and the proposed prospective, observational 
study that is attributed to MSD officials who are described as irresponsible. The rhetoric 
deployed in this story is clearly linked to ethos contrasting the character and actions of 
Minister Tolley favourably against those of her officials. 
 
12  The “sensible reforms” referred to were part of Minister Tolley’s own plans to modernise child 
protection services in Aotearoa New Zealand (Modernising Child, Youth and Family Expert Panel, 2015). 
Reforms that would eventually lead to a renewed organisational crisis and allegations of institution racism 
in relation to dramatic threefold increase in the number of court orders to remove unborn children at birth 
(Sachdeva & Reid, 201). 
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NEWS_10: Dare, T. (2015, August 4). Anne Tolley's 'Lab Rats' Call Inflammatory 
Political Rhetoric.  
 
Analysis of this article identified two stories: 
• Story 10.1: Science collided with politics, and politics won 
• Story 10.2: Rhetoric won the day. 
 
Story 10.1: Science Collided with Politics, and Politics Won 
 
Storyline. A Minister closes down a proposed research study for political reasons.  
 
Oppositions. 
• Producing evidence for effective social policy / acting politically 
 
Enthymeme 10.1.1. WHEN POLITICIANS INTERVENE TO PREVENT 
SCIENTIFIC STUDIES FOR NO GOOD REASON, WE SHOULD FEEL UNEASY. 
Minister Tolley intervened to prevent a scientific study for no good reason. Therefore, 
we should feel uneasy. 
 
Commentary on story 10.1. As one of the original team that developed the 
prototype, and the author of its ethical review, Professor Dare is a policy actor with an 
obvious interest in the PRM tool. Although Minister Tolley positioned herself as an 
ethical actor in enthymeme’s 8.1.1 and 8.3.1, this story is intended to position Minister 
Tolley as a political actor intervening to close down a ‘scientific study’ for political 
reasons. Although, what those political reasons might be, is not made clear. As we will 
argue in chapter eight, contrasting politics with science is not straightforward since 
there is a complex relationship between science and policy making, especially when, 
“science is being applied to systems that are complex, non-linear and dynamic.” 
(Gluckman, 2011, p. 6) 
 
Story10.2: Rhetoric Won the Day 
 
Storyline. People should be concerned that inflammatory political rhetoric and 
misleading statements can close down important research. 
 
 Oppositions. 
• political rhetoric/a research-driven approach  
• inflammatory views/considered views 
• misleading information/accurate information 
 
Enthymeme 10.2.1. A GENUINE RESEARCH-DRIVEN APPROACH TO 
SOCIAL POLICY MAKING NEEDS POLICY ACTORS, LIKE THE OPPOSITION 
AND THE MEDIA, TO CHALLENGE MISLEADING INFORMATION AND 
POLITICAL RHETORIC USED BY GOVERNMENT. Policy actors failed to challenge 




 Commentary on story 10.2. In the arguments above, and in other points made in the 
article, Tim Dare makes a strong case that the intervention of Minister Tolley was a 
political decision justified with misleading information – that children were at risk of 
being treated like “lab rats” – and political rhetoric. The fact that neither the opposition 
party, or the media, challenged the political nature of the decision is noted by Dare as a 
concern for the future of evidence-informed policy making. However, as we will discuss 
further in chapter eight, this story is itself a rhetorical intervention by a policy actor with 
a vested interest in the PRM tool. 
 
Tabular Summary of Enthymemes and Syllogisms 
 
 Appendix 4 includes a table (table three) tabulating all 24 stories, and 29 
enthymemes and syllogisms identified in the ten news media articles included in the 
sample. It also identifies the policy actors making the arguments, summarises their 
attitude towards the PRM tool – pro, anti, cautious or neutral – and identifies the broad 
issues presented in the arguments. Although there were many individuals quoted in the 
news media reports most of these quotes made individual points rather than narrative 
arguments. In the six news media reports published in 2012 there were nine different 
policy actors making arguments about ViKI and the PRM tool: three politicians (Jacinda 
Ardern MP, Metiria Turei MP and Minister Bennett), three academic experts (Rhema 
Vaithianathan, University of Auckland; David Fergusson, University of Otago; and Tim 
Dare, University of Auckland), one paediatrician (Patrick Kelly, Starship Hospital), the 
CEO of the professional association of social workers (Lucy Sandford-Reed, 
ANZASW) and one journalist13 (Tapu Misa, New Zealand Herald). The only policy 
actors who were arguing in support of ViKI and the PRM tool were Minister Bennett 
and the two academics associated with the development of the prototype (Rhema 
Vaithianathan and Tim Dare). Professor David Fergusson (University of Otago) was 
cautious and the remaining five commentators were negative. 
 
 The commentators making arguments in the four news media articles sampled from 
2015 included an MSD official, the incoming MSD Minister Tolley, a spokesperson for 
Minister Bennett, Rhema Vaithianathan, Tim Dare and a Dominion Post editor. This 
time only the two academics associated with the development of the prototype, PRM 
tool were arguing in support of the PRM tool, others were either anti or cautious. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter used a rhetorical narrative analysis to analyse and make visible the 
arguments used in the news media to debate the White Paper for Vulnerable Children, 
ViKI and the PRM tool. The majority of these arguments focused on the risks and 
benefits associated with the PRM tool. The following chapter uses the findings from the 
key informant interviews and news media analysis – in combination with reference to 
official documents on the White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand 
Government 2012a, 2012b) and other media sources – to discuss the findings of this 
study and answer its four research questions. 
 
13 Of course, journalists were critical in selecting content and shaping each one of the news media 
reports but this op-ed report was a series of arguments attributed to a freelance journalist. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
 For Flyvbjerg (2006b), the fundamental objective of social science is to understand 
values and interests and how they relate to praxis or practical action; and the key to 
investigating values and interests is to ask the four value-rational questions noted 
below. These value-rational or phronetic questions become particularly pertinent for the 
analysis of a policy that involves the application of an innovative technological 
development since technologies – such as ViKI and the PRM tool – are usually framed 
in terms of an instrumental rationality (Feenberg, 2019). Reflections on techne 
(technical knowledge) must be balanced by a discussion informed by phronesis 
(practical wisdom), and instrumental rationality balanced with democratic rationality14 
(Feenberg, 2019). The four value-rational questions used to structure the discussion of 
findings in this chapter are: 
 
1. Where are we going with ViKI and the PRM tool?  
2. Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?  
3. Is this development desirable?  
4. What, if anything, should we do about it? 
 
With reference to the “we” in the questions above, Flyvbjerg (2006b) notes that: 
 
  Social scientists following this approach realise there is no global and 
unified ‘we’ in relation to which the four questions can be given a final answer. 
What is a ‘gain’ or a ‘loss’ often depends, crucially, on perspective: My gain 
may be your loss. (p. 40) 
 
 In the present context relevant actors include government Ministers, Ministry of 
Social Development officials, professional and academic experts, journalists, service 
users – especially whānau Māori – and all parents of newborn children in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. Each of these actors has different degrees and types of influence and power, 
different stances towards ViKI and the PRM and shifting relationships and alignments 
with each other. The governmentality thesis, and actor-network theory, propose that for 
innovative technologies like ViKI and the PRM to be adopted autonomous actors need 
to be aligned and assembled into a durable network and that this involves a process of 
translation including “negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion” (Callon 
& Latour, 1981, p. 279). Although many of the processes associated with ViKI and the 
PRM tool occurred in settings and between people that were not directly accessible to 
this researcher, traces of the processes (Ricci, 2010) are clearly evident in the interviews 
with key informants (chapter six) and in news media stories (chapter seven). In addition 
to data from the interview and news media analyses, this chapter also, where 
appropriate, draws on references to government policy documents and other news 
media sources, especially two Radio New Zealand programmes broadcast in 2015 
(Cowie, 2015; Ryan, 2015). 
 
 
14 Feenberg (2019) contrasts instrumental rationality with democratic rationality, “…the one 
oriented toward efficiency and control, the other toward public information and deliberation.” 
(p. 238) 
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Where are we Going with the Vulnerable Kids’ Information System and the PRM 
Tool?  
 
 Since the development of the PRM tool is now part of social policy history, and 
ViKI rolled out as a much more modest information system for children’s teams 
(Dudding, 2016), it is clear that, from the standpoint of government’s original 
aspirations, we did not get very far with either system. Yet this was a development that, 
when announced in the White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand 
Government, 2012a, 2012b), was strongly supported by politicians, policy makers and 
academic experts as a solution that would enable major improvements to the child 
protection system in Aotearoa New Zealand. So where were we going with ViKI and 
the PRM tool before the change of Minister and the eventual closure of the PRM 
project? To answer this question, we will consider what the data reveal about the 
overarching political rationality (Cornellison, 2018) informing this development, how 
this rationality shaped the way in which the issue was problematized (Rose & Miller, 
2010), and how ViKI and the PRM tool came to be represented as offering a natural, 
rational, and efficient technological solution (Morozov, 2014). 
 
Social Investment as an Overarching Political Rationality 
 
 As argued in chapters two and four, to fully understand the form that this 
technological and policy innovation took, it must be situated in the context of the 
political rationality of social investment as espoused by the Fifth National Government. 
This perspective was clearly reflected in Simon’s (Frontline Panel: Interviewee #1) 
interview where he identifies the social investment policy as an overarching framework 
motivating the targeted, selective approach advocated by government. It is also worth 
noting that Simon attributed an ethical ‘if we can, then we must’ rationale to the 
comments made by Bill English, then Minister of Finance, about the need to use the 
data held by government for ‘social good’ (an argument we will return to below). 
 
Even though Eleanor (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #2) does not make an explicit 
reference to the social investment approach she was quite clear about the opposition 
between two different perspectives debated in the Scientific Panel which she 
characterised as an opposition between an approach based on the information system 
and “surveillance and risk”; and another based on “thriving and wellbeing” and “…a 
universal system which says every child should have access to supports”. The language 
of the Green Paper (New Zealand Government, 2011b) referred to “…how we ensure 
every child thrives, belongs and achieves”, but, as we will see, the White Paper 
characterised the issues quite differently. The news media article by Tapu Misa 
(NEWS_04) included the same narrative opposition (Feldman and Almquist, 2015) 
identified by Eleanor (Scientific panel: Interviewee #2) and argued strongly against the 
government’s targeted approach that risked stigmatising and humiliating service users, 
and in favour of universal services that “build a sense of community and contribute to 
social cohesion” (enthymemes 4.1.1, 4.2.1 and 4.2.1). Of course, what is playing out 
here is a battle of ideas and competing policy perspectives for problematising the issues 
(Bacchi & Godwin, 2016). Drawing on the work of Gilbert et al. (2011) and Križ and 
Skivenes (2013), Keddell (2014a) distinguished two broad policy orientations in the 
field of child and family policy: a family-focused child welfare orientation and an 
individual child protection orientation, “Child welfare orientations contain an 
assumption of state responsibility for broad-ranging social well-being, linked to a 
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universalist social democratic ideal, while child protection orientations can be related to 
the individually targeted, investigation and punishment-driven models of residualist, 
neo-liberal approaches” (p. 3). Keddell (2014a) concluded that the child welfare 
orientation of the Fifth National Government could be best characterised as an 
individual child protection orientation with an emphasis on selectivity and targeting, 
and that the PRM tool was being used to achieve those ends. 
 
Problematising Child Maltreatment as Child Vulnerability 
 
 According to Bacchi and Goodwin (2016) “what we propose to do about something 
indicates what we think needs to change and hence what we think the “problem” is” 
(p.16). If the problem is framed as one of identifying vulnerable children at risk of 
future harm, then predictive risk modelling technology seems like a natural solution. 
But how did the concerns of the Green Paper (New Zealand Government, 2011b) with 
ensuring “every child thrives, belongs and achieves” (New Zealand Government, 
2011b) become translated into the focus of the White Paper (New Zealand Government, 
2012b) on “vulnerable children who have been abused or maltreated” (p.6)?  Simon 
(Frontline Panel: Interviewee #1) was very clear on the purpose of the Green Paper: 
Well, the central thesis of the Green Paper that then was translated into the 
White Paper is, “Do you believe we should prioritise the needs of vulnerable 
children over other segments of society?” So that was basically the central thesis 
of the approach and so that came through the White Paper.  
 Whilst the issue was problematised in both papers as a problem of vulnerable 
children (the word was used in the title of both) there was a considerable shift in the 
meaning of child vulnerability between the Green and the White papers, a shift that 
concerned how vulnerability was defined, and a shift that was closely related to the 
capabilities of the PRM tool. If the Green Paper “promoted an idea of vulnerability that 
incorporated structural, institutional, socio-cultural, economic, relational and individual 
aspects” (Stanley & de Froideville , 2020, p.6); the White Paper that followed it, 
“depicted a substantively narrowed concept of vulnerability” (Stanley & de Froideville, 
2020, p. 6-7). As discussed in chapter four, one important aspect of governmentality is 
the idea of language as an intellectual technology that “provides a mechanism for 
rendering reality amenable to certain kinds of action” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 7). In a 
social policy context, language allows social problems to be framed in particular ways, 
in ways that do not simply represent social problems but brings them into being, 
offering categories of things that matter (and conversely those that do not) and shaping 
the way solutions are proposed (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016). Numbers too, in addition 
to language, quite literally enumerate the things that count, “Every number, therefore, is 
an assertion about similarities and differences. No number is innocent, for it is 
impossible to count without making judgements about categorisation. Every number is a 
political claim about ‘where to draw the line’” (Stone, 2012, p. 188). We can see this 
process at work in the different ways in which the term child vulnerability is put to use 
in the Green Paper and the White Paper and the number of children considered to be 
vulnerable. 
 
The word vulnerable appears over 200 times in the Green Paper, but it did not define 
vulnerable children except to say that “Vulnerability is difficult to measure and 
describe” (p. 4). And yet, although the Green Paper considered that vulnerability was 
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difficult to measure, and that children passed in and out of vulnerability at different 
points in time, it included the statement that: 
While most children are vulnerable at some point of their lives, New Zealand 
researchers15 suggest that at any one time 15 per cent of children (or 163,000 
children aged under 18 years) are particularly vulnerable. That is, without 
significant support and intervention, they will not thrive, belong or achieve. 
(p.6) 
 The White Paper offered an extensive discussion of child vulnerability, but rather 
than using the more universalist language of “how we ensure every child thrives, 
belongs and achieves” (New Zealand Government, 2011b), the register shifts to 
selectivism as it “focuses on vulnerable children who have been abused or maltreated, 
and those at the greatest risk of maltreatment, along with the adults who are 
endangering them” (p.6).  It proposed the following definition of vulnerable children: 
Vulnerable children are children who are at significant risk of harm to their 
wellbeing now and into the future as a consequence of the environment in which 
they are being raised and, in some cases, due to their own complex needs. (New 
Zealand Government, 2012a p.6) 
 Despite the fact that the definition mentions the social environment of the child. The 
emphasis is clearly on “the risks emanating from immediate (family) environments or 
children’s personal complexities” (Stanley & de Froideville, 2020, p.13). This line of 
thought is echoed in the comments of Simon (Frontline Panel: Interviewee #1) who 
worried that “the real concern” of government was with “bad people” who have access 
to children and who need to be sorted out; and in Roger’s remarks (Scientific Panel: 
Interviewee #1) that the PRM tool might be used to “treat people and families in a 
discriminatory way that implied that they are abusers, villains, undesirables”.  These 
perceptions, about the primary focus on parents and parenting, are supported by a 
statement made by Minister Bennett in a Cabinet Paper that set out the implications of 
the White Paper: 
While many risk factors, or confluence of factors, play an important role in 
vulnerability and resilience, the most important factors are parental behaviour, 
action and failure to act. (Bennett 2012, p.3) 
 This way of framing the problem detracts attention from “the vulnerabilities of 
parents that may have led to abusive behaviour, or to the structural, relational, 
community or personal causes of those vulnerabilities” (Keddell, 2018. p. 99). 
 
 The logic of vulnerability in the White Paper is then linked to the identification of 
children at risk of maltreatment (as well as those already known to services and 
considered to be at risk of further maltreatment). This new definition of vulnerability 
led to a new estimation of the numbers involved: 
It is estimated that across both target groups there will be around 20,000–30,000 
children and families who will need to be worked with intensively each year. 
 
15 The Green Paper does not cite the source of this research and quite different rates, based on the 
New Zealand General Social Survey, are included in a later paper by Statistics New Zealand (New 
Zealand Government, 2012d) 
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Close to half of the children and/or their caregivers are expected to identify as 
Māori…Note that these estimates draw on numbers generated by risk modelling 
work detailed in the following chapter. (New Zealand Government, 2012b, p. 
69) 
 So, who counts as vulnerable shifts from 163,000 children who would not “thrive, 
belong or achieve” without “significant support” (New Zealand Government, 2011b, 
p.6); to an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 children who are at risk of maltreatment (New 
Zealand Government 2012a, p.5). The White Paper (New Zealand Government, 2012a, 
2012b) redefines, quite literally, what counts as child vulnerability and the PRM tool 
plays a significant role in shaping that definition by generating the numbers of children 
assumed to be at risk of maltreatment. Where we were going with ViKI and the PRM 
tool was then clearly linked to the selectivist orientation of the Fifth National 
Government’s political rationality of social investment, which – translated into the 
context of child protection – was expressed as a programme of government to identify 
children at risk of maltreatment made possible by ViKI and the PRM tool as 
technologies of governance (Rose & Miller, 2010). 
 
Who Gains and Who Loses, and by Which Mechanisms of Power? 
 
 This second value-rational question assumes that in any new development there are 
those who will benefit and those who may be burdened, and that the gains and the 
losses may not be distributed equally. There is seldom a single unifying perspective on 
a policy or technological development, no ‘God’s eye’ view from which we can deduce 
the absolute truth, there are only situated knowledges and partial perspectives 
(Haraway, 1988). Minister Bennett and her MSD officials, along with some policy 
advisors and academic experts, were strong advocates of ViKI and the PRM tool 
believing that vulnerable children would gain, and that a significant proportion of child 
maltreatment – and perhaps even child homicide – could be prevented (see enthymemes 
1.2.1, 2.1.1, 6.1.1, and 7.2.1). From a governmental perspective, if the logic of social 
investment paid off, the government might also gain by savings in terms of its future 
fiscal liability (Baker and Cooper, 2018). And, if Simon’s (Frontline Panel: Interviewee 
#1) view was correct, perhaps Minister Bennett might have gained in terms of a political 
legacy. From the perspective of the supporters of this development, it was openly 
acknowledged that there were ethical issues and risks associated with it (New Zealand 
Government, 2012b; Vaithianathan, 2012; Dare, 2013), but considered that some risks 
could be managed (Dare, 2013) and that, in order to achieve the benefits, sacrifices 
were necessary, there were necessary burdens that must be borne (enthymeme 1.2.2).  
 
 When Minister Bennett asked the New Zealand public “what you would give up so 
that vulnerable children come first” (New Zealand Government, 2011a), and referred to 
“the trade-offs and sacrifices we’re prepared to make” (New Zealand Government, 
2011b) she was – without making direct mention of it – referring to the loss of privacy 
and the right to informed consent for sharing personal data held in official databases. 
She was also referring indirectly to the risk that some families may be labelled and 
stigmatised by unnecessary intervention as a result of the false positives produced by 
the PRM. It is also clear from Minister Bennett’s intervention in the news media 
(especially NEWS_01), that she was firmly of the view that the benefits of ViKI and the 
PRM outweighed the risks and legitimised the sacrifices required, “So, for the small 
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risk of it being seen as being a bit intrusive, for those kids, yeah let's get intrusive” 
(enthymeme 1.2.2). 
 
 In terms of those who might have lost had the development proceeded, the section 
below considers the impact on whānau Māori. The sections that follow assess how 
power was deployed to maintain the policy framing, government’s preference for forms 
of expertise conducive to the social investment approach and the work done to keep the 
use of public data out of the public eye. 
 
The Impact on Whānau Māori. 
 In chapter two we noted that the over-representation of Māori in the child 
protection system is a legacy of Aotearoa New Zealand’s status as a settler colonial 
state (Keddel & Hyslop, 2019; Hyslop & Keddell, 2019). We also noted above that 
almost half of the families identified as high risk by the PRM tool were anticipated to 
identify as Māori (New Zealand Government, 2012b). Therefore the harms associated 
with the PRM tool – false positives, labelling and stigmatisation – were widely 
recognised to fall disproportionately on Māori. In that sense, this policy and the PRM 
tool, in the context of a settler colonial state, were always likely to further amplify 
discriminatory processes that were already embedded in administrative databases 
(Keddell, 2019). This point, that the administrative databases on which the PRM tool 
was developed were based on subjective judgements and riven with bias – both 
surveillance and personal bias16 (Keddell, 2019) – was highlighted by Roger (Scientific 
Panel: Interviewee #1) to critique the use of the PRM tool to identify high risk families, 
“As I keep on pointing out to them, that while her analysis was good, the data quality 
was probably quite poor.” 
 Stanley and de Froideville (2020) argued that, for Māori, “Their experience of ‘risk 
factors’, built and sustained through colonizing structures and institutional interventions 
will inevitably be further energised through the ‘evidence’ collated on the ViKI” (p. 17). 
Linking the practices of individualised risk assessment to colonisation, Stanley and de 
Froideville (2020) stated that: 
In a settler state, where prevailing practices ensure that Māori suffer structural, 
institutional and socio-cultural harms, these approaches will increase state 
interventions towards Māori. Their ‘risk factors’ will be marked out in the real 
or proportional increases in those placed into care, processed through the courts 
or incarcerated. (p.17) 
 Therefore, whānau Māori would have stood to lose more from this development 
than any other social group, a clear case of data discrimination against an indigenous 
people (Keddell, 2019; Stanley & de Froideville, 2020). This is an issue of data justice 






16 See the discussion of surveillance bias in chapter three. 
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The Work Done to Resist Alternative Ways of Framing the Policy Problem 
 
 Minister Bennett was very clear in her intentions to divert the framing of the 
problem of child maltreatment away from the issue of child and family poverty and 
towards the responsibilities of parents. In her Ministerial introduction to the White 
Paper, she stated: 
Though I acknowledge the pressure that financial hardship puts on families, that 
is never an excuse to neglect, beat, or abuse children. Most people in such 
circumstances do not abuse their children, and I cannot tolerate it being used as a 
justification to do so. (New Zealand Government, 2012a, p.2) 
 Evidence from the interview data discussed in chapter six indicates that members of 
the Green Paper advisory panels were conscious that the policy problem was actively 
framed in particular ways and alternative framings discouraged. According to Simon 
(Frontline Panel: Interviewee #1), questions about tackling inequality or disadvantage 
were not on the agenda because, “The answer being sought was, how do we sort out 
these families that abuse children?”. Eleanor (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #2) 
described a similar process, “But we weren’t allowed to use…the word ‘poverty’….was 
reframed. Words like ‘inequality’ were reframed…called ‘lacking material resources’ or 
something.” And, as discussed in chapter six, Roger (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #1) 
was highly sceptical of the whole policy-making process, and what he considered to be 
the undue influence of the Minister on her officials. So, in Green Paper advisory panel 
meetings with government officials, there is evidence that preferred ways of framing the 
problem subtly influenced deliberations. In effect, the expertise of at least some 
members of the Frontline Panel and the Scientific Panel seems to have been ignored in 
favour of other sources of expertise, more conducive to the assumptions of the social 
investment agenda, as we will consider below. 
 
Evidence from analysis of news media in chapter seven revealed public and explicit 
interventions on the part of the Minister, and other actors, to maintain the focus on the 
risks presented by the families of vulnerable children rather than on structural factors. In 
particular – echoing her comments in the introduction to the White Paper – in 
NEWS_01 Minister Bennett actively resisted the connections made by opposition MPs 
between child maltreatment and child poverty (enthymeme 1.1.1). She made a positive 
rhetorical intervention to shift the ground from a statement of empirical fact that there is 
a strong association between poverty and a range of negative health and social outcomes 
– including child maltreatment – to a moral and ethical argument that people should not 
use poverty to justify child maltreatment (enthymeme 1.1.2) and anyway, she argued, 
reducing child maltreatment to poverty is too simplistic (enthymeme 3.1.1). This is 
active policy work and a good example of the use of power to supress certain issues and 
keep them off the political agenda, or what Bachrach and Baratz (1970) referred to as 
the power of non-decision making and the mobilisation of bias to privilege some groups 
in relation to others.  
 
Expertise and Forms of Knowledge 
 
 Following Foucault (1980), Flyvbjerg (2006a) argued that knowledge and power are 
inseparable from each other, “power produces knowledge, and knowledge produces 
power” (p. 376). In addition, from a governmentality perspective, in liberal 
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democracies, “government is inherently bound to the authority of expertise” (Rose, 
1993, p. 291) and traffic travels in both directions: that is, government seeks to enrol 
experts in attempts to tackle social problems and experts attempt to enrol government in 
adopting their solutions so they can access resources. From a poststructural frame of 
reference expert knowledge is not considered as a set of true statements about an 
objective reality out there, but as an intervention that plays a critical role in shaping and 
making reality. In this view expert knowledge is “a form of political practice” (Bacchi 
& Goodwin, 2016, p. 15). Expertise frames policy problems and offers policy solutions 
in ways that are acceptable to the political rationality of governmental elites: “Power 
determines what counts as knowledge, what kind of interpretation attains authority as 
the dominant interpretation. Power procures the knowledge which supports its purposes, 
while it ignores or suppresses that knowledge which does not serve it” (Flyvbjerg, 2003, 
p. 319). 
 
 In terms of our question with regard to who gains and who loses, when the 
predictive risk modelling tool was advanced in the White Paper as a solution to the 
problem of child maltreatment it was evident that social work as a form of knowledge 
lost out to other forms of expertise. Social work and social workers, with their avowed 
commitment to social justice, tackling social inequality and a relational approach to 
practice may not offer a form of knowledge (Philp, 1979) that has a good fit with the 
direction of travel sought by some political elites (Gupta, 2015; Hyslop, 2017). As was 
evident in the news media reports (NEWS_02, NEWS_06, NEWS_7 & NEWS_10) and 
in the literature review (Vaithianathan, 2012, Vaithianathan et al., 2013; Dare, 2013; 
Dare, 2015), two of the most prominent expert supporters of the PRM were both part of 
the original University of Auckland team commissioned by the MSD to develop the 
PRM prototype. Rhema Vaithianathan was a health economist who had undertaken 
work on predictive risk modelling in the context of health systems (Panattoni et al., 
2011), and Tim Dare was a professor of philosophy employed as an ethicist for the 
PRM prototype project (Dare, 2013, 2015). Notably, a University of Auckland social 
work academic  – Irene De Hann – was also part of the original PRM team. In 
NEWS_05, in 2012, she argued that the PRM tool could help focus resources on “at-
risk families before any abuse occurs”, but by 2014, perhaps reflecting the deep 
ambivalence many policy actors felt about the PRM tool, she published an article with a 
colleague calling the PRM into question and arguing that “If used to identify individual 
families it could easily serve to reinforce forensically oriented child protection practice, 
stigmatising and labelling families as well as overwhelming service responses” (de 
Hann & Connolly, 2014). 
 
As a health economist Vaithianathan brought a form of expertise that was committed to 
the economic evaluation of programmes of intervention “from the perspective of 
efficiency – maximising the benefits from available resources (or ensuring benefits 
gained exceed benefits forgone)” (Kernick, 2003, p. 147). Dare (2013) adopted an 
explicitly consequentialist approach to his ethical evaluation, an approach that focused 
on an ethical assessment of the costs and benefits of using the PRM tool. Both were 
applying their expertise to a technology using a third form of expertise, data science, or 
more particularly, predictive risk modelling, a form of expertise with the alluring 
promise of improved efficiencies in service delivery to cash strapped governmental 
actors (Stats NZ, 2018; Veale & Brass, 2019). An instrumental form of rationality 
(Feenberg, 2019) – assuming objectivity and valuing efficiency and control – was very 
evident in these forms of knowledge. 
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Actor-network theory includes the concept of a spokesperson who speaks on behalf of 
technological entities that cannot speak for themselves (Ritzer, 2004). In this sense the 
PRM tool was given agency in the news media debate through the advocacy of 
members of its original development team. Acting as a spokesperson for the PRM tool, 
Vaithianathan, in NEWS_02, deployed rhetoric to naturalise the PRM tool, comparing 
its capability to the “the predictive strength of mammograms” (Enthymeme 2.1.1), an 
accepted and familiar technology. Later, in response to the controversy of the PRM in 
the news media debate, Dare published an op-ed (NEWS_06) defending the PRM 
against its critics (enthymeme 6.1.1) arguing that objections identified were either ill-
founded or possible to manage (an argument he would later elaborate in the ethical 
review of the PRM) (Dare, 2013). Later, after the prospective observational study had 
been quietly dropped by the incoming Minister Tolley, Vaithianathan intervened to 
restart the debate in NEWS_07, arguing that by not making proactive use of the PRM, 
government was failing to realise the benefits of a technology developed locally 
(enthymeme 7.2.1). Then, when the new Minister made the belated public 
announcement that the prospective observational study was halted (enthymeme 8.1.1 
and 8.3.1), Dare published another op-ed (NEWS_10) arguing that Minister Tolley had 
used “inflammatory political rhetoric” (enthymeme 10.2.1) and that citizens should feel 
uneasy about the fact that “Science collided with politics and politics won” (enthymeme 
10.1.1). In Dare’s own rhetorical intervention, political rhetoric is placed in opposition 
to science. Yet, as argued at the beginning of this section, from a poststructural 
perspective, expert knowledge is “a form of political practice” (Bacchi & Goodwin, 
2016, p. 15). But you do not need to be a postructuralist to recognise that there is a 
problem with assuming, as Dare does, a direct relationship between science and policy 
making. Peter Gluckman, the former Chief Science Advisor to the New Zealand Prime 
Minister – and Chairperson of the Green Paper, Scientific Panel – argued that, “A 
purely technocratic model of policy formation is not appropriate in that knowledge is 
not, and cannot be, the sole determinant of how policy is developed” (Gluckman, 2011, 
p.3). 
 
Datafication Hidden from View 
 
 Van Zoonen (2020) has noted the growing interest in the use of big data by 
government in many jurisdictions and argued “This transition to data-driven social 
policy, captured by the term “digital welfare state,” almost completely takes place out of 
political and social view, and escapes democratic decision making”. This lack of public 
engagement in the policy process of datafication, the absence of a democratic rationality 
(Feenberg, 2019), was very evident in relation to ViKI and the PRM tool. From its 
beginnings in 2009/2010 till the announcement of its closure in 2015 plans for the PRM 
tool were often hidden from view and carefully managed in public media. Several key 
documents were only released following Official Information Act requests from 
journalists (for example, Ministry of Social Development, 2014b) others were released 
quietly to the MSD website in 2015 (Cowie, 2015) a considerable time after their 
internal MSD publication dates (for example, Dare, 2013 and Ministry of Social 
Development, 2014a) and only when the interests of investigative journalists had been 
piqued. 
 
Since the end goal of the PRM tool trials was to establish proactive, population wide 
screening and risk scoring of all newborn children in Aotearoa New Zealand (Ministry 
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of Social Development, 2014), and since it was recognised that there would be a 
considerable number of false positives with the risk of subsequent labelling and 
stigmatisation (Dare,2013), all future parents and caregivers stood to be burdened by 
this policy. However, it is not possible for the public to exercise any power or influence 
over a policy development if there is no process for consultation or deliberation. It is a 
very curious feature of this policy development that although government issued a 
Green Paper (New Zealand Government, 2011b) with a consultation period of six 
months at no point was the most controversial aspect of the eventual policy revealed. 
ViKI, and the PRM tool, were conspicuous by their absence from the Green Paper 
process. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that government had predictive risk 
modelling in mind even at the point of publication of the Green Paper. There are at least 
three sources of evidence to support this view. Firstly, from our expert interviews, 
Eleanor (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #2) stated that, at the end of 2009, two years 
before the publication of the Green Paper, Minister Bennett was “really convinced that 
what we needed was an information system that could find vulnerable children. Like 
she just, that was what she wanted. She wanted to be able to locate these people”. 
Secondly, the publication of the Green Paper was accompanied by a short, public 
information video in which Minister Bennett, accompanied by a child actor, appeals to 
the public and states:  
We've written a Green Paper on children, it deals with uncomfortable issues, it 
poses some pretty hard questions. It asks you what you would give up so that 
vulnerable children come first. Are you willing for all children to be tracked at 
birth for example? (New Zealand Government, 2011, 1:04), 
 This is first public reference to the PRM tool, although the text of the Green Paper 
asks no questions and makes no reference to such a technology. Finally, several years 
later, in a Radio New Zealand programme investigating the use of the PRM tool, 
Dorothy Adams, a senior official from the Ministry of Social Development, stated that 
“We had Rhema [Vaithianathan] and her team do their work in 2010…around then” 
(Ryan, 2015, 19:16). It therefore seems highly likely that predictive risk modelling was 
under active consideration since at least 2010 if not before, and yet the public 
consultation made no reference to this development. It is unsurprising then, that when 
the White Paper (New Zealand Government, 2012b) announced the development of 
ViKI and the PRM, it prompted a heated debate in the news media and one nationally 
recognised expert in child protection – and former member of the 2009 Expert Forum 
on Child Abuse – Patrick Kelly could describe himself as being, “…kind of blindsided”, 
and that the predictive model came, "completely out of left field" (enthymemes 5.1.1 
and 5.2.1). 
 
As discussed in chapter seven, the news media debate in the New Zealand Herald 
and the Dominion Post fell silent from the point of Tim Dare’s op-ed in October 2012 
only to reopen in May 2015 (NEWS_07) with an announcement by Dorothy Adams 
(MSD, Acting Deputy Chief Executive) about plans for a cautious, vignette-based user 
testing trial to test the influence of the PRM tool on social workers’ decision making to 
help triage notifications (enthymemes 7.1.1 and 7.1.1). This article included a challenge 
from Rhema Vaithianathan that the government were not making use of the PRM tool 
in a proactive way, as it was intended to be used (enthymeme 7.2.1). Then, in July 2015 
(NEWS_08) – two months later – Minister Tolley makes the dramatic announcement 
that, shortly after taking up office in November 2015 she took her officials to task 
calling a halt to plans for a proposed, prospective observational study on all newborn 
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children. Minister Tolley considered the plans to be unethical (enthymeme 8.1.1) and 
argued they would lead to unnecessary state intervention in private family life 
(enthymeme 8.3.1). However, she did approve a trial of the PRM tool on historical 
notifications, a plan that was, she argued, more ethical and safe (enthymeme 8.2.1). 
 
It seems puzzling that the MSD would announce its intention to run the vignette, 
based trials to test the influence of the PRM tool on social workers decision making in 
May 2015 without announcing that Minister Tolley had halted the population wide 
prospective, observational trial – as alleged by Vaithaianathan (enthymeme 7.2.1) – 
eight months before. In this case we really seem to be in the territory of the 
negotiations, intrigues, calculations, and acts of persuasion described by Callon & 
Latour (1981). It is possible that both the announcement of the triage trial (NEWS_07) 
and the announcement of the closure of the prospective observational study (NEWS_08) 
were prompted by two Radio New Zealand investigative journalists and two news 
programmes: one broadcast on the 12th May titled, MSD urged to adopt predictive tool 
to identify at risk children (Ryan, 2015); and the second broadcast on 21st June titled 
Child abuse or Big Brother? (Cowie, 2015). The radio journalist Kathryn Ryan (2015, 
00:00) opens the first programme with the question, “Well why is the Social 
Development Ministry stopping short of fully implementing a predictive risk 
assessment tool that can identify children at risk of abuse?”, then, referring to comments 
made by Vaithianathan: 
 
she says MSD has chosen not to implement the tool proactively as it is meant to 
be used. Rather it may apply it retrospectively only once a notification of 
suspected abuse has been made by a member of the public, and only once 
another trial is conducted. She’s frustrated with the pace and says delays are 
unethical. (Ryan, 2015, 00:38) 
 
In effect, Rhema Vaithianathan appears to have broken the news of the halting of the 
prospective, observational study in order to challenge the decision by the MSD. She 
also implies that not using the PRM tool proactively on the whole population, “as it was 
meant to be used” is unethical (echoing the doctrine of negative responsibility used by 
Bill English in relation to the broader goals of social investment). The journalist also 
interviews Dorothy Adams (General Manager, Insights, MSD) who stated that: 
 
So, at this stage, Rhema’s right, we’re not using the predictive modelling in a 
proactive way. That’s not to the say that we’ve taken the decision that we’ll 
never do that, we just don’t feel that we are ready to do that. (Ryan, 2015, 18:37) 
 
Later in the interview, Adams repeats “so what we’re saying is we haven’t taken 
proactive use off the table at all. What we’re saying is we don’t know enough yet, we 
believe, to start implementing a proactive model at this point in time” (Ryan, 2015, 
27:10). It seems reasonable to assume that this interview may have triggered NEWS_07 
where Dorothy Adams announced the vignette-based, user testing trial presented as a 
cautious and considered approach to testing the PRM tool to triage notifications to the 
CYF call centre (enthymeme 7.1.1). One month later, the media debate is intensified by 
another RNZ investigative journalist (Cowie, 2015) who broadcasts a programme on the 
PRM tool titled Child Abuse or Big Brother? This programme interviews a number of 
supporters and detractors of the PRM tool including Patrick Kelly, Emily Keddell, 
Rhema Vaithianathan, Tim Dare and Dorothy Adams. In this programme there is an 
 83 
exchange between the journalist and Dorothy Adams (replicated in full in Appendix 5) 
that unovers a number of issues with regard to the lack of transparency of the 
development of the PRM including a statement from the journalist that “In the three 
years since the research began, the Ministry’s been fairly cagy about its progress. 
Uploading the research documents quietly onto its website only after I requested them 
in May” (Cowie, 2015, 21:32). 
 
So, in the press release and radio programmes during May and June 2015 the MSD 
acknowledged that proactive use of the PRM tool was delayed, but at no point is there a 
statement that it was removed as an option. Then, in July 2015, as noted in the analysis 
of NEWS_8, Minister Tolley announced that, whilst the vignette-based user testing trial 
was proceeding, she had halted the prospective, predictive risk modelling tool for 
ethical reasons and made it clear that a PRM tool to screen the whole population, “will 
never fly”. This timeline is also reflected in an MSD (2015) document titled, Predictive 
modelling: Frequently asked questions. The document stated that in November 2014, 
“The Minister considered the ethical risks of undertaking a prospective observational 
study unacceptably high and instructed that all work on the study should stop.” Also, in 
an internal report to the Minister released to a journalist under the Official Information 
Act the report (published in December 2014 and drafted by Dorothy Adams) stated that: 
 
Given your considerable concerns around the ethics of the proposed prospective 
observational study, all work to test the value the Vulnerable Children's PM 
might add to the early identification of potentially vulnerable children has been 
halted. We will discuss with other agencies whether there are other options for 
testing that do not raise the ethical risks associated with particular study. 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2014b, p.2) 
 
It may be that the reference to “other options” was what Dorothy Adams had in mind 
when referring to not taking, “proactive use off the table.” (Cowie, 2015). Clearly, 
Minister Tolley had a different point of view on that matter. 
 
Is this Development Desirable?  
 
 Latour (2013) characterises the lifecycle of any sociotechnical project as occurring 
over time and consisting of programmes and anti-programmes recognising that the 
process of sociotechnical innovation can be controversial and replete with advances and 
setbacks, proponents and opponents.  
In other words, technological invention never proceeds in a straight line; rather, 
it zigzags between a multitude of compromises…these continual maneuvers, 
which define invention, trace the front line between “friends” and “enemies,” 
those who had to be held onto or fought against every time. 
 Latour’s (2013) characterisation of the progress of technological innovation is 
useful in highlighting the temporal and dynamic nature of innovation and the “continual 
maneuvers” that are part and parcel of the process. This process was very evident in the 
evolution of ViKI and the PRM tool as they were subject to a series of trials, reviews 
and the cut and thrust of policy debate. As the debate unfolded, the desirability of ViKI 
was perceived very differently from the PRM tool. These developments are therefore 
discussed separately below. 
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The Desirability of Electronic Information Sharing 
 
 The White Paper for Vulnerable Children (New Zealand, 2012b) identified 
professional information sharing as a challenge to effective child protection practice in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and argued that the introduction of a new information-sharing 
platform – or ViKI – would support:  
 
• the earlier and more systematic identification of children at risk of abuse or 
re-abuse 
• more efficient and comprehensive assessments of needs 
• greater clarity about who is taking responsibility for children’s safety and 
wellbeing 
• ongoing tracking and monitoring of outcomes for vulnerable children. (New 
Zealand, 2012b, p. 74) 
 
 When Minister Bennett intervened in the news media (NEWS_01) to argue for the 
benefits of the database she went even further, linking the database to the death of Nia 
Glassie. The rhetorical point is illustrated well in enthymeme 1.2.1 which included the 
implicit claim that the Government’s plans for an information sharing database could 
have prevented Nia’s death and could prevent future child homicide. In NEWS_01 
Minister Bennett was cited as saying: 
 
If you look at those high-profile cases that have gone through the coroner ... our 
lovely Nia Glassie, a whole lot of people held a small piece of information. No 
one put the pieces together. [The database] is going to put the pieces together. 
So, for the small risk of it being seen as being a bit intrusive, for those kids, yeah 
let's get intrusive 
 
 Underlying the oft-repeated rationale for professional information sharing is the 
jigsaw metaphor, or the idea that: 
 
professionals do not have ‘all’ the ‘pieces’ to establish a ‘full’ picture of a 
child’s life on their own; rather, the jigsaw is assembled through the working 
together of relevant professionals who each bring to the table their own ‘piece’ 
or ‘pieces’ in order to complete the picture. (Thompson, 2013, p. 191) 
 
 This rationale was evident in the interviews with the two senior agency managers 
interviewed. Simon (Frontline Panel: Interviewee #1) highlighted findings from 
inquiries into the deaths of children, stating that, “I mean one of the key things, one of 
the key findings consistently was everybody had a little bit of the information, and if 
somebody had put it all together then the vulnerability of this child would be obvious.” 
Christine (Frontline Panel Interviewee #2) was also clear that, “I think for me sharing of 
information has to be high on the agenda if you are looking out for the best outcomes 
for children”. However, Christine was also clear that there needed to be safeguards and 
protocols around use of an electronic information sharing system and that issues of 
privacy and the informed consent of parents and caregivers was critical.  
 
 Both Roger (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #1) and Eleanor (Scientific Panel: 
Interviewee #2) were more sceptical about the impact of electronic information sharing. 
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Eleanor was concerned that different professional cultures, philosophies and language 
may present an obstacle to effective information sharing, and pointed out that 
information sharing should not be an end in itself, it must lead to action, “It’s all very 
well having all the information sitting there in a system but so, so what? What are you 
going to do with it? How are you going to make it work?”. She contrasted the idea of 
electronic information sharing with genuine interprofessional communication and 
planning, or, as she put it, “professionals around the table talking to each other about 
intervention”. Like Christine (Frontline Panel Interviewee #2), Eleanor (Scientific 
Panel: Interviewee #2) also highlighted problems created when different professionals 
use a shared information system without sharing a common lexicon, “unless you have 
people putting in the same information, using the same concepts and the same terms, 
it’s useless.” Eleanor also considered that an electronic information system may lead to 
over assessment and was also concerned about the need to secure the informed consent 
of families and caregivers.  
 
 Roger’s (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #1) interview focused more on the PRM than 
electronic information sharing but he did highlight the opportunity cost of investing in 
“a flash data system” and argued strongly against the idea that child homicide could be 
prevented by information sharing: 
That’s a silly argument. The argument that they had information that they 
weren’t sharing, because if you actually look at the families who kill their kids, 
the Kahui’s and everything, there’s probably at any one time in this country 
about five to six thousand of them that bad. Only ten will kill their kids. Now 
which ten, no one ever knows.  
Minister Bennett’s argument that the database might prevent child homicides, like 
that of Nia Glassie, is a clear use of pathos (Gottweis, 2006, 2007) or an emotional 
appeal to promote the benefits of the database over the risks associated with the loss of 
privacy and the intrusion of the state into family life. In fact, in NEWS_01 the two 
points are closely linked and she argues that precisely because the database could 
prevent child homicide then being intrusive is justified (enthymeme 1.2.2). 
In spite of the appeal of the idea of professional information sharing for child 
protection purposes in many jurisdictions there is no clear evidence of its efficacy and 
many concerns about its unintended consequences. Discussing the dangers of 
professional information sharing, and referring to the changes associated with the 
English databases, Munro (2007) concluded that: 
There is a lack of evidence that professional monitoring and screening, using an 
agenda set by the government, will do better in improving outcomes for children 
than a good professional network that listens and responds to the worries of 
children and parents. 
This last point resonates with the points made by Eleanor (Scientific Panel: 
Interviewee #2) above, and with the argument advanced by Patrick Kelly, in NEWS_5. 
Kelly, a former member of the 2009 Expert Advisory Group, argues that 
interprofessional information sharing can be achieved without investing in an expensive 
database (enthymeme 5.3.1). Referring to the findings of the 2009 Expert Advisory 
Group (referred to in chapter two) he argued that “The forum did not interpret data 
sharing to require any expenditure on new IT. It is possible to share data simply by 
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allowing individuals in different agencies to talk to each other." In a similar vein, 
Eleanor (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #2) repeatedly contrasted the false reassurance 
provided by an electronic information system with the lived reality of effective, 
interprofessional communication: 
So, they might have, they have ways of joining up, sorting out the information 
system so professionals are joined up, share information. I still don’t think 
they’ve got professionals around the table talking to each other about 
intervention. I think that’s where it falls down.  
As Thomson (2013) has argued, the problem with the information sharing issue is the 
assumption that “information is something that can be perfected, and that all 
professionals in their organisations need to do is get better at it” (Thomson, 2013, p. 
197). However, Thomson’s (2013) study of interprofessional information sharing in 
child protection practice suggests that real word information sharing practices are 
considerably more complex, contextual and nuanced than the jigsaw metaphor implies: 
understanding what information is, and how it works, requires a significantly 
more complex set of ideas than is currently offered through the broadly 
objectivist assumptions within policy dis- courses; context, sense-making and 
translation, all matter in determining what gets said, remains unspoken, what is 
passed on, how information is understood and the priority given at any point in 
time. It is only by understanding these factors that multi-agency information 
practices, particularly at the stage of referral, can be improved. (p. 197) 
So, although Minister Bennet, and the two Frontline Panel informants were positive 
about the desirability of ViKI; serious reservations were expressed by both Scientific 
Panel informants and Patrick Kelly from Starship Hospital. 
The Desirability of the Predictive Risk Modelling Tool 
 
 Whilst the findings of this study include some discussion about the desirability or 
otherwise of an electronic information sharing system, the debate about the predictive 
risk modelling tool was much more vigorous and extensive. This is not surprising given 
the untested nature of the tool and the ethical risks that even the designers of the tool 
and the MSD recognised to be associated with its implementation (Vaithianathan 2012, 
Dare 2013, Ministry of Social Development, 2014a). The issue here was whether the 
benefits to be derived from its use outweighed the burdens. As indicated in chapter 
three, Tim Dare, the ethicist associated with the development of the PRM tool, was of 
the view that, “The application of predictive risk modelling to child maltreatment does 
raise significant ethical concerns” but that, “Many of these concerns can be significantly 
mitigated or ameliorated”, and “Remaining concerns may plausibly be regarded as 
outweighed by the very considerable potential benefits of the Vulnerable Children 
PRM” (Dare 2013, p. 1). 
 
Amongst interviewees there was considerable ambivalence about the use of 
predictive risk modelling. Christine (Frontline Panel: Interviewee #2), was strongly 
supportive of electronic information sharing, but much more cautious about the use of 
PRM, “I think it’s a tool to have back, way back but not as the forefront, in my view. I 
think ethically we’ve got to be really careful using that.” Simon (Frontline Panel: 
Interviewee #1) also suggested deep ambivalence describing himself as wearing, “two 
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hats” since, “it feels quite Orwellian, particularly when you throw predictive risk 
modelling into it”. Roger (Scientific Panel: Interviewee #1) considered that the PRM 
tool may have value if used by skilled analysts to inform decision making about 
population groups but that giving the data to practitioners to work with individuals and 
families was risky and may lead to discriminatory practices. Eleanor (Scientific Panel: 
Interviewee #2) was also highly sceptical about the role of predictive risk modelling 
because of its emphasis on individual risk factors rather than contextual factors such as 
poverty. She was also concerned about the extent to which the implementation of  PRM 
would override the human rights of families to privacy. 
 
 In the news media reports PRM was highly controversial, and many arguments were 
deployed by a range of actors to persuade readers of the benefits and burdens of the 
tool. Minister Bennett appears as the main advocate for the PRM tool. In NEWS_01 she 
promotes the tool by suggesting it might prevent child homicide (enthymeme 1.2.1) 
and, anticipating criticism, argued that since social workers made the ultimate decisions 
“children” would not be stigmatised (enthymeme 1.3.1). Two members of the team who 
designed the PRM – Rhema Vaithianathan and Tim Dare – also emerged as strong 
advocates in the news media reports. In particular, in order to naturalise the PRM tool, 
Vaithianathan compared it to mammography an accepted technology used to prevent 
serious risk of harm (enthymeme 2.1.1); Dare also intervened in an opinion editorial 
where he critiqued a number of opponents of the introduction off the PRM and argued 
that the tool was “too vital to ignore” (enthymeme 6.1.1). 
 
Patrick Kelly was amongst the foremost critics of the tool in the news media, arguing 
that the public should pay attention to the alarm felt by people like himself (enthymeme 
5.1.1), regarded as experts in child protection, about the introduction of a revolutionary 
new system (enthymeme 5.2.1), that came, “completely out of left field” and made him 
feel, “profoundly sceptical”. The Chief Executive of the Aotearoa New Zealand 
Association of Social Workers also joined the debate, highlighting the risk that the PRM 
tool would undermine professional judgement and create stress on families that might 
increase risks to children (enthymeme 5.4.1). Kelly also points to the issue of labelling 
and stigmatisation associated with being identified as high risk especially when the 
PRM was associated with a high proportion of false positives (enthymeme 5.5.1). This 
issue was also one of the arguments made by Professor David Fergusson who pointed to 
the risk associated with being identified as a “potential child abuser” (enthymeme 
2.2.1). He was also of the view that, because of the significant risks associated with the 
system, that it should only be operationalised after carefully constructed pilot studies 
and randomised control trials (enthymeme 2.2.2). 
 
 Of course, the debate about the desirability of the PRM tool, as a proactive, 
population wide screening tool was effectively over when Minister Tolley delivered a 
complete reversal of its fortunes and declared “Not on my watch! These are children, 
not lab rats.” (NEWS_08). Only the possible use of the PRM tool to support social work 
decision making to triage notifications remained, but as we shall see, this option too 
would encounter the dictum of Miller and Rose (1990), that, “governmentality may be 





What, if Anything, Should we do About it? 
 
 Notwithstanding that the original focus of this study was directed at ViKI and the 
PRM tool, in the end it was the PRM tool’s role in early identification that became the 
primary focus of controversy and debate. ViKI’s purpose as an information sharing 
platform was commented on but receded into the background only later to be “quietly 
rolled out” (Dudding, 2016) as a more modest information sharing tool for professionals 
working in local Children’s Teams. In this section the question of what, if anything, 
should be done about the PRM tool will be addressed. This is a question that make most 
sense in the context of a development that is currently underway. As a value-rational 
question the “should” implies that there ought to be deliberation about the new 
development and that decisions about implementation ought to be founded on explicit 
values. Indeed, in a paper on the use of science to inform public policy, former Chief 
Science Advisor to the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Gluckman (2011), argued 
that there is a complex relationship between science and policy making especially when, 
“science is being applied to systems that are complex, non-linear and dynamic” (p. 6). 
In these contexts – and the use of data science to predict child maltreatment is a good 
example, “science almost never produces absolute answers, but serves to elucidate 
interactions and reduce uncertainties. Precision is not the outcome, rather an assessment 
of probabilities” (p. 7). Gluckman recommends the adoption of a co-production model 
of policy making in these contexts: 
 
in which policy makers, expert advisors and society negotiate to set policy goals 
and regulatory decisions that are agreed to be scientifically justifiable (in terms, 
say, of the information available and the levels of future risk that are tolerable) 
as well as socially and politically acceptable. (Gluckman, 2011, p. 8) 
 
 From the evidence of this study, what actually happened was not a deliberative 
process of policy co-production, nor was it one where citizens were viewed in terms of 
their wellbeing and their agency as responsible political actors (as advocated by 
Bromell, 2018). Instead planning and deliberation about the PRM both in terms of its 
trialling and then in terms of its closure, happened out of public view and at the behest 
of the Ministers involved. The public were made aware long after key decisions were 
taken and only in response to the activities of investigative journalists and Official 
Information Act requests. The vignette-based user testing trial study proceeded, and 
results were reported in Rea and Erasmus (2017). The report concluded that "The 
overall findings of the Enhancing Intake Decision-Making Project suggest that using 
statistical risk model information, in the form of a ‘Background Risk Indicator’, has the 
potential to improve care and protection intake decisions." (Rea &  Erasmus, 2017, p.9). 
However, the level of improvement noted – around 6 percentage points – was very 
slight. Perhaps for that reason, the PRM tool was not implemented as a population 
surveillance tool or as a tool to triage notifications. In 2018, Statistics NZ published an 
Algorithm Assessment Report to take stock of algorithmic use by government agencies. 
Oranga Tamariki participated in this study and the report declared that “Oranga 
Tamariki does not currently deploy any operational algorithms for use in operational 







 This chapter used data from the findings of the study – both interview findings and 
the analysis of new media – along with official documents and additional radio news 
reports, to trace the development of ViKI and the PRM tool. In particular, it followed 
the development of the PRM tool from the point of its inception, before the Green 
Paper, until its eventual demise at the behest of incoming Minister Tolley. The chapter 
included evidence of the negotiations, intrigues, calculations and acts of persuasion 
anticipated by actor network theory and applied the governmentality framework to 
illuminate the connection between social investment as a political rationality, data 
science as a form of knowledge and ViKI and the PRM tool as technologies of 
governance. The final chapter will conclude with a summary of these findings and place 
them in the context of the wider international debate about the datafication of child 




Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This study of the Aotearoa New Zealand Vulnerable Kids’ Information System 
became, for the most part, a study of the PRM tool, a study of the first attempt by any 
government in the world to test and trial a machine learning algorithm to risk score 
every newborn child’s risk of maltreatment, identify those with the highest score and 
intervene to attempt to prevent harm. In the end, the PRM tool never got past the 
research and development stage and was closed down before it had completed its 
technical trials of strength (Latour, 1988), an action that reflected a failure to keep 
powerful political actors enrolled in support of the programme.  
 
The governmentality thesis of Foucault (1997), as developed by the English 
governmentality theorists (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 2010), proved vital in 
tracing the connections between the overarching political rationality of social 
investment, the White Paper’s programme of government focused on vulnerable 
children, and the technologies of governance represented by ViKI and the PRM tool. 
These were new technologies whose capabilities were intended to give effect to the 
Fifth National Government’s version of social investment with its emphasis on data 
driven governance to reduce future fiscal costs (Baker & Cooper, 2018). The PRM tool 
was considered to be a particularly significant technology of governance that promised 
to render the population of vulnerable children calculable enabling government at a 
distance and the pre-emptive regulation of family life (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & 
Miller, 2010). The concepts of translation (Callon & Latour, 1981) and problematisation 
(Rose & Miller, 2010) – along with the notion of language as an intellectual technology 
(Miller & Rose 1990) – helped to identify the work done by the Green Paper and the 
White Paper in framing vulnerable children and their families as a policy problem (the 
work of the Green Paper) and then narrowing the definition to children vulnerable to 
maltreatment (the work of the White Paper). These ideas, along with the rhetorical 
approach to narrative analysis (Feldman & Almquist, 2015), helped to make visible the 
policy work done by a range of actors to maintain the focus on targeted interventions on 
individual families identified by the PRM tool, and to resist alternative framings – and 
alternative political rationalities – focused on poverty reduction, promoting wellbeing 
and non-stigmatising, universal services. 
 
The PRM prototype was developed by, amongst others, a health economist and an 
ethicist using forms of knowledge – health economics, consequentialist ethics and data 
science – that emphasised an instrumental rationality (Feenberg, 2019), using data 
science to promote efficiency and consequentialist ethics to strike a balance between 
societal costs and benefits. These were not social work forms of knowledge (Philp, 
1979), or the forms of knowledge espoused by the Expert’s Forum on Child Abuse 
(New Zealand Government, 2009) or the Green Paper Advisory Panels (OECD, 2016); 
but they dovetailed well with the Fifth National Government’s political rationality of 
social investment and, as Flyvbjerg (2003) argued, “Power procures the knowledge 
which supports its purposes, while it ignores or suppresses that knowledge which does 
not serve it” (p. 319). Considered in this way the PRM tools calculation of risk of 
maltreatment was also a calculation of future liability and the proposed intervention – 
based on the US Family Nurse Partnership17 scheme – a targeted investment in the 
 
17 It was not raised as an issue in the findings, however, the assumption that the US Family Nurse 
Partnership would have been an efficacious intervention in the context of Aotearoa New Zealand may 
have been flawed. A UK randomised control trial found no significant benefits because, “Unlike women 
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present to prevent future costs to the state. The actors who developed the prototype 
PRM proved to be amongst its most proactive spokespersons (Ritzer, 2004), actively 
intervening in news media – and in the academic literature – to promote its benefits, 
deflect criticism, and directly challenge government when its position moved from 
being pro-programme to anti-programme (Latour, 2013). They also advanced, the 
ethical argument that, “if we can, then we must”: an argument that highlighted the 
benefits of the PRM tool in terms of capturing children at risk in its net, whilst working 
hard to minimise the burdens of the PRM tool. These burdens included the loss of 
privacy and informed consent, a high proportion of false positives, the likelihood of 
labelling and stigmatisation, the potential damage to client and practitioner 
relationships, data discrimination flowing from the bias baked into the databases and the 
subsequent disproportionate burden on the poor and whānau Māori. In spite of an 
extensive ethical review recognising these burdens (Dare, 2013), government seemed 
set to continue trialling the PRM tool. As argued in chapter three, “consequentialism 
seems to be insensitive to issues of justice” (Moore, 1999, p. 66). 
 
When Minister Tolley closed down the prospective, observational study the reason 
given was that she did not accept the idea that it might identify children who were 
predicted to be at risk but take no action, even although that is a normal part of 
observational studies when the intervention is unproven. However, in another comment 
to the press, she revealed another reason:  
Where it goes from there is another big ethical question. Because God knows, do 
we really want people with clipboards knocking on people's doors and saying 
'hello, I'm from the Government, I'm here to help because your children are 
going to end up in prison?' I just can't see that happening. (Kirk, 2015) 
 What may be evident here is the contradiction that lay at the heart of the PRM tool 
project for the traditional values of a liberal-conservative party. The National Party was 
traditionally uncomfortable with social and moral reform, valued the family as the 
fundamental social unit and was the “the antithesis of radical change” (James, 2015, p. 
224). If Minister Bennett accepted the advice of data science experts that to achieve a 
reduction in child maltreatment it was necessary to take a detour from business as usual 
by using the PRM tool to surveil the whole population, then clearly Minister Tolley did 
not share that view18. For Foucault (1997) the challenge to liberal governments lay in 
finding ways to govern populations without governing too much, for Minister Tolley 
the proactive use of the PRM tool may indeed have seemed to be governing too much. 
There may well have been other motivations for the decision, including the potential 
impact on the middle-class voter base of the National Party (James, 2015) and concerns 
about the resources required to provide additional provision for the support of families, 
half of whom were likely to be false positives (Pierse, 2014). Had the proposal been to 
 
in the US settings in which the intervention originated, teenage mothers in England can access many 
statutory supportive health and social services…” Robling, et al. (2016, p. 152). 
 
18 Not that Minister Tolley was against reforming the child protection service. In fact, she announced 
a complete restructure of the Child Youth and Family Service in April 2015 to be led by yet another panel 
of “independent experts” (New Zealand Government, 2015). 
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surveil only the families of beneficiaries – the sample used in the retrospective, PRM 
prototype study (Vaithianathan, 2012) – the outcome may well have been different19. 
 
Social work and the datafication of social welfare 
 
 In chapter five I argued that, whilst the subject of this case study was the Vulnerable 
Kids’ Information System and the PRM tool, its object (Thomas; 2011a)  – what the 
case study is a case of – is an instance of a public sector project aimed at the 
datafication of child welfare services. Projects similar, but different, to ViKI and the 
PRM tool are increasingly reported in the international academic literature (Church & 
Fairchild, 2017; Jørgensen et al., 2021; Redden, 2020; Redden, Dencik & Warne, 2020; 
Teixeira & Boyas, 2017). These studies all have particular local features some of which 
were not the case in Aotearoa New Zealand – such as the involvement of commercial 
actors (Xantura, 2019) – but there are also striking similarities that raise common 
concerns about data justice and deliberative democracy. For example, Redden, Dencik 
and Warne (2020) state that “The lack of information publicly available about the 
systems makes it often near impossible to know how data systems are developed, 
implemented and used which in turn limits public debate and civil society involvement” 
(p.2). A study by Jørgensen et al., (2021) compared child welfare datafication initiatives 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Denmark and found several 
common themes: the child, rather than the family, was the central concern of the state; 
there was an emphasis on risky individuals and families rather than structural 
inequalities; a backdrop of economic constraint and austerity was perceived to drive the 
need for efficiencies; child welfare datafication was influenced by broader government-
wide datafication initiatives (such as the social investment strategy in Aotearoa New 
Zealand); and key actors (such as social workers and people with lived experience of 
child welfare) were excluded from deliberations about the developments. 
 
 Although the Fifth National Government’s trialling of predictive analytics was 
halted, and the current and Sixth Labour Government appears to be committed to 
tacking child poverty and addressing issues of wellbeing20, it is highly likely that the 
global shifts towards datafication will emerge in some other shape or form within child 
welfare or other social welfare services in Aotearoa New Zealand. Social work as a 
profession is committed to social justice but in the age of datafication, social justice has 
a new object of concern. Big data, machine learning and predictive analytics are 
increasingly implicated in decisions affecting the lives of poor and marginalised people 
(Eubanks, 2018b; Redden, 2018). There is a new and emerging data justice agenda 
(Dencik et al., 2019) associated with the datafication of social welfare: an agenda that 
includes issues such as data discrimination (Favaretto et al. 2019), data ethics 
(Richterich,2018), algorithmic governance (Katzenbach & Ulbricht, 2019), design 
justice (Costanza-Chock, 20020) and indigenous data rights (Kukatai & Taylor, 2016).  
 
 
19 Eubanks (2018b) recognised that the use of predictive tools tends to begin with disadvantaged and 
marginalised populations least able to resist or refuse their use. See also Redden (2018) on the harm that 
data do. 
20 Moore (2019) suggests that the difference in approach may not be as marked as it seems since the 
Labour government are still interested in collecting data to help them with ‘investing for social wellbeing’ 
(p.142). 
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 That social workers ought to be digitally literate is widely accepted (Taylor, 2017;  
Young et al., 2018; Zgoda, & Shane, 2018) as is the idea that there are ethical 
challenges in the use of technology by social workers (McAuliffe & Nipperess, 2017; 
Reamer, 2018) especially in relation to the use of social media (Boddy & Dominelli, 
2017; Cooner et al., 2020). However, the idea of data justice is only beginning to 
emerge in the social work literature. McNutt (2019) has signalled that data justice 
concerns the impact of datafication on poor and marginalised communities and “extends 
the social work profession’s traditional concerns for the disadvantaged, the 
downtrodden, and the dispossessed” (p. 285); and Goldkind et al. (2018) have called for 
“data justice…to be integrated in human services professional development, social work 
education and practice” (p. 177).  
 
 However, the data justice movement is proliferating outside of social work circles, 
and there are several progressive initiatives – inside computer science, data science and 
digital activism – that are inspired by ideas that also inform social work practice: 
including the idea of anti-oppressive design (Green, 2020; Smyth & Dimond, 2014) and 
the “nothing about us without us” movement (Costanza-Chok, 2020). Social workers, 
and social work researchers, do not need to become data scientists to engage with data 
justice issues, but they do need to have a grasp of the potential and limitations of data 
science and a commitment to submitting initiatives to open, democratic scrutiny from an 
anti-oppressive perspective. Working in partnership with data scientists who are 
committed to social justice would be a good place for social workers to start. As Green 
(2020) argues, from the standpoint of a data scientist committed to social justice, “The 
task of data science is not to eradicate social challenges on their own, but to act as 
thoughtful and productive partners in broad coalitions and social movements striving 




Completing this case study affirmed several of the research design choices made. 
Foucault’s governmentality framework, blended with concepts from actor-network 
theory, proved to be immensely helpful in providing the analytical tools to track the rise 
and fall of the PRM tool. The use of a narrative approach to data analysis, especially the 
analysis of enthymemes, was invaluable in “making politics visible” (Bacchi, 2012). 
The study also affirmed the value of Feenberg’s (2019) distinction between instrumental 
and democratic rationalities, and Winner’s (1980) contention that technologies have 
politics. The case study is a contribution to growing international interest in the 
datafication of child welfare and social welfare services more broadly (Jørgensen et al., 
2021; Redden, 202; and Redden, Dencik & Warne, 2020). It also contributes to 
emerging concerns about data justice especially the impact of datafication on the poor 
and the marginalised.  
 
Many of the problems and issues with datafication are well known, research efforts 
must turn to finding solutions. We need to know and learn from the impact of current 
data justice initiatives globally, initiatives like the Data Justice Lab21 and the Design 





how to amplify the work of organisations like Te Mana Raraunga on establishing 
principles of Māori Data sovereignty.23 We also need research to define the role of 
social workers in data justice advocacy and to identify the implications for social work 
education and professional development. The emphasis here is not on the digital literacy 
of social workers, or on their understanding of the ethical issues associated with 
technology use (important as these are). In the domain of data justice the concern for 
social workers is with their capability to promote the “empowerment and liberation” 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
 
List of self-instructions 
 
1. Explain the purpose and nature of the study to the informant, telling how s/he came 
to be selected. 
2. Assure the informant that their identity will be made confidential in any written 
report associated with the study, and that her/his responses will be held in strictest 
confidence. 
3. Explain that the interview is intended to be informal and conversational in nature.  
4. During the interview the informant should feel free to interrupt, seek clarification or 
criticise a line of questioning and so on. 
5. Tell the informant something about your self – background, training, interest in the 
area of enquiry and so on. 
6. Ask for permission to record the session and explain what will happen to the 
recordings. 
Topics to be included  
The interview is intended to be conversational in style, allowing participants to offer 
a narrative account of their involvement in the policy process and to comment on the 
development of the Vulnerable Kids’ Information System. The precise phrasing of 
the questions and the order in which they are asked is not important, but ensure that 
information is gathered in relation to each of the topics below. 
 
Part 1: Background to your involvement in the policy process 
 
1. Can you tell me how you came to be involved in the Frontline Panel/Scientific Panel 
for the Green Paper? 
 
2. In what ways did the work of the Frontline Panel/Scientific Panel influence the 
eventual content of the Green Paper? 
 
3. Can you see the influence of the work of the Frontline Panel/Scientific Panel on the 
White Paper? If so, in what way? If not, why not? 
 
Part 2: Significant influences on the development of the ViKI 
 
1. As you know I’m interested in hearing your views on the Vulnerable Kids’ 
Information System (ViKI) and the policy that underpins it.  As someone who 
contributed to the development of the Green Paper can you tell me how the 
proposals for ViKI connect with the issues raised by the Frontline Panel/Scientific 
Panel? 
 
2. What do you think were most significant influences that led to the White Paper 




3. If we take each influence in turn can you tell something about what each one 
contributed to shaping the White Paper proposals for ViKI? 
 
 
4. In the development of policy processes different influences sometimes combine so 
shape policy outcomes. Did the influences you identified combine in any way to 
shape the development of ViKI? If so, how did they combine? 
 
Part 3: The design of the system 
Turning now to ViKI itself 
 
1. How would you describe the overall purpose of ViKI? 
 
2. The White Paper described ViKI as comprising of two component parts: 
a. An Information-Sharing Platform where frontline professionals from 
different agencies can record and share concerns about children 
b. A Predictive Risk Modelling Tool designed to assess the risk of child 
maltreatment. 
 
3. Considering these two different parts of the system: Why do you think the 
Information-Sharing Platform has been proposed?  
 
4. How would you describe the main purpose of the Information-Sharing 
Platform? 
 
5. Considering these two different parts of the system: Why do you think the 
Predictive Risk Modelling Tool has been proposed? 
 
6. How would you describe the main purpose of the Predictive Risk Modelling 
Tool? 
 
7. How do you think these two different parts of ViKI will work together to 
achieve the overall purpose of ViKI? 
Part 4: Future challenges and issues 
 
I’d like to turn now to the future development of system and the challenges that you 
think lie ahead. 
 
1. What obstacles might block the successful implementation of the system? (for 
example, obstacles might include social, political, technical, economic or legal 
factors) 
 
2. How should these obstacles be responded to? 
 
3. In your view, are there particular limitations inherent in the current design of the 
system? 
 
4. How could those limitations be addressed? 
 115 
 
5. What unintended consequences might emerge as a result of the introduction of 
the proposed system? 
 




7. What do you consider to be the main ethical issues associated with the 
implementation of the system? 
 
8. How should these ethical issues be responded to? 
 
9. I’d like to end by asking you to tell me something about what you think are the 
lessons that might be learned from the development of this system, or from your 
knowledge of the development of similar systems. 
 
10. Are there any other comments you would like to make about ViKI? 
 
Thank you very much for giving me your time today. 
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Appendix 3: News Media Article Descriptions 
 
NEWS_01 Trevett, C. (2012, Oct 11). Govt Database to Track 30,000 At-Risk Kids. 
 
At almost 2,000 words in length, NEWS_01 is the second most substantial of the six 
articles reviewed and the first to comment on the newly released White Paper. The 
journalist Claire Trevett (the New Zealand Herald’s deputy political editor) cites 
comments made by seven different actors including: Minister Paula Bennett, Jacinda 
Ardern (then Labour's social development spokeswoman), Metiria Turei (Green Party 
co-leader), Liz Gibbs (Chief Executive of Save the Children), Barbara Lambourn 
(Unicef's national advocacy manager), Deborah Morris-Travers (Manager of Every 
Child Counts) and Rhema Vaithianathan (the Associate Professor from the University of 
Auckland who led the team that designed the prototype predictive risk modelling tool).  
 
NEWS_02 Collins, S. (2012, October 13). Economists Maths aim to Forecast 
Which Children will be Abused. 
 
 NEWS_02 is 512 words in length and in it Simon Collins (the New Zealand Herald 
social issues editor) counterposes two expert views on the use of the predictive risk 
modelling tool: the views of  Rhema Vaithianathan (the Associate Professor from the 
University of Auckland who led the team that designed the predictive risk modelling 
tool); and the views of Professor David Fergusson (Director of the Christchurch Health 
and Development Study at the University of Otago). Whilst Vaithianathan argues for the 
value of the predictive risk modelling tool and advocates its introduction within the 
year, Fergusson recommends a more cautious and considered approach to avoid 
unintended consequences. 
 
NEWS_03: APNZ (2012, October 14). NZ Has 'Underlying Current of Violence 
Towards Children': Paula Bennett. 
 
In this short (332 words) article, attributed to Associated Press New Zealand (APNZ), 
Minister Bennet reiterates some facts about the proposed database and advances another 
argument – three days after the previous argument – directed at the perspective of 
opposition ministers Jacinda Ardern (Labour) and Metiria Turei (Greens) that, “poverty 
was the most significant factor in child abuse”. 
 
NEWS_04: Misa, T. (2012, October 15). Tapu Misa: Child Abuse Plan Shows a 
Lack of Vision.  
 
This article is a 752-word opinion editorial by the freelance journalist Tapu Misa. 
Analysis identified two main stories one of which critiques the “Government's apparent 
determination to downplay the role of poverty” and the other focusing on the folly of 
offering services targeted at particular population groups like vulnerable children, rather 
than on universal services. To support her arguments Misa refers to several sources: 
Minister Bennett, an “OECD report” (Berger & Waldfogel, 2011), Barbara Lambourn of 
Unicef, the Child Poverty Action Group (2012), the “Expert Advisory Group”, the 
“UK's 2010 Marmot Review”, “Stephen Kidd, an expatriate Kiwi and social policy 
specialist working in Britain” and Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen. 
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NEWS_05: New Zealand Herald (2012, October 20). Predicting Trouble: Child 
Abuse Database Raises Eyebrows  
 
The fifth article in the sample from 2012 is, at 2,493 words long, the longest by far and 
was written by Simon Collins nine days after the release of the White Paper. The angle 
of the article, highlighted in its title, is about the “surprise and alarm” of several key 
policy actors with the main protagonist being Dr. Patrick Kelly who is described as 
“head of the country's main child abuse unit at Auckland's Starship Children's Hospital” 
and is identified as having been part of a 2009 Experts’ Forum on Child Abuse. The 
article includes comments from a number of “critics” including Lucy Sandford-Reed 
(Chief Executive of the Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers), 
Professor Eileen Munro (a UK academic who led a review of England's child protection 
system for the British Government) and Dr. Barry Blundell (senior lecturer in 
computing at Auckland University of Technology). It also includes a number of 
commentators identified as “the defence”: Dr. Emma Davies (Auckland University of 
Technology), Garry Collin (Chair of Family Law at the Law Society), Dr. Ian Hyslop 
(Lecturer at UNITEC), Dr. Irene de Haan (Lecturer at the University of Auckland and 
also a member of the PRM development group), Jacinda Ardern (Labour Party welfare 
spokeswoman), Metiria Turei (Greens co-leader) and Dr. Cindy Kiro (Former Children's 
Commissioner). The comments included from “the defence” tend to be very brief 
statements arguing that sharing information is, generally speaking, a good thing. Kiro 
and De Haan both make explicit reference to the potential benefits of the predictive risk 
modelling tool with De Haan arguing that it could help focus resources on “at-risk 
families before any abuse occurs.”  
 
NEWS_06: Dare, T. (2012, October 25). Abuse Prediction Tool too Vital to Ignore. 
New Zealand Herald 
 
The last of the 2012 articles is a 772-word opinion editorial by Tim Dare, an Associate 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland and the ethicist who was part of 
the team that developed the prototype PRM tool. The article argues that the benefits of 
the predictive risk modelling tool considerably outweigh any concerns about its 
implementation.  
 
NEWS_07: Collins, S. (2015, May 21). CYF in Child Abuse Predictor Trials  
 
The first of the 2015 articles is a 656-word article by Simon Collins of the NZ Herald. 
The article is, in essence, an announcement by the MSD that the predictive risk 
modelling tool will be subject to a trial using historical case records held by the Child, 
Youth and Family’s Auckland call-centre. The article includes statements in support of 
this cautious trial of the predictive risk modelling tool by Dorothy Adams (MSD Acting 
Deputy Chief Executive). And, in contrast, it includes arguments for a more proactive, 
trial of the PRM tool on the whole population made by the AUT University health 
economist Rhema Vaithianathan (who was on the team who developed the prototype 
PRM tool). The article also makes brief references to two more cautious, academic 
voices: the Australian researcher Philip Gillingham who published an article critiquing 
the data on which the model was based, and David Fergusson Professor at the 
University of Otago who welcomes the predictive power of the PRM but warns that, 
“…it needed much more careful research to fine-tune it”. 
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NEWS_08: Jones, N. (2015, July 30). Anne Tolley Scraps 'Lab Rat' Study on 
Children 
 
This 740-word article is by Nicholas Jones a New Zealand Herald political reporter. It 
announces that Anne Tolley (the new Minister for Social Development)24 had stopped a 
prospective, observational study to test the efficacy of the predictive risk modelling tool 
proposed by the Ministry for Social Development. The story includes the dramatic 
statement that “infants would not be treated as ‘lab rats’ under her watch”. It is noted 
that “Ms Tolley said the papers came to her late last year as the incoming Minister” yet 
there is no explanation as to why the news waited eight months before its release. The 
story includes an image of an official document describing the study where the Minister 
has written “Not on my watch!”. 
 
NEWS_09: Dominion Post (2015, July 30). Editorial: Children not to be 'Lab Rats' 
in Fight Against Abuse  
 
This 488-word editorial appeared in the Dominion Post. It replicates most of the 
information in NEWS_08, with a difference, there is a stronger focus on the idea that 
the prospective, observational study entailed knowing children were being abused and 
not intervening. Other “sensible” reforms sponsored by Minister Tolley are contrasted 
with the “irresponsible” use of PRM tool. 
 
News_10: Dare, T. (2015, August 4). Anne Tolley's 'Lab Rats' Call Inflammatory 
Political Rhetoric 
 
In this 732-word opinion editorial, published in the Dominion Post, Tim Dare, Associate 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland and the ethicist who was part of 
the original PRM prototype team, argues that the intervention by Minister Tolley to 
close down the proposed, observational study of the PRM was an example of politics 




24 Anne Tolley replaced Paula Bennett as the Minister for Social Development following the general 
election in September 2014. The election saw the continuation of the National led government (in power 
since 2008). Anne Tolley was formerly Minister of Police and Minister of Corrections. Paula Bennett 
moved into the role of Minister of State Services. 
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Appendix 4 Actors, Attitudes, Enthymemes, Syllogisms and the Issues Explored 
 







ENTHYMEMES AND SYLLOGISMS KEY ISSUES 
2012 
NEWS_01 Story 1.1: 






Anti Enthymeme 1.1.1. Poverty is the most significant factor in child abuse. The 
government’s White Paper does not address child poverty. THEREFORE, THE 





Pro Enthymeme 1.1.2. It is morally wrong to use poverty as an excuse for child abuse. 
LABOUR AND THE GREENS USE POVERTY AS AN EXCUSE FOR CHILD 
ABUSE. THEREFORE, LABOUR AND THE GREENS ARE MORALLY 
WRONG. 
Poverty 
Story 1.2:  






Pro Enthymeme 1.2.1. In cases like Nia Glassie’s different agencies held a little piece of 
information but did not share it. If agencies shared information it could have helped 
prevent the death of Nia Glassie. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S PLANS 






Pro Enthymeme 1.2.2. Some people consider the database to be intrusive into the 
privacy of families. However, by enabling better information sharing, the database 
might help to prevent child homicides. THEREFORE, THE ENDS JUSTIFIES THE 








Pro Syllogism 1.3.1. The automatic predictive risk modelling tool may identify some 
children as being at risk who turn out not to be at risk. However, no response will be 
activated unless a professional decides to do so. Therefore, children will not be 
stigmatised or worked with unnecessarily. 
Stigma 








Pro Enthymeme 2.1.1. The predictions based on the predictive risk modelling tool are 
not certain but are similar to the predictive strength of mammograms. 
MAMMOGRAMS ARE AN ACCEPTED TECHNOLOGY USED TO PREVENT 
SERIOUS RISK OF HARM. THEREFORE, THE PREDICTIVE RISK 
MODELLING TOOL SHOULD BE INTRODUCED TO PREVENT SERIOUS 








Cautious Enthymeme 2.2.1. BEING WRONGLY IDENTIFIED AS A POTENTIAL CHILD 
ABUSER LABELS AND STIGMATISES PEOPLE. THE PREDICTIVE RISK 













Cautious Enthymeme 2.2.2. THE CORRECT WAY TO IMPLEMENT NEW 
INTERVENTIONS THAT HAVE RISKS IS TO CONDUCT PILOT STUDIES 
AND RANDOMISED CONTROL TRIALS. The predictive risk modelling tool is a 
new intervention that is associated with significant risks. Therefore, the method 
should be carefully tested with pilot studies and randomized control trials before 
being widely implemented. 
Benefits and 
risks 
NEWS_03 Story 3.1: It is 
“too simplistic” 
to blame 






Pro Enthymeme 3.1.1. Child maltreatment is a complex problem involving over 100 
different factors, one of which may be poverty. Jacinda Ardern (Labour) and Metiria 
Turei (Green Party) argue that poverty is the most significant factor in child 
maltreatment. THEREFORE, THE ARGUMENTS PROPOSED BY JACINDA 
ARDERN AND METIRIA TUREI ARE TOO SIMPLISTIC. 
 
Poverty 
NEWS_04 Story 4.1: 
Downplaying 





Anti Enthymeme 4.1.1. It is not possible to tackle child maltreatment effectively without 
acknowledging its strong association with poverty and inequality. The government’s 
White Paper downplays the association between poverty and inequality. 
THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENTS WHITE PAPER CANNOT EFFECTIVELY 




misses the mark 
Tapu Misa: 
(Journalist) 
Anti Enthymeme 4.2.1. Targeting services on vulnerable people can have unintended 
consequences such as creating a ‘poverty trap’, stigmatising services and 
humiliating service users. The government’s plans for children’s services propose 
targeting services on vulnerable children. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S 
PROPOSALS RISK CREATING A ‘POVERTY TRAP’, STIGMATISING 





Anti Enthymeme 4.2.2. Providing universal services is more effective because they avoid 
the unintended effects of targeting and have the additional benefits of building 
community and promoting social cohesion. THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS 
DO NOT PROVIDE UNIVERSAL SERVICES. THEREFORE, THE 
GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS MISS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD 
COMMUNITY AND PROMOTE SOCIAL COHESION. 
Universal 
services 
NEWS_5 Story 5.1: 







Anti Enthymeme 5.1.1. WHEN PEOPLE REGARDED AS EXPERTS IN THEIR FIELD 
ARE SURPRISED OR ALARMED AT PROPOSED GOVERNMENT POLICY 
CHANGES IT INDICATES THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG. Dr Patrick Kelly 
(an acknowledged child protection expert) is surprised and alarmed at government’s 
plans for a revolutionary new "predictive risk model". THEREFORE, 





Story 5.2: The 






Anti Enthymeme 5.2.1. Introducing untested revolutionary change is uncertain of 
success and can disrupt existing practices. The government’s proposed new 
"predictive risk model" is an untested and revolutionary change. THEREFORE, 
THE PREDICTIVE RISK MODEL IS UNCERTAIN OF SUCCESS AND MAY 
DISRUPT EXISTING PRACTICES. 
Benefits and 
risks 
Story 5.3: A 
new database 






Anti Enthymeme 5.3.1. It is possible to encourage interprofessional information sharing 
without investing public funds in expensive information technology. THE 
GOVERNMENT PLANS TO INVEST IN AN EXPENSIVE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO 












Anti Enthymeme 5.4.1. Relying on a computer model can creates lots of false negatives 
and false positives. The uncertainty created by false positives and false negatives 
can undermine professional judgement and create unnecessary stress that leads to 
risk for children. THEREFORE, THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PREDICTIVE 
RISK MODELLING TOOL WILL UNDERMINE PROFESSIONAL 













Anti Enthymeme 5.5.1. Intervening with families who have been falsely identified as 
being likely to maltreat their children can only be justified if no harm will result 
from the intervention. The government does not know whether harm will result 
from these interventions. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS 
TO INTERVENE IS NOT JUSTIFIED. 
Benefits and 
risks 
NEWS_6 Story 6.1: 
Abuse 
prediction tool 





Pro Enthymeme 6.1.1. A number of people have been critical of the government’s plans 
to introduce a predictive risk modelling tool for child maltreatment. These 
objections are either ill-founded or describe issues that are possible to manage. 
THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE THE 




NEWS_7 Story 7.1: 
Evaluating the 




making on cases 
notified to CYF 
Dorothy 
Adams (MSD) 
Cautious Enthymeme 7.1.1. TRAINING SOCIAL WORKERS IN HOW TO USE THE PRM 
MAY LEAD TO BETTER DECISION-MAKING AND AVOID UNINTENDED 
OUTCOMES. MSD and CYF plan to evaluate the effect of training social workers 
in how to use the PRM to screen notified cases. THEREFORE, MSD AND CYF 










Pro Enthymeme 7.2.1. Proactive use of the predictive risk modelling tool, developed in 




proactive use of 





been abused. Unlike Pittsburgh in the USA, the New Zealand government are not 
trialling proactive use of the PRM. THEREFORE, THE NEW ZEALAND 
GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ACHIEVE THE REAL BENEFITS OF A 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED BY NEW ZEALAND EXPERTS. 
NEWS_8 Story 8.1: Not 
on my watch, 





Anti Enthymeme 8.1.1. A RESPONSIBLE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ENSURES THAT THEIR OFFICIALS DON’T TAKE ACTIONS THAT ARE 
UNETHICAL AND NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Minister Tolley acted to 
prevent an unethical proposal by MSD officials. THEREFORE, MINISTER 












Cautious Enthymeme 8.2.1. TESTING THE PREDICTIVE RISK MODELLING TOOL 
WITH HISTORICAL DATA IS MORE ETHICAL AND SAFER THAN TESTING 
IT WITH LIVE DATA. The MSD are testing the predictive risk modelling tool with 






use of the PRM 




Anti Enthymeme 8.3.1. POLICIES THAT LEAD TO UNNECESSARY STATE 
INTERVENTION IN PRIVATE FAMILY LIFE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED. 
Using the PRM to screen the whole population of newborn children will lead to 
unnecessary state intervention in private family life. THEREFORE, THE PRM 














Neutral Enthymeme 8.4.1. IF MINISTER BENNET WAS AWARE OF THIS PROPOSAL 
SHE MUST HAVE SUPPORTED IT. Minister Bennett was not aware of this 
proposal. THEREFORE, WE CANNOT ASSUME THAT SHE SUPPORTED IT. 
 
Minister Bennett 
Story 9.1: No 
sane politician 




Anti Enthymeme 9.1.1. Conducting an observational study that would not intervene if 
children were identified as being at high risk of abuse is unethical. MSD officials 









Anti Enthymeme 9.2.1. Tackling child abuse and neglect is a difficult domain and 
sensible reforms require a careful balancing act between the rights of parents and 
children. MINISTER TOLLEY’S PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 













Anti Enthymeme 9.2.2. Tackling child abuse and neglect is a difficult domain and 
sensible reforms require a careful balancing act between the rights of parents and 
children. THE MSD OFFICAL’S PROPOSED OBSERVATIONAL STUDY DOES 





NEWS_10 Story 10.1:  
Science collided 
with politics, 




Pro Enthymeme 10.1.1. WHEN POLITICIANS INTERVENE TO PREVENT 
SCIENTIFIC STUDIES FOR NO GOOD REASON, WE SHOULD FEEL 
UNEASY. Minister Tolley intervened to prevent a scientific study for no good 











Pro Enthymeme 10.2.1. A GENUINE RESEARCH-DRIVEN APPROACH TO 
SOCIAL POLICY MAKING NEEDS POLICY ACTORS, LIKE THE 
OPPOSITION AND THE MEDIA, TO CHALLENGE MISLEADING 
INFORMATION AND POLITICAL RHETORIC USED BY GOVERNMENT. 
Policy actors failed to challenge Minister Tolley. Therefore, we should be worried 





Appendix 5: Extract from Radio New Zealand programme 
 
Extract from transcript of: Cowie, T. (2015, June 21). Child abuse or Big Brother? [Radio 




Teresa Cowie: In the three years since the research began, the Ministry’s been fairly cagy 
about its progress. Uploading the research documents quietly onto its website only after I 
requested them in May.  
Dorothy Adams: We are trying to be as transparent as we can. We’ll happily do radio 
interviews, we are publishing everything we’re doing, so that, and some of it is very technical 
but, so that if people want to interact with it and understand what we’re doing they can.  
Teresa Cowie: Documents…there was really an announcement that they were put on your 
website and a couple of academics I’ve spoken to have said that they have been wondering 
where is this research, it’s been going on for four/five years.  
Dorothy Adams: And they didn’t know about it?  
Teresa Cowie: They were saying it didn’t feel like there was a real flow of information, so 
have you been holding back… 
Dorothy Adams: Look, I’ll be honest, we were… 
Teresa Cowie: …have you been worried about the public perception of it? 
Dorothy Adams: No. Look, we were slow to release them, I know that. But we did let a 
very wide group of people know that we have released them, but no we are definitely trying 
to be transparent in what we’re doing, yep.  
 
 
 
